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1. Introduction 
 
 
This work studies the nexus of German banking and foreign trade development in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is designed and structured as three independent but 
interrelated articles linked by the study of trade finance in historical perspective. The first article 
analyzes and compares the role of foreign banks, focusing on geographical banking penetration 
in the German and British world trade dynamics from 1880 to 1913. The second part 
investigates how the connection between the German export sector and the first German banks 
in Argentina influenced the development of German exports to Argentina between 1875 and 
1913. The third article provides a micro perspective of trade finance, analyzing how the 
provision of credit of German banks in Brazil affected the performance of Brazilian coffee 
export houses between 1880 and 1913. 
 
From the early 1870s Germany experienced a period of accelerated economic growth and 
expansion. In 1871, political unification was achieved and the German Empire was founded. 
As a result of an intensive process of industrialization and the development of domestic 
markets, the German economy was in a position to expand beyond national frontiers. The home 
market had become too limited to provide the increasing needs of the German population and 
industries for commodities, raw materials and capital goods. Thus, the exploration of new 
markets became a necessity (Hurley, 1914, 18, and Forbes, 1978, 384-85). The major global 
player in foreign trade at that time was Great Britain. Yet, German commerce grew 
considerably faster, and as Great Britain`s share in world trade gradually diminished, Germany 
gained in dominance. By the turn of the century, Germany had become Great Britain`s most 
important competitor in world trade markets (see Table 1 and Figure 1 section 2.4). The 
principal requirement that was defined as indispensable to guarantee the successful expansion 
of German foreign trade from a financial perspective was independence from British trade 
finance (Hauser, 1906). At that time, London was the “clearing house” of international 
payments and the center of trade finance. German industrial and commercial interests in foreign 
countries had to rely nearly entirely on the intermediary of English banks (Hauser, 1906, 
Frankfurter Zeitung, 1915, Einzig, 1931). The solution was seen in creating an independent, 
global network of German financial institutions; the first German foreign banks 
(Auslandsbanken) (Hauser, 1906, Riesser and Jacobs, 1911, and Young, 1991). 
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The first article of this work studies the capacity of foreign banks to promote trade by providing 
financial assistance abroad. It argues that the Auslandsbanken were key factors in the dynamics 
of German trade expansion, and moreover played a more pivotal role in the establishment of 
external trade than the British banks. The particularity of German foreign banking seems to 
have been the concentration of activities primarily in those markets where German trade was 
only marginally developed. This contrasts with the banking dynamics of Great Britain. The 
qualitative evidence suggests that British banking internationalization in the second half of the 
nineteenth century was motivated by a ´gravitational pull effect´, emerging from increasing 
trade and investments in the overseas settlements (Jones, 1993, Battilossi, 2006). Using a novel 
data set on German and British bilateral trade and foreign banks on a global scale between 1881 
and 1913, the first chapter analyzes and compares the development of international commerce 
and finance of the two nations. Furthermore, using an augmented gravity model of trade, it 
empirically studies the nexus of German and British world exports and geographic banking 
penetration. The results suggest a positive and significant correlation between the number of 
German banks in and exports to a country. In particular, the impact of bank presence seems to 
be more significant in 1881 than in 1913, affirming the central idea of banks as initiators of 
trade. In contrast, the results do not confirm such a relation between British foreign bank and 
export development. With the aim to establish a causal chain between banking 
internationalization and trade development, I additionally investigate, using a probit regression, 
the reasons why German banks entered a certain country. The results show that German foreign 
banks were more likely to position themselves in markets where German exports were only 
marginally developed in the years previous to bank entry. 
 
One of the principal destinations of German foreign trade in the nineteenth centuries was the 
emerging economies of Latin America, particularly the three largest, most economically 
developed and politically stable republics: Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Between 1880 and 
1913, German trade with South America grew on average by 9.2 per cent, increasing its share 
of total German trade from nearly two to almost ten per cent. This accelerated expansion did 
not only challenge British dominance in these markets, but also outperformed the other leading 
economies and competitors of Germany. In 1874, the German share in Argentine imports was 
four per cent, ranking the country fifth among the main Argentine trading partners behind the 
United Kingdom, France, the USA, and Italy. By the turn of the century, Germany had become 
Argentina’s second most important trading partner following Great Britain (see section 3.4).  
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The aim of the second article is to identify and analyze the determinants of the success of 
German exports in comparison with the exports of other leading industrial economies to 
Argentina between 1875 and 1913. Concretely, it concentrates on the effect of German bank 
entry. The major hypothesis is that German export companies connected to German banks 
operating in Argentina benefited from relatively easier access to financial support and 
privileged information in the Argentine market; in other words, a reduction of transaction costs 
and information asymmetry. As a result, Germany exported more of those products that were 
exported by one or more companies connected to the banks. I create a novel dataset containing 
disaggregated Argentine imports and the connections between German banks in Argentina and 
German export companies for the period 1875 - 1913. First, I use an augmented gravity model 
to define the major determinants of exports and the extensive and intensive margins of 
Argentina’s trading partners, and find that Germany’s success can be attributed primarily to 
higher productivity and export intensification, especially when it comes to the export of high 
skill products. Second, I use a difference-in-difference approach to estimate the effect of 
German bank entry on German exports to Argentina between 1875 and 1912. The results 
confirm the initial hypothesis and show a positive and significant impact of German bank 
presence on exports of the products exported by bank-connected companies.  
 
In 1888, one of the first German overseas banks the Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland 
opened its first branch in Rio de Janeiro. One of the principal purposes of the bank was to 
engage in the financing of Brazilian coffee exports (Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland, 1912 
4). At that time, Brazil was the world`s leading producer and exporter of coffee and Germany 
was the second most important importer, behind the USA, and the hub for European coffee 
imports. The demand for credit grew over time as exporters´ ability to assure the availability of 
trade finance defined their competitiveness and they became increasingly involved in upstream 
activities such as storage and packing (Krause, 2004 144ff, Rieschbieter, 2011 42ff).  
 
The aim of the third article is to empirically address the questions whether the Brasilianische’s 
entry contributed to easing firms’ credit constraints in the coffee market, and how its entry 
affected the export performance of financed coffee export houses. I create an original and 
unique data set on the yearly quantities of coffee exported and the credit received from the 
Brasilianische by 389 export houses in Rio and 152 in Santos for the period 1880-1913. The 
results of a difference-in-difference model confirm the idea that the companies that obtained 
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the Brasilianische’s credits performed significantly better than their counterparts. Moreover, 
the results suggest that companies that received credit more frequently performed better. 
Preliminary logit analysis testing the influence of companies’ heterogeneity on their changes in 
receiving a credit show that though larger companies were more likely to be supported by the 
bank, the major focus of the bank’s credit policy was on young companies. This provides strong 
evidence that the Brasilianische Bank contributed to ease the credit constraints of new entrants. 
Most interestingly, the results affirm the idea that the bank channelled credit to export houses 
of German origin and / or companies exporting to Germany. This, on one hand, suggests that 
previous to the bank´s entry, German companies had suffered from credit constraints. On the 
other hand, it confirms the idea of the significant role of the bank in promoting trade between 
Brazil and Germany. 
 
Contributions 
 
This work contributes to two major literatures. First, it enters the ongoing debate on the nexus 
between trade and finance, from both, macro- and microeconomic perspectives. Analyzing 
German and British foreign bank and trade dynamics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, I contribute to the literature on the determinants of banking internationalization 
(Buch,1999) and provide quantitative evidence of the relation between foreign banking 
penetration and export developments. My findings support the idea that the significance of such 
a relation depends on a country´s market share, suggesting a positive effect of banks on trade 
in the case of late-comer economies (Germany), whereas such an effect is absent in the case of 
established economies (Great Britain). Though there are several studies on 19th century 
German and British banking and trade development (see Hoffmann, 1964, Platt, 1968, 
Fremdling et at, 1978, Neuburger and Stokes, 1979, Pohl, 1987, Born, 1992, Bulmer-Thomas, 
1998, Briones and Villela, 2006), analysis of the foreign banking – export nexus seems to be 
left beyond the scope of existing research. My analysis provides the first empirical confirmation 
of contemporaneous qualitative studies, which claimed that German trade expansion was 
facilitated by German foreign banks (Hauser, 1901, Riesser and Jacobson, 1911, Strasser, 
1924).  
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I widen the perspective by establishing a connection between German foreign banks and the 
German export sector. Studies on the connection between banks and firms suggest that 
companies facing liquidity constraints are more likely to enter a close relationship with banks 
(Mizruchi and Stearns, 1988) and that companies connected to banks benefit from easier access 
to capital (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985). On the other hand, studies have shown that a close 
relation between German banks and industrial firms was crucial in the economic development 
of industrializing Germany (Lough, 1915, Gerschenkron, 1962, Da rin and Hellmann, 2002). 
Literature on German foreign banking history suggests that this relation was maintained in 
foreign markets as well, yet fails to provide evidence (Hauser, 1901, Strasser, 1924). This study 
provides first empirical evidence on the link between export companies and German foreign 
banks and on the positive effect of this link on German export performance.  
 
From a microeconomic perspective, this study contributes to the strand of literature that focuses 
on the impact of credit availability on the performance of export companies (see e.g. Chaney, 
2005, Minetti & Zhu 2011, Manova, 2008 and 2013, Wang 2015). My findings empirically 
confirm that foreign bank entry eases credit constraints for exporters and thereby improves their 
performance. In particular, I show that German banks eased the credit constraints of German 
companies and companies involved with German trade.  
 
Finally, this work addresses the literature on the determinants of trade developments (e.g. 
Hummels and Klenow, 2005, Huberman et al, 2015). Emphasizing the competition between the 
leading economies in an emerging market during the first globalization, I show that the key 
drivers of export expansion were a country`s relative productivity, its capacity to increase its 
intensive margins of trade, and the presence of financial institutions. 
 
Limitations 
 
Of course, this work has its limitations. Such limitations, however, pave the way for future 
research. Firstly, the comparison between late-comers and established economies is based on 
contrasting the development of German and British foreign bank and trade dynamics. The 
results however, might not be representative for a larger sample of countries. The research also 
lacks the data on the banks’ heterogeneity. Hence, future research may widen the sample of 
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countries and include more detailed information on bank characteristics. One useful next step 
would be to consider the importance of a bank’s size.  
 
Another issue is establishing causality between bank presence and trade developments. Though 
I provide empirical evidence that German foreign banks were more likely to position 
themselves in markets where German exports were only marginally developed in the years 
previous to bank entry, the findings could be strengthened by applying an appropriate 
instrumental variable.  
 
Thirdly, the analysis of the connection between banks and export companies would improve by 
including the connection between German foreign banks and their mother institutions. I have 
shown that the foreign banks were closely connected to their mother institutions, much of the 
time sharing the same management. The mother institutions, in turn, were closely connected to 
industrial firms in Germany. This indirect connection might have also influenced the export 
performance of certain industries.  
 
Finally, my analysis on the effect of German bank entry on German exports to Argentina does 
not include the possible influence of other financial institutions; whether they be local or of a 
nationality other than German. We cannot totally be sure that companies not connected to banks 
did not receive any financial and informational support from alternative sources. My approach, 
however, is justified, as equally bank-connected companies had access to all sources of finance. 
Hence, the objective of the study is to show the effect of creating privileged access to financial 
and informational support in the target market. This includes privileged access in comparison 
to those companies that did not possess such access, as well as to those that did possess the 
same and alternative sources of finance. The same logic applies to the case of the financing of 
coffee export houses in Brazil. Future research, however, would benefit from including the 
information of the financial support from other institutions. A start could be the consideration 
of British banks. 
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2. Essay 1: Banks and trade, is there a link? – A comparative, empirical analysis of 
German and British global foreign banking and trade development, 1881-1913 
2.1. Introduction 
Having previously completed an intensive process of industrialization, in the late 1870s the 
now fully developed German economy began to expand beyond national frontiers. Effectively, 
it had become necessary for German commerce and industry to overcome the limitations of the 
supply of commodities, raw materials and capital goods afforded by the home market (Hurley, 
1911 18, and Forbes, 1978 384-85). The major global player in foreign trade at that time was 
Great Britain. Yet, since the 1880s Germany had been expanding its foreign commercial 
relations constantly, challenging British hegemony intensively. In the period between 1881 and 
1913, the compound growth rate of German trade was 4.4 per cent, whereas British exports 
only grew by 2.4 per cent (see Appendix A – Sources). Indeed, by the turn of the century, 
Germany had become Great Britain`s most important competitor in the world trade markets1. 
 
The subject of this study is to examine and illustrate the role of German and British banks in 
the development of German and British trade in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. It argues that the rapid and successful expansion of German trade in the international 
markets from the 1870s was facilitated by the establishment of the first Auslandsbanken 
(foreign banks), able to meet the informational and financial need of the foreign commerce 
sector. The particularity of German foreign banking seems to have been the concentration of 
activities primarily in those markets where German trade was only marginally developed. This 
contrasts with the banking dynamics of economies that by that time already had established 
themselves in the international commercial markets, such as Great Britain (see e.g. Hauser, 
1906, Whale, 1930). The qualitative evidence suggests that the internationalization of British 
banking in the 1860s and 1870s was rather motivated by a ´gravitational pull effect´, emerging 
                                                 
 
1  As stated by Neuburger et al (1979): “In 1897 the largest exporting country was the United Kingdom (U.S.$1431.9 
million) followed closely by the United States (U.S. $1153 million), Germany (U.S. $865.13 million) and then France (U.S. 
$694.41 million). […] The dominant position of the United Kingdom in exports at the beginning of the period was seriously 
eroded by the end. Although the United Kingdom still exported more than other countries, it appears that if the prevailing 
pattern continued, Germany would have overtaken the United Kingdom before long.” In Neuburger, Hugh and Stokes, 
Houstan H. (1979), “The Anglo-German Trade Rivalry, 1887-1913: A Counterfactual Outcome and Its Implications”, 
Social Science History, Vol. 3, No. 2. (Winter, 1979), pp. 187-201 
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from increasing trade and investments in the overseas settlements (Battilossi, 2006 7). 
Additionally, German foreign banks apparently concentrated their activities more on the 
establishment of industry and commerce in the long run, whereas the British banks focused on 
the maximization of investment benefits in the short run. Studies highlight the differences in 
information and credit policies, denoting that German banks provided the export sector with 
more detailed information about international market conditions and seemingly granted longer 
credits (Hurley, 1911, Riesser Jacobs, 1911, Young, 1991).   
 
This study provides new insights and empirical evidence on the link between foreign banking 
and trade development in the cases of Germany and Great Britain between 1881 and 1913. It 
creates a new panel data base on (i) the bilateral trade of both Germany and Great Britain with 
the rest of the world, and (ii) the number and geographical distribution of German and foreign 
banks abroad for benchmark years between 1881 and 1913. With the purpose of providing the 
first quantitative approach to defining the direct link between German foreign banking and 
trade, it then, using an augmented gravity model of trade, tests for a possible correlation 
between world export developments and geographic banking penetration in the cases of Great 
Britain and Germany. The model furthermore includes the notion of German banks being 
initiators of trade, accounting for possible differences in the magnitude of the relation between 
bank penetration and export growth over time.  
 
The empirical results confirm a positive and significant correlation between the number of 
German banks in and the respective exports to a country. The impact of bank presence seems 
to be more significant in 1881 than in 1913, affirming the central idea of banks as initiators of 
trade. In contrast, the results do not confirm such correlation in the case of British foreign bank 
and export developments. To overcome the limitation of the gravity model of only predicting 
correlation, but not illustrating causality, I use a probit regression to test for the determinants 
of German bank entry between 1881 and 1913. The results indicate that German banks were 
more likely to establish themselves in markets that showed a high demand for foreign goods 
but where German trade only had a marginal market share previous to bank entry. 
 
The article is structured as follows. The next section discusses the dynamics of German banking 
internationalization and trade finance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 
history of German foreign banks and their role in foreign trade finance is illustrated in section 
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three. Section four provides a comparison of German and British foreign trade and foreign 
banking development between 1880 and 1913. The specifications and the results of the 
econometric analysis, the augmented gravity model of trade, are presented in section five. The 
final section concludes. 
 
2.2. Related Literature - German bank internationalization and trade finance 
The literature on banking internationalization commonly defines three main triggers of banks 
going abroad. First, banks follow their clients. By taking advantage of competitive advantages 
–such as size, reputation, information, customer base, human capital- in comparison to domestic 
banks, foreign banks are able to support their clients more efficiently (Buch, 1999). Second, 
foreign markets yield higher profit opportunities than the home market, due to institutional and 
economic advantages, inter alia taxation, externalities and competition, and additional 
macroeconomic circumstances such as return on capital, economic growth rates and exchange 
rate risk. Finally, banks go abroad in order to overcome market failures, caused by information 
asymmetries, and to reduce transaction costs (Battilossi, 2006).  
 
Studies on German foreign banking in the nineteenth century suggest that the principal purpose 
of the Auslandsbanken (foreign banks) was to (i) conduct German foreign investment and (ii) 
provide financial and informational assistance for German trade and industries abroad (Hauser, 
1906 1ff, Riesser, 1911 420 ff, Hertner, 1991 100ff). However, although, German banks 
participated to some extend in investment banking in foreign markets (Young, 1991 86-93), the 
primary motivation for German banks to go abroad was commercial interests (Tilly, 1992 98).2 
Effectively, as a consequence of rapid industrialization it had become necessary for German 
commerce and industry to overcome the limitations of the supply of commodities, raw materials 
                                                 
 
2  The principal form of involvement of German banks in capital export was the issuing of foreign government securities 
in the German markets such as Berlin, Hamburg or Frankfurt (Ahrens, 1938, 53 57, Hertner, 1991 101, and Bersch and 
Kaminsky, 2008 2-3). The majority of portfolio investment throughout the nineteenth century was directed to European 
countries, accounting for more than fifty-three per cent of total investments.  However, in the 1880s there was a slight shift 
to the eastern hemisphere, with the nascent railway industries in Russia and China, and the American and Latin continent 
where in particular government bonds promised high returns (Strasser, 1924 18, Tilly, 1991 92ff). In the case of the latter, 
the Deutsche Überseeische Bank, the Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland, and the Deutsch Südamerikanische Bank put 
extra effort into participating in government flotations from the 1880s (Young, 1991 93).  The enthusiasm was dampened 
by political instability and financial crisis in the 1890s, such as the Baring crisis in Argentina, and apart from a small second 
wave directed to Latin America, from then foreign investment played a relatively minor role in German capital issue 
(Strasser, 1924 18, Tilly, 1991 92ff).  
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and capital goods afforded by the home market (Hurley, 1914 18, Lange, 1926 1ff, and Forbes, 
1978 384-85). 
 
The positive relationship between the access to finance and trade development has been shown 
by qualitative and empirical studies alike. Kletzer and Bradhan (1987), for example, highlight 
the link between the quality of a country´s financial system and the development of sectors and 
industries that depend on external finance, i.e. the export sector. They show that imperfections 
in credit markets, such as moral hazard and credit contract enforcement under incomplete 
information, may define a country`s comparative advantage in international trade markets (see 
also Contessi and de Nicola, 2012 7). The perspective has been widened by the work of Beck 
and Bordo and Rousseau showing that trade flows are positively correlated with the size of a 
country`s banking system (Bordo and Rousseau, 2012 1236-7)3, and confirming that countries 
with a higher level of financial development have higher export shares and trade balances 
(Beck, 2004 1-4)4. Turner moreover affirms that the impact of finance on exports is not only 
defined by the reliance of the sector on external finance, but also on the availability and 
efficiency of financial intermediaries. He finds a significant positive correlation between 
geographic bank penetration, in terms of total number of branches, and export volumes (Turner, 
2011 269-70 279-80). 
 
Studies on nineteenth century German and British international bank and trade developments 
contemplate different aspects. Some deal with wider perspectives, illustrating German and 
British international trade developments (Platt, 1968, Forbes, 1978, Bulmer-Thomas, 2003), 
the emerging trade rivalry between the two nations (The Standard, 1914, Hoffmann, 1964, 
Neuburger and Stokes, 1979) and the general characteristics of German and British banking 
(Riesser and Jacobs, 1911, Born, 1977, Pohl, 1982, Tilly, 1992). Other work analyzes specific 
details: the influence of German and British foreign banks on the development of local banks 
(Briones and Villela, 2006), the role of, British banks in fostering investments in emerging 
markets (Arndt, 1908, Halsey, 1918, Rippey, 1948 and 1959, and Corley, 1994), the possible 
                                                 
 
3  Trade is measured as the sum of total exports and imports, the size of the banking system is defined as the ratio of 
broad money to GDP (Bordo and Rousseau, 2012, 1237) 
4  The indicator of trade in manufactured goods was defined as exports, imports and their difference relative to GDP. 
Financial development was measured as credit to the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial 
intermediaries as share of GDP (Beck, 2004, 4). 
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effects of competition between German and British banks (Young, 1991), and the individual 
history of selected banks (Joslin, 1963, Pohl, 1987). Empirical analysis of the relation between 
global bank and trade dynamics comparing the case of Germany and Great Britain is left 
wanting. This work aims to provide empirical evidence supporting the idea that banking 
penetration is positively correlated with trade development via the case of the expansion of 
German banking and trade.    
 
 
2.3. The German strategy of trade finance - “Los von London” 
 “The object of the company is the transaction of all sorts of banking business, 
particularly the fostering and facilitating of commercial relations between Germany, 
the other European countries, and over-sea markets.” 
 (Denkschrift Deutsche Bank, 1869).5 
 
 
The principal strategy of German banks in fostering the advancement of German trade in the 
international markets in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was simple and 
ambitious at the same time: “Los von London” (Away from London), or become financially 
independent from Great Britain. At the time, London was the “clearing house” of international 
payments and the center of trade finance. German industrial and commercial interests in foreign 
countries had to rely nearly entirely on the intermediary of English banks (many, but see for 
example Hauser, 1906 13, Frankfurter Zeitung, 1915).  
 
The financial supremacy of Great Britain derived most importantly from two facts. First, with 
the Sterling, Great Britain possessed the most stable and internationally accepted currency in 
the world.6 Second, London possessed a unique position in the banking world. The old, 
                                                 
 
5  Translated from German by author. See also Riesser (1911), p 421, Hauser (1906), pp. 18-19 and Whale (1930), p.16 
6  According to Einzig (1931 26ff) the dominance of London can additionally be explained by (i) firstly, the existence 
of a well-developed money market that included a distinctive call money market -the sterling bill was the principal payment 
in international trade- a market for short-term loans, and a discount market unrivaled by any other market at this time. 
Secondly, the British financial market was highly liquid. Great Britain at this time possessed immense resource in the form 
of external investments representing the accumulation of favorable trade balance. In addition, British government bonds 
and other securities, considered to be particularly safe, enjoyed high prestige among foreign investors. Thirdly, the high 
degree of liberalization of the British financial market, being reflected by (i) the easy access of foreign banking to London 
with no discriminating legal conditions, only with the exception of being part of the clearing house, and no special 
establishment requirements, (ii) no legal restrictions regarding employment, (iii) nor in dealings in exchanges and 
international transfer of funds, (iv) and the absolute freedom of the gold market with the Bank of England following strict 
neutral policy with respect to gold movements. Latter was partly due to the high reserves and constant gold inflows from 
the British colonies in South Africa. Fourthly, the existence of large wealthy class of investors willing to invest in foreign 
Essay 1: Banks and trade, is there a link? 
 
Wilfried Kisling – Trade finance in historical perspective 12 / 149 
 
established British banking houses were considered to be trustworthy, experienced in 
international banking and enjoyed a high international reputation. They, moreover, were able 
to narrow their profit margins considerably in comparison with banks of other nations, as 
London showed a larger banking turnover than any other financial center at this time (Einzig, 
1931 26ff). The advantage of British banks in narrowing their yields significantly is considered 
as one of the major struggles their German counterparts, and with them foreign trade, faced. 
One of the consequences was that British discount rates were constantly beneath those offered 
in Berlin or Hamburg. London was simply the cheaper alternative for German merchants 
(Hauser, 1906 14-17 and Strasser, 1924 23).7  
 
Consequently, given the dominance of the financial intuitions and markets in Great Britain, 
German banks focused on the creation of their own independent network of financial 
institutions in international markets; The Auslandsbanken8. In their aim to support German 
trade, they applied two approaches. First, (i) to provide German exporters and importers with 
adequate credit, both in foreign and the home market, and (ii) to foster the establishment of the 
German Valuta (currency) in the international market (various, see for example Riesser, 1911, 
420-21, Hurley, 1911 7 19, Whale, 1930 66-67, and Tilly, 1991 106). One of the first 
                                                 
 
markets. This might be derived from their historical experience in foreign investments, with the British colonies ever since 
having been destination of British investments, and their trust in the British financial institution, that inhered the image of 
following rather risk-adverse investment policies ´ 
7  In 1904,  the bank discount rate offered in Berlin was in twenty-one out of twenty-four cases one per cent higher than 
the London rates (Hauser, 1906 14-15). Moreover, contemporaneous calculations suggest that the loss of German banks in 
fees and commissions to their British competitors for handling the German payment transaction accounted until the late 
1880s for up to 3.5 Million Marks per year (Hauser, 1906 17 and Strasser, 1924, 23). 
8  German banks applied three principal approaches to establish their presence in foreign markets. (i) The extent of their 
organization to foreign countries, (ii) the establishment of close relations to foreign banking firms, (iii) and the creation of 
affiliated foreign banks as subsidiary companies; The Auslandsbanken. (Barrett, 1930 68-69, see also Strasser, 1924 37ff).  
The earliest method implemented was to enter into a “sleeping” partnership (Kommandite) with a foreign private banking 
firm, with the principal purpose to strengthen commercial relations with countries already disposing of well-developed 
financial institutions. It was the leading Grossbanken that made the first step to enter into such relations with foreign 
financial institutions. In 1870, the Darmstädter Bank entered into a silent partnership with the Austrian Dutschko&Co 
Bank, based in Vienna (Riesser, 1911 439 987). Already five years earlier the Deutsche Bank had established relations with 
the United States in the form of a commandite with the New Yorker Bank Knoblauch&Lichtenstein (Riesser, 1911 987). 
In addition to the Kommandite, German banks and foreign institutions in some cases established partnerships by agreeing 
on the cooperation on certain matters of common interest, but with each retaining full freedom of action. This so called 
“community of interest” was especially formed, similar to the Kommandite, to gain ground in the financial and commercial 
centers which afforded little scope for new institutions (Whale, 1930 66-67). Although creating closer relations than that 
formed by so far existing correspondent networks, the Kommandite and the community of interest inhered the risk that the 
management remained in foreign hands, which again likely defined the support of German interests as their first objective 
and furthermore tended to hazard the German capital on speculations of their own. Besides, such connections were limited 
to be formed with partners of relatively minor importance (Whale, 1930, 66, 67). In regions showing less development in 
financial terms and in maintaining commercial relations with Germany, German banks aspired to obtain more direct and 
distinctive control and created subsidiary banks (Whale, 1930 68-69). 
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Auslandsbanken was established in London in 1870, a subsidiary of the Deutsche Bank. In the 
same year the London and Hanseatic Bank to be based in London was founded by the Commerz 
Bank together with the Disconto Gesellschaft. Soon other European countries followed, such 
as the Netherlands (Amsterdamsche Bank) in 1871 or Italy in 1894 (Banco Commerciale 
Italiana) (Riesser, 1911 433-36 985-87, Forbes, 1978 392-93). Following the initial step of 
gaining independence from London and ground in neighboring countries, in the late nineteenth 
century German bank expansion focused more on the emerging periphery than the core 
European countries, particularly on the Southern American and Asian regions. The first 
overseas bank with German participation was established in Argentina. In 1872 the Disconto-
Gesellschaft together with banking institutions founded the La Plata Bank. The bank was 
partially taken over by the Deutsche Bank in 1874. Although they succeeded in expanding their 
operation to Uruguay, the life span of the bank was short. Extensive investments in Uruguayan 
government bonds in the 1870s led to an even more intensive loss after a regime change in 
1874, when the new government in Uruguay refused to honor its debts. The situation was 
worsened by an intensive depreciation of silver in the late 1870s, diminishing invested capital. 
Never really recovering in the following years, the Deutsche Bank finally managed, with great 
losses, to liquidate the bank in 1884/5 (Jones, 1991 103, Riesser, 1911 423 433 443, Young, 
1991 89, Gall et al, 1995 59).  
 
Soon after this first tentative and unfortunate intent, in the early 1880s a government-run 
“Überseeische Reichsbank” (1881/1884) was launched, with the idea of establishing a single 
bank responsible for all German oversea banking activities. Besides the idea of the German 
government of gaining influence in the commercial ventures of German business men and 
banks, it clearly followed the aim to establish  some sort of political influence in foreign 
countries via the Auslandsbanken. However, this idea was met with little enthusiasm amongst 
private bankers, who in fact ruined the initiative of an Überseeische Reichsbank in 1886 
(Deutsche Ökonomist, 1884, Young, 1991, 90). Instead, the largest and most important 
institute, the Deutsche Bank, founded in the same year, became one of the most influential 
Auslandsbanken, die Deutsche Überseeische Bank (Geschäftsberichte Deutsche Überseeische 
Bank, 1886). In general, the influence and involvement of German politics in foreign banking 
can be described as rather marginal. The expansion of the German banks in foreign countries 
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indeed was driven primary by private- and economic reasons (Strasser, 1924 29-30).9 Literally 
all the Auslandsbanken were founded by one of the Grossbanken or in corporation between 
them in the form of a Konsortium. The latter may confirm the idea of historical scholars that 
one special feature of German banks was their ability to finance risky and capital-intensive 
ventures by corporation (Foxwell, 1917). This dynamic apparently was not limited to the 
operations within Germany, but also applied to German banking activities abroad. In 1886 the 
Deutsche Überseeische Bank was founded by the Deutsche Bank, focusing on the Latin 
American market. Only one year later the Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland followed, 
founded as a co-venture between the Norddeutsche Bank and the Diskonto-Gesellschaft. 
Subsequently, German banking expanded to the Asian continent. In the mid-1880s, German 
industry and with it the German Grossbanken focused more and more on Asian markets. The 
German railway companies aimed to establish new business in China. In 1889, the already 
previously discussed Deutsch-Asiatische Bank was created. In the early-twentieth century 
Germany started to expand its presence in Africa. In 1905 the Deutsche Afrika Bank was 
founded, concentrating its activities on the Empire´s colonies, such as Namibia and Tanzania. 
In 1905, the Deutsche Orientbank followed, operating mainly in the Far East and competing 
directly with the British in Egypt, especially in becoming one of the principal financiers of the 
cotton sector (see Schwanitz 2002) (Riesser, 1911 443 446). Table 13 in the Appendix A 
provides an overview of the German Auslandsbanken and their mother institutions founded 
between 1869 and 1913. 
 
Recent work suggests that German banks failed in breaking the dominance of the sterling or 
London bills as the key currency and access to cheap credit. Nevertheless, they were successful 
in converting the German Mark into an international currency. Not being able to challenge the 
                                                 
 
9  A minor exception and and an example of the intent of the German government to maintain some counterbalance to 
the private Grossbanken, was the Seehandlungsgesellschaft (Maritime Trade Association), later called the Prussian State 
Bank. Founded in 1772 by Frederick II as a Joint-stock Company with the primary purpose of fostering commerce, with 
special privileges to trade transmarine salt, and finance state expenditures, it passed under the control of the Prussian 
Ministry of Finance in 1848 (Wirth, 1896 11, and Stiftung Seehandlung - Historie). The most famous example may be its 
involvement in the foundation of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. Internal struggles among the leading Grossbanken, mainly 
the growing competition among the two largest institutions - the Deutsche Bank and the Diskonto-Gesellschaft - impeded 
the foundation of the China bank created by a Bank Konsortium. It was the Seehandlungsgesellschaft that finally intervened 
and subscribed the capital of the new China Bank. Founded in 1889 it was named the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank (Hertner, 
1999 107-109). Besides the involvement of the Seehandlungsgesellschaft, it was also the Deutsche Bank, the Darmstädter 
Bank, the Diskonto-Gesellschaft, the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft, the A Schaafhausen´scher Bankverein, the 
Nationalbank für Deutschland and the Dresdner Bank that participated in its foundation. 
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British pound, it became a “key currency” and possible alternative that enjoyed increasing 
utilization in some European countries, such as Sweden, Italy or Austria-Hungary, and in Asia 
and South America that were the focus of German foreign banking activities (Tilly, 1992 108-
109). The credit policies, however, of the German banks and their Auslandsbanken is 
commonly defined in literature as the preeminent feature of their successful financing of foreign 
trade. The Auslandsbanken were known to grant comparatively longer credits then their 
competing counterparts from Great Britain or any other nation at that time. German banks 
discounted bills of exchange up to 240 days on credit (Strasser, 1924 22, see also Whale, 1930 
87, and Young, 1991 86) and it was common practice that German banks paid German exporters 
up to seventy per cent of the total value of their delivery before the actual arrival of the same 
(Hauser, 1906 5). They moreover granted Kreditbriefe (direct letters of credit) that permitted 
the exporter to receive the payment at the moment of arrival of the shipping and paying 
documents (Konossement), but before the actual arrival of the delivery. The Kreditbrief was 
emitted by the Auslandsbank and send to its mother institution based in Germany. At the time 
the Konossement arrived at the Auslandsbank in the country of destination of the exports, the 
German exporter was paid the full amount by the German mother institution (Hauser, 1906 5). 
Most interestingly, German banks seemed to act as some sort of “buyer of last resort” for 
German exporters. In case of non-payment by the overseas importer, German banks granted an 
“Akkzeptkredit” (“reimbursement” credit) to the German exporter with an amount up to 74% of 
the invoice. Furthermore, they received and stored the shipment and administrated further sales 
(Hauser, 1906 6, Riesser, 1911 246-428). Some studies even argue that the involvement of the 
German banks in supporting the establishment of industrial companies abroad exceeded the 
pure financing as they provided the German home market with information on foreign trade 
and investment opportunities and eventually even took initiatives in the foundation of foreign 
business ventures themselves (Strasser, 1924 27-28, Tilly, 1992). They thus served as some sort 
of ´pioneer´ for German industry in foreign markets. They aimed to win new trade markets, 
contrasting the objectives of the banks of other nations, such as Great Britain, of 
accommodating already existing trade (Hurely, 1914 18). This argumentation is most 
interesting, as it paves a certain kind of causality between the development of German foreign 
trade and banking. At the same time, it somehow contradicts the literature on banking 
internationalization, assuming that banks tend to follow their clients, in a chronological sense, 
and not vice versa (Buch, 1999). 
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2.4. German and British foreign banks and world trade 
The aim of this section is to empirically analyze and compare German and British foreign trade 
and banking development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. For this purpose, I 
create a new panel dataset on German and British global bilateral trade and number of banks, 
including their branches. The data on trade includes observations for the periods from 1880 to 
1884, 1898 to 1902, and 1909 to 1913. The number of countries presented in the data set varies 
over time in accordance with the official trade statistics, with 66 countries for the years 1880-
1884, 92 for the years 1898-1902, and 102 for the years 1909-1913. The bank data cover the 
years 1881, 1900, and 1913, for the same number of countries as trade in the respective years. 
The sources for the data are presented in Appendix A – Sources. 
 
Figure 1: German and British exports and imports (in Mio USD) - 1880-84, 1898-1902, 1909-1913 
 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources  
 
 
The British were the dominant force in international trade markets when Germany started to 
intensify its foreign trade in the 1880s, and continued to dominate during the entire period of 
investigation. In 1880, German foreign commerce accounted for a total value of 1.104 million 
USD. British trade, with 3.366 million USD, valued more than three times as much (see Tables 
18 and 21 Appendix A). However, having reached a relatively high level of maturity, British 
trade grew far less impressively than German trade. Between 1880 and 1913 German trade 
grew at a rate of 4.33 per cent, British trade merely at 2.35 per cent. Especially in the period 
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between 1880 and 1884, Germany managed to catch up, showing an annual growth rate above 
3.67 per cent in the first four years of the 1880s, while British trade in contrast slowed down, 
showing even a reduction in growth in the same period (see Table 1 below and Tables 20 and 
23 in Appendix A). By 1913, Germany had reduced the gap with Great Britain considerably, 
with British total exports and imports accounting for 7.136 million USD, and German trade for 
4.424 million USD (sources see Appendix A – Sources).   
 
Table 1: German and British trade by continent - Growth rates (%) – 1880-1900, 1900-1913, 1880-1913 
 
1880-1900 Germany Great Britain 
Africa 11.23 3.69 
America Central 15.34 -2.49 
America North 7.33 1.18 
America South 11.37 2.81 
Asia 10.05 0.22 
Australia 15.62 0.36 
Europe 2.91 1.53 
Oceania 12.12 83.99 
Total 4.20 1.41 
    
1900-1913   
Africa 10.92 5.54 
America Central 5.06 5.79 
America North 4.79 1.95 
America South 8.01 7.47 
Asia 8.38 6.39 
Australia 6.61 3.93 
Europe 3.87 3.26 
Oceania 109.35 5.05 
Total 4.92 4.03 
    
1880-1913   
Africa 10.76 4.27 
America Central 11.01 0.69 
America North 6.15 1.43 
America South 9.76 4.47 
Asia 9.11 2.53 
Australia 11.75 1.69 
Europe 3.18 2.14 
Oceania 48.20 51.76 
Total 4.34 2.35 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
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The major part of German foreign commerce was directed to the European core countries, with 
Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and France as its main trading partners. Figures 2 and 3 
illustrate the geographical distribution of German and British trade in the world in 1881 and 
1913 (see also Tables 19 and 22 in Appendix A). Likewise, British trade was concentrated in 
Europe, but to a far less extent. In 1880, German and British trade with Europe accounted for 
more than 87 per cent and a little more than 41 per cent of total trade, respectively. At the time 
Germany intensified its external commercial relations, British foreign commerce was already 
more regionally diversified and present in international trade markets. Besides Europe, British 
trade concentrated on the prospering peripheral countries in the western and eastern 
hemisphere. In 1880, trade between Great Britain and the American countries made up for more 
than 31 per cent and with Asia for more than 15.5 per cent of total trade. They are followed by 
Australia and the African colonies, responsible for 5.05 per cent and 6.39 per cent of total trade, 
respectively. Yet, the global distribution of British foreign commerce remained relatively stable 
during the entire period of investigation. In 1913, British trade with Europe still accounted for 
about 31 per cent of total trade, followed by America with 27.64 per cent and Asia with 16.48 
per cent. 
 
By the turn of the century, Germany began to expand its market shares, especially in South 
America and Asia, showing comparatively higher growth rates than British trade in these 
regions. As shown in Table 1, between 1880 and 1913 German trade with South America 
increased by 9.76 per cent and with Asia by 9.11 per cent. British trade, on the other hand, grew  
by 2.5 and 1.6, respectively. Interestingly, while German trade with America constantly gained 
in importance and share relative to total trade, Great Britain eventually lost ground. In 1880, 
German trade with America accounted for 9.75 per cent of total trade and for 24.76 per cent in 
1913. Trade with South American countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile gained 
constantly in importance. Similarly, trade with Asia, in particular China, increased from 1.86 
per cent of total trade in 1880 to 9.75 per cent in 1913. Trade with Europe diminished to a little 
bit more than 60 per cent of total trade in 1913.10  
 
 
                                                 
 
10  The impressive growth rates of Oceania, mainly New Zealand and Australia, were the results of an increase from an 
initially, nearly non-existent to a yet rather marginal trade between Germany and these countries (for growth rates see also 
Table 19 and 22 in Appendix A). In 1913, trade with Oceania accounted for 0.11 per cent and trade with Australia for a 
little more than 2.2 per cent of total German foreign trade. 
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Figure 2: British trade by continent – Share on total trade (%) – 1881 and 1913 
 
  
Sources: See Appendix A – Sources  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: German trade by continent – Share on total trade (%) – 1881 and 1913 
 
  
Sources: See Appendix A – Sources  
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The financial supremacy of Great Britain was equally striking. In 1881, a total number of 
nineteen German banks with 21 branches were operating in twelve different countries. In the 
same year 137 British banks with more than 450 branches were operating in forty-eight 
countries (see Table 24 and 25 in Appendix A). Figures 4 and 5 show the geographical 
distribution of German and British banks in the world in 1881 and 1913. Similar to trade, British 
foreign banking was comparatively more diversified than German foreign banking, with a focus 
on the emerging economies of America and Asia, followed by Australia and the African 
colonies. Between 1881 and 1913, the percentage of banks operating in America in relation to 
the total number of banks rose slightly from 15.4 per cent to 19 per cent and in Africa and Asia 
from 14.5 to 18.7 per cent and 27.7 to 29.9 per cent, respectively. In Australia, the share in total 
number of banks remained more or less the same, and in Europe even, although only marginally, 
decreased. Remarkably, British banks expanded their subsidiary network constantly and 
notably, especially in those countries of the Commonwealth that had adopted the “Scottish” 
free banking model, such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia. In the latter for example, the 
total number of branches rose from 148 in 1881 to an impressive 602 in 1913. 
 
Yet, at the same time Germany managed to create its own network of overseas banking that 
stood in direct competition with the British banks. It seems that particularly in those markets 
where German trade initially was only marginally developed, especially in the emerging 
economies of Latin America, Germany was able to successfully penetrate the financial markets 
and establish a competitive banking network. This reflects the idea of German banks being 
promoters of trade and contrasts with the British foreign banking dynamic. The primary purpose 
of the latter was to broaden already existing trade and engage in the increasing investment 
opportunities in the prospering peripheral markets and British colonies. Until the second half 
of the nineteenth century, British trade and its financing were managed by the merchant houses, 
maintaining offices in England and abroad. With British trade and investment accelerating 
intensively from the 1860s11, Banks became indispensable to managing the increasing amount 
of financial transactions (Hurley, 1911 14ff).12 Following the premise “Los von London” and 
                                                 
 
11  However, British banks already expanded their activities to foreign countries in the 1820s. Founded in 1809 in 
London, the Nathan Mayer Rotschild (NMR) started its operations in Brazil from independence in 1822. Initially 
concentrating on merchant banking activities, the NMR became the exclusive financial agent of the Brazilian government 
in London in 1855. They managed every Brazilian Government fund and every purchase of the Brazilian government in 
England, as well as the payment of the dividends of Brazilian debt in London (Marichal and Triner, 2001, 261-262). 
12  Besides being better suited to managing the increasing capital movements, British banks also released the merchant 
houses from the necessity to maintain expensive representation abroad, and thus, enabled smaller firms to enter into foreign 
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the aim to establish financial representation in the immediate neighboring countries, the initial 
focus of German foreign banks was Great Britain and the other European core countries. 
However, over the 30-year period there was a significant shift in the geographical distribution 
of the German banks, showing similar patterns as German foreign banking. While in 1881 more 
than 84 per cent of all German banks and their branches were located in Europe, by 1913 this 
figure decreased to 45 per cent as the interest of German banks moved outside of Europe.  The 
remaining 56 per cent were concentrated mainly - 72% of the non-European share – in South 
and Central America and Asia.   
 
In 1913, a total number of 74 German banks were operating with 235 branches in 53 different 
countries. Still, Great Britain possessed nearly more than twice as many foreign banks, 127, 
with 1251 branches in 72 countries. Yet, Germany caught up in establishing banks outside of 
Europe, in particular in the Latin American countries that at the same time were the focus of 
German foreign trade. Between 1862 and 1886 a total number of ten British banks were founded 
while Germany only established one that was liquidated in 1885. By the end of 1913, fourteen 
German13 and eighteen British Banks were operating in Latin America (see Table 24 and 25 in 
Appendix A). 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
trade business. Moreover, prevailing conditions in their home country triggered British banks to go abroad in the 1860s. In 
1857-58, the British parliament passed two company acts that extended the privilege of incorporation with limited liability 
to banks, leading to a boom of joint-stock bank foundations, with many of them aiming for foreign markets (Hurley, 1911, 
14, Young, 1991, 82-85, and Briones and Villela, 2006, 334). 
13  For the purpose of correctness; these included eight different institutions, accounting for fourteen banks in the 
different countries in Latin America.  
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Figure 4: Geographical distribution of British foreign banks (% of total) – 1881 and 1913 
 
  
Sources: See Appendix A – Sources  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Geographical distribution of German foreign banks (% of total) – 1881 and 1913 
 
  
Sources: See Appendix A – Sources 
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2.5. Banks and trade – Is there a link? 
Using an augmented gravity model, based on the theoretical assumptions of Head and Mayer 
(2013), this part investigates and compares the nexus of German and British world export 
development and geographic banking penetration between 1881 and 1913. It tests for three 
principal hypotheses: (i) Germany exports relatively more to those countries where German 
banks are present than to the countries where they are not; (ii) German banks initiate trade, 
hence exports increase with bank entrance into the market; (iii) The same or a similar relation 
between British banks and exports does not exist. Expressed in the form of an equation, the 
model is designed as follows: 
 
(1.1 - OLS) 
 
LnXijt = β0 + β1ln(Yit+Yjt) + β2lnDij + β3Bijt + β4ComLangij + β5SharedBordij + β6LandLockij + 
β7ColLinkijt + β8GSijt +  βit + βjt + ɛij 
 
 
(1.2 - PPML) 
 
Xijt = β0 + β1ln(Yit+Yjt) + β2lnDij + β3Bijt + β4ComLangij + β5SharedBordij + β6LandLockij + 
β7ColLinkijt + β8GSijt + βit + βjt + ɛij 
 
 
Where Xijt is the nominal value of exports from i to j in t, β0 is a constant, Yit and Yjt are the 
nominal national incomes of each country (GDP) in t, and Dij is the great circle distance between 
the capital cities of i and j in kilometers. Bijt is a numeric variable, representing the number of 
banks of country i present in country j at the time t. Cultural barriers and natural borders are 
taken into account as forces of resistance additional to distance, as they are expected to 
influence trade and communication. ComLangij and SharedBordij are binary variables which 
are unity if i and j have a common language or share a land border, respectively. The variable 
LandLockij takes the value of one in the event of j being a landlocked country, and zero in the 
opposite case. The colonial links between i and j are expressed in the binary variable ColLinkijt, 
equally becoming unity in case of j being a colony of i. The dummy variable GS considers the 
adherence of i and j to the Gold Standard, as it assumingly eases capital flows, and hence has a 
positive effect on bilateral trade relations. For this study, the key coefficient of interest is β3, 
which shows the impact of banks on exports. The estimated model also includes time-variant 
country fixed effects for each exporter and importer country (βit and βjt) (Head and Mayer, 2013, 
based on Anderson & Wincoop, 2003). ɛij is an error term, representing the myriad other 
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influences on exports. Technically, panel data is used to estimate equation 1.1 and 1.2 with 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and Poisson-maximum likelihood (PPML) alternatively.14 Two 
models are defined: (i) the `standard` model that includes the explaining variables real GDP, 
distance, banks, land lock, shared borders and common language, and (ii) the ´ advanced´ model, 
which adds the variables colonial link and Gold Standard. Furthermore, each model 
differentiates between the overall effects of bank presence and the specific effect of banks in 
each year. 
 
The results of the OLS and PPML estimations are presented in Table 2 (OLS) and Table 3 
(PPML). They reflect the general theoretical assumptions for gravity models and confirm the 
main hypothesis of this paper. While economic size has a positive impact on export volumes, 
higher distance leads to less trade. The coefficients for shared borders and colonial link are 
always positive and significant. Speaking the same language likewise has a positive impact on 
exports, and though the coefficient lacks significance in the ´advanced´ OLS model, it is 
significant at the 1 per cent level in the ´advanced´ PPML model, which has the advantage of 
including zero values and hence more observations. The fact whether or not countries are 
landlocked does not seem to have any significant influence on export flows and neither does 
the adherence to the Gold Standard, although the coefficient of the latter shows consistently 
positive values. The key hypothesis of this paper seems to be affirmed; German banks matter, 
British banks do not. The results, for each OLS and PPML ´standard´ and ´advanced´ model, 
show an overall significant and positive correlation between the number of banks operating in 
a country and the respective German exports to that country. In the case of British banks and 
exports, such a correlation cannot be confirmed. Most interestingly, German banks and exports 
seem to be more significantly and positively correlated in 1881 than in the following years. 
This encourages the second central idea of banks being initiators of trade. The effects are also 
qualitatively large. The contemporaneous effect of banks on exports in 1881 is 0.402, implying 
that the level of exports increases by 49 per cent (since 1-e 0.402 = 0.495)15 with each additional 
bank. In 1900 and 1913 the effect is still considerable, though an increase in banks by one unit 
                                                 
 
14  Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), “Log,” have shown that LS estimates of log-linear models (like equations 1 and 
2) are likely inefficient, biased, and/or even inconsistent. They proposed PPML with robust standard errors as a superior 
alternative. Additionally, PPML allows for including “0” observations in the dependent variable, which have to be excluded 
or treated improperly under log-linear OLS estimates (Lampe, 2009). 
15  See Wooldrige, Jeffrey (2002), “Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach”, Itps Thomson Learning; 2nd 
Revised edition 
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resulted in the comparatively lower increase of 15.5 and 8.5 per cent in exports (since 1-e 0.144 
= 0.144 and 1-e 0.082 = 0.0802), respectively.16  
 
 
Table 2: Estimates of Equation 1.1 – German and British banks and exports – OLS 
 
 
 ´Standard´ Model ´Advanced´ Model 
 (1.1.a) (1.1.b) (1.1c) (1.1d) 
lnGDP 1.094* 1.079+ 1.177* 1.245* 
lnD -0.792*** -0.782** -0.836*** -0.811*** 
B-Ger 0.356***  0.321***  
B-GB 0.037  0.04  
LandLock 0.719 0.291 1.374 1.055 
SharedBord 1.124*** 1.047*** 1.308*** 1.212*** 
ComLang 0.743** 0.699** 0.18 0.127 
B-Ger_1881  0.532***  0.566*** 
B-Ger_1900  0.506**  0.391* 
B-Ger_1913  0.273**  0.235** 
B-GB_1881  0.015  0.031 
B-GB_1900  0.069  0.069 
B-GB_1913  0.093  0.085 
ColLink   1.279*** 1.316*** 
GS   0.446 0.525 
Exp Time (βit) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Imp Time (βjt) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method of est. OLS OLS OLS OLS 
N obs. 251 251 251 251 
*** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 + 0.1  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
16  Numbers and calculations based on the estimates of the ´Advanced´ ppml model – Table 3, columns (2.1c) and (2.1d). 
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Table 3: Estimates of Equation 1.2 – German and British banks and exports – PPML 
 
 
 ´Standard´ Model ´Advanced´ Model 
 (2.1.a) (2.1.b) (2.1c) (2.1d) 
lnGDP 1.066*** 1.205*** 0.980*** 1.248*** 
lnD -1.617*** -1.493*** -1.669*** -1.446*** 
B-Ger 0.136***  0.130**  
B-GB -0.003  0.001  
LandLock -0.584 -0.778 -0.458 -0.227 
SharedBord 1.126* 1.058* 1.357*** 1.264*** 
ComLang 1.835*** 1.858*** 1.062** 1.011** 
B-Ger_1881  0.387***  0.402*** 
B-Ger_1900  0.147*  0.144* 
B-Ger_1913  0.093*  0.082+ 
B-GB_1881  0.027  0.031 
B-GB_1900  -0.026  -0.02 
B-GB_1913  0.024  0.029 
ColLink   1.232*** 1.379*** 
GS   0.563 0.603 
Exp Time (βit) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Imp Time (βjt) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method of est. PPML PPML PPML PPML 
N obs. 340 340 340 340 
*** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 + 0.1  
 
 
 
Yet, this study suffers from the traditional disadvantage of a possible inconsistent parameter 
estimation due to endogenous regressors. In other words, although disclosing clear tendencies, 
it is limited in its capacity to provide axiomatic empirical information on what comes first, 
banks or trade. An attempt has been made to remedy this problem by including time effects, as 
well as importer and exporter fixed-effects varying over time. The preferable approach from a 
theoretical and empirical perspective would be the inclusion of an instrumental variable, 
accounting for the establishment of banks not driven by trade developments. The identification 
and definition of such an instrument remains an unsolved challenge. However, there are some 
indicators that provide first quantitative evidence on the reasons why German banks entered a 
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certain country, establishing a certain causal chain between banking internationalization and 
trade development. The assumption is that German banks first entered into markets that in years 
previous to the bank entry showed (i) a comparatively high demand for foreign products, (ii) a 
constant increase in demand, (iii), and in which German exports so far only showed a marginal 
market share. Using a probit estimation I test for the influence of these three determinants on 
the geographical distribution of German foreign banks between 1881 and 1913. In the form of 
an equation, this is expressed as follows: 
 
(1.3) 
BGerct = β0 + β1LnImpct=b + β2LnGrowthct=b + β3LnSharect=b + ɛct 
 
 
Where BGerct is a dummy variable that represents the presence (value=1) or absence (value=0) 
of German banks in country c in the years from 1881 to 1913. β0 is a constant. The variables 
Impct  and Growthct  are the average of the nominal value of imports and the annual average 
growth rate of imports of country c in the years from 1860 to 1870 (t=b). They consider the two 
assumptions that German banks established themselves in economies that showed a high and 
growing demand for foreign goods previous to the bank entry. The first German foreign bank 
was the Deutsche Bank in London, founded in 1870. The importance of German exports in a 
certain market is captured by Sharect that is the average share (per cent) of imports from 
Germany on the total imports of country c between 1860 and 1870, and ɛct is an error term. C 
are all countries (59) that Germany exported to between 1881 and 1913, based on the data on 
German exports by country used in the augmented gravity model. The number of observations 
is limited according to the available data on trade (56). The information on the share of German 
imports is particularly scarce.17 The remaining 32 countries, however, represent around 65 per 
cent of the German export markets between 1881 and 191318.  
 
                                                 
 
17   The data for the average, and the annual average growth rate of imports have been extracted from: Federico Giovanni 
and Antonio Tena-Junguito (2016) “World trade, 1800-1938: a new data-set” EHES Working paper n.93. 
http://www.ehes.org/EHES_93.pdf. With special thanks to Antonio Tena Junguito for providing the data. The information 
on the shares of Germany of imports have been obtained from: Dedinger, Béatrice, et Paul Girard. (2017) “Exploring trade 
globalization in the long run: The RICardo project” Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary 
History 50 (1): 30-48. For some countries, the import data is not available for the whole period between 1860 and 1870. In 
this case, the share of imports from Germany of total imports has been calculated from the available years.  
18  Their average share of total German exports in 1881 was 67 per cent, in 1901 59 per cent, and in 1913 71 per cent 
(see Appendix A – Sources) 
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The results of the probit estimation are presented in Table 4. The coefficients – columns (1.3a) 
and (1.3b) - indicate whether or not an independent variable had a significant positive or 
negative effect on the probability that a German bank established itself in a country. 19 The 
marginal effects – columns (1.3c) and (1.3d) - quantify the effect. The coefficient for the 
average nominal value of imports shows a positive, significant influence, indicating that 
German foreign banks were more likely to position themselves in markets with a high demand 
for foreign goods in the years previous to the bank entry. If a market grew comparatively more 
than others seems to have had no effect. The coefficient for the share of imports from Germany 
is significantly negative, supporting the idea that the decision of German banks to establish 
themselves in a certain country was driven by the relative importance of German commerce in 
the country. Banks established themselves in those markets where German exports were only 
marginally developed. Eventually, the German share in the market was even more important 
than the actual size of the market. A one-unit change in the imports of a country increased the 
probability of the establishment of a  German bank in that country by 25 per cent. In the case 
of the market share, a one-unit increase would diminish the probability for German bank entry 
by 231 per cent.  
 
Table 4: Estimates of Equation 1.3 – Determinants of German bank entry - Probit and Marginal effects 
 
 (1.3a) (1.3b) (1.3c) (1.3d ) 
Imports (LnImp) 0.382*** 0.945*** 0.134*** 0.250*** 
 (0.1368) (0.2446) (0.0392) (0.0359) 
Import growth (LnGrowth) 5.835 1.274 2.039 0.337 
 (3.896) (8.428) (1.304) (2.229) 
Share Germany (LnShare)  -8.747**  -2.315*** 
  (3.591)  (0.803) 
Observations 56 32 56 32 
Pseudo R2 0.1115 0.3096 - - 
Method of est. Probit Probit Probit- Marginal Probit- Marginal 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
Note: The marginal effects are the average marginal effects based on the Delta-method. Robust Standard errors are 
indicated in brackets. 
 
                                                 
 
19  Probability that the dependent variable takes the value one. 
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2.6. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this study has been to investigate the role of German and British foreign banks in 
the development of German and British foreign trade in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, following the principal hypothesis that banks promoted international trade by 
providing financial and informational assistance abroad. 
  
Therefore, I created a novel data set on German and British foreign banks and world trade in 
the years between 1881 and 1913. Using an augmented gravity model of trade, I investigate the 
relation between the geographical banking distribution and export developments of the two 
countries. The results confirm a significant and positive correlation between German banks and 
trade; Germany exported more to countries where German banks were present. Such correlation 
could not be confirmed in the case of British foreign banks and trade. Most interestingly, 
German banks and exports seem to be more significantly and higher correlated in the 1880s, 
the years of establishment of the first German foreign banks, than in the following years. With 
the aim to establish a causal chain between banking internationalization and trade development, 
this study additionally investigated, using a probit regression, the reasons why German banks 
entered a certain country. The results show that German foreign banks were more likely to 
position themselves in markets where German exports were only marginally developed in the 
years previous to bank entry. 
  
This study contributes to the literature on trade finance, providing quantitative evidence on a 
positive relation between foreign bank penetration and export developments. Moreover, the 
findings not only lend empirical support to the literature on German foreign banking during the 
period of the First Globalization, but also to the study of the role of finance in the development 
of foreign trade of a “latecomer” in comparison to an economy already established in the 
international markets. Qualitative studies affirm that the primary purpose of the 
Auslandsbanken was to provide financial assistance to trade in those markets where German 
foreign commerce was underrepresented. They hence acted as promoters of trade. In contrast, 
the primary purpose of British foreign banks was to broaden already existing trade and engage 
in the increasing investment opportunities in the prospering peripheral markets and British 
colonies. This finds support by the fact that I only find a positive correlation between foreign 
banking penetration and export developments in the case of Germany and that this effect was 
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initially more significant. The idea of the Auslandsbanken being initiators of trade is moreover 
reinforced by the empirical evidence affirming that German banking focused on markets with 
a comparatively low German export share. 
  
Future research on one hand should concentrate on including additional information on German 
and British foreign banks going beyond the aspect of pure banking presence, such as for 
example bank size, age etc. On the other hand, it would be useful to identify and include an 
instrumental variable, which explains the internationalization of German banks independent 
from German export developments, in future econometric work. 
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3. Essay 2: Trade finance and the importance of knowing a bank - Determining the 
success of the German trade expansion in nineteenth century Argentina, 1875-1912 
3.1. Introduction 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the rising economies of the so-called second industrial 
revolution, and particularly Germany, began to intensively challenge British dominance in 
manufacturing productivity and its leadership in international trade markets. The emerging 
economies of Latin America were one of the principal destinations of both German and British 
foreign trade at that time, with focus on the three largest, most economically developed and 
politically stable republics: Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Yet, German trade with these countries 
grew significantly faster than British trade.20  In 1874, the German share of Argentinian imports 
was four per cent, ranking fifth among the main Argentine trading partners behind the United 
Kingdom, France, the USA, and Italy. By the turn of the century, Germany had become 
Argentina’s second most important trade partner following Great Britain (see Figure 6 and 
Appendix B – Sources).  
 
This article studies the effect of German bank entry in Argentina on the development of German 
exports to Argentina between 1875 and 1912. The major hypothesis is that German export 
companies connected to German banks operating in Argentina benefited from relatively easier 
access to financial support and privileged information in the Argentine market; in other words, 
a reduction of transaction costs and information asymmetry. Consequently, Germany exported 
more of those products that were exported by one or more companies connected to the banks -
bank-connected exports- after their entry. 
 
Therefore, I create two novel data sets. The first set includes Argentine imports by product for 
all Argentina’s trading partners for five benchmark years between 1875 and 1912.21 I 
                                                 
 
20  Between 1880 and 1913, German trade with South America grew on average by 9.8 per cent. British trade by 4.5 per 
cent. In 1881, trade with South America accounted for nearly two per cent of total German foreign trade, in 1913 for almost 
ten per cent. In case of Great Britain, it accounted in the same years for 4 and 8 per cent respectively (see Appendix B - 
Sources).  
21  The use of Argentinian import statistics instead of the individual export statistics of each trading country with 
Argentina has two major advantages. First, it allows to control for effects of demand and possible variations in it. Second, 
it assures the comparability between countries, as the information is homogenous and covers all the Argentinian trading 
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differentiate between imports of high skill intensity products – mostly second industrial 
revolution manufactures- and low skill intensity products – mostly textiles – to discuss and 
compare the market entry strategies of the new and old industrial powers. The second data set 
contains the connection between the two German foreign banks established in Argentina 
between 1875 and 1913 – the Deutsche Überseeische and the Deutsche Südamerikanische Bank 
– and German export companies. The connection is measured as Interlocking Directorates; that 
is the number of representatives a bank had on a company’s supervisory board. To identify the 
effect of bank entry, I then classify the German exports by products exported by companies 
linked and not linked to the banks. 
 
I first empirically examine and compare the determinants of the exports and the extensive/ 
intensive trade margin of Argentina’s trading partners between 1875 and 1912, using an 
Augmented Gravity Model of trade based on a Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) 
approach. Seen from the supply side, I test for the influence of the relative productivity and the 
size of the economy of the exporting countries. On the demand side, I focus on trade costs in 
the form of geographical distance, the absence of freight costs, and tariff frictions – measured 
as product specific tariffs and the presence of financial institutions of the exporting countries 
in Argentina to account for the presumable influence of finance. I additionally differentiate 
between the effect of the explaining variables on the exports of each class of products, High-, 
and Low-skill manufactures. At the second stage, I use a difference-in-difference model, 
measuring the effect of bank entry on the German bank-connected exports. 
 
The results show that although Great Britain dominated the Argentine market, and France and 
Belgium also enjoyed some privileges there, at the turn of the century Germany and the US 
were particularly successful in intensifying and expanding their (high skill) manufacture 
exports in that market. The success of the newly emerging industrial countries, especially 
Germany, seems to be explained by a higher degree of productivity and an increased 
intensification of exports. This is especially evident in the case of high skill products, as I find 
a significant and stronger influence of the explaining variables when looking at exports from 
the high skill sector. Finally, the results confirm the idea that German companies that 
maintained a special network with German foreign banks in Argentina benefited from their 
                                                 
 
partners. 
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privileged financial support, as I find a positive and significant effect of the German bank entry 
on bank-connected exports.   
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the literature on trade finance, 
with an emphasis on the history of German foreign banking. Section three presents the data. 
Sections four and five describe and analyze the performance of German exports to Argentina 
in comparison to its main competitors and the connection between German banks in Argentina 
and the German export industry. The specifications and the results of the econometric analysis, 
the augmented gravity model of trade and the difference in difference model, are presented in 
sections six and seven. The final section offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
3.2. Related Literature - German banks and export companies  
“German banking does not stand aloof as ours (British) does…The men who direct the 
German banks are all the time in close touch with the […] industries […]. With them finance, 
industry and transportation go hand in hand, and are regarded as integral parts of the same 
problem…The German banker has its finger in everything that is going on. He is presented 
directly or indirectly on the boards of the manufacturing, trading, shipping, and mining 
companies.”  
(Foxwell, 1917).22  
 
 
 
The literature on German foreign banking suggests that the driving force behind the 
internationalization of German banks in the 1880s were the German Grossbanken23 (great 
banks). One of the primary concerns of the latter was to support their important clients in the 
                                                 
 
22   In Foxwell, 1917, p. 513, based on a statement of W.R. Lawson 
23   The term Grossbanken has been subject to several interpretations. The Deutsche and the Dresdner Bank, together 
with the created Discontogesellschaft and Darmstädter Bank (für Handel und Industrie) created in 1851 and 1853 are often 
referred to as the “Vier D-Banken”. Commonly, the concept Grossbanken describes the nine, in terms of capital and 
branches, largest German banks of the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: A. Schaafhausen`scher 
Bankenverein (1848), Discontogesellschaft (1851), Darmstädter Bank (1853), Berliner Handelsgesellschaft (1856), 
Mitteldeutsche Creditbank (1856), Deutsche Bank (1870), Commerz Bank (1870), Dresdner Bank (1872), and the 
Nationalbank für Deutschland (1881) (among others, Riesser, 1911 and Whale, 1930). 
In addition, the Grossbanken are quite frequently referred to as the Joint-stock companies, Kreditbanken, mixed banks or 
universal banks (Sylla, 1991 51). However, these denominations distinguish the legal composition and the type of these 
banks, rather than their actual importance in the German economy at this time. Perhaps one of the most commonly used 
name in the literature besides Grossbanken is the term Universal banks. For a straight forward definition of the term 
Universal bank see George J. Benston (1994), p. 121 
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German industry in their effort to expand in foreign markets. And they did so effectively by 
establishing the first Auslandsbanken that provided financial and informational assistance 
abroad. A decisive factor in this dynamic was the unique connection between the Grossbanken 
and the German industrial sector. The close link between banks and industry was the result of 
a simultaneous process of industrial and banking concentration. With Germany’s general 
economic ambitions shifting in the 1870s from industrial catch up to the development of foreign 
commercial markets, German industry and banks entered an intensive process of concentration. 
Based on the idea that competitive advantage in international markets is achieved by production 
on a large scale, the focus was on creating big concerns (Konzerne) that soon dominated the 
industrial sector. This process was accompanied by the consolidation of the German banking 
system and the creation of new large financial institutions able to satisfy the increasing financial 
needs of the industrial sector; the German Grossbanken (Hauser, 1906 1-5, Lough, 1915 44, 
Ahrens, 1938 53, Hertner, 1991 100ff, Tilly, 1992 90-9). This unique bank-industry nexus 
occurred in three principal forms: (i) the extension of current account privileges to firms, (ii) 
banks holding securities of firms, and (iii) the assignment of bank officials on the Aufsichstrat 
(directory or supervisory board) of firms; the so-called Interlocking Directorates24.  
The existence of interlocking directorates (ID) is commonly defined as the most important and 
powerful nexus between bank and industry, as it, besides inhering voting rights, enabled banks 
to access internal information about the management and working processes of the firms, and 
furthermore acted as a mutual commitment mechanism between the organizations (Fohlin, 1995 
4-5). The literature explaining the emergence and function of interlocks have focused on 
different aspects. Analyzing interlock relationship among US banks and firms in the 1960’s, 
Mintz and Schwartz (1985) show that one of the primary motives of bank positioning in 
companies` boards was to gain valuable information about industry conditions and investment 
opportunities. The companies, on the other hand, profited from participating in the banks 
decisions about capital allocation. Along this line, Meeusenn and Cuyvers (1985) affirm a 
positive relation between financial interlocking and profitability. Questioning the causality 
between profitability and interlocking, Thompson and McEwen (1959) stress the view that 
companies tend to name the representatives of banks members of the supervisory board to 
                                                 
 
24  A straight forward definition of Interlocking directorates is given by Mizruchi, “An interlocking directorate occurs 
when a person affiliated with one organization sits on the board of directors of another organization.” (Mizruchi, M., 1996, 
p. 271) 
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which they are highly indebted, and Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) find that unprofitable firms a 
more likely to interlock. Consequently and consistent with the idea that interlocking appears 
with decreasing profitability, other studies highlight the aspect of monitoring, suggesting that 
interlocking is an instrument of corporate control (Mizruchi, 1982).25   
The literature on interlocking directorates in pre-World War I Germany focuses on how the 
relation between banks and industry influenced the allocation of capital in the process of 
industrialization. Analyzing the rate of expansion and magnitude of capital mobilized together 
with the direct involvement of the universal banks in equity ownership of industrial firms, 
Fohlin and Temin (1998) do not find that universal banks were more efficient in accumulating 
and ultimately channeling capital to growth enhancing industries in comparison to other 
German banking types or even in comparison to British banks (see also Fohlin 2006). Equally, 
studying the liquidity sensitivity of investment in Germany between 1903 and 1913 as a 
measure of financial constraints, Fohlin (1998)26 does not find that related banking promoted 
investment or produced large effects on companies’ liquidity sensitivity. On the other hand, 
studies on the finance growth nexus commonly suggest that this bank industry link was crucial 
in the process of German industrialization, as it gave initiative to the banks to concentrate and 
channel capital towards the leading German industrial companies.27 Besides their ability to 
allocate large amounts of capital, moreover, numerous studies stress the extraordinary 
perpetuity between German banks and their clients. Analyzing the development of networks 
                                                 
 
25   For a very good overview and discussion on the evolvment and function of interlocks see Mizruchi, Mark (1996), 
„What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates“, Annual Rev. 
Sociol. No.22, pp. 271 - 98 
26  A condensed form of the here discussed publications of C. Fohlin on the history of German banks, their relation with 
industrial companies and their role in the economic development of nineteenth century Germany are provided in the form 
of a book, published in 2007, „Finance Capitalism and Germany´s Rise to Industrial Power“, Cambridge University Press 
27  Pre-World War I Germany is certainly one of the most intensely studied cases of the finance-growth-nexus in 
economic history (Burhop, 2006 40). Classic studies on German banking history by Riesser (1911), Lough (1915), Whale 
(1930), Gerschenkron (1962), Cameron (1967, 1972) highlight the importance of banks in the crucial process of capital 
accumulation and the channeling towards industry in Germany`s initial phase of industrialization. This view has been 
highly debated. Some scholars argue that industrialization itself rather depends on retained profit independently from banks 
(Sylla, 1991) and German industry actually tended to rely more on internal finance than on external finance provided by 
the banks (Edwards and Oglivie, 1996). Benston (1995) and Fohlin (1999) affirm bank-led growth, but stress the point to 
not only relate the performance of the German industrial sector to the Grossbanken, but the overall financial system and 
other types of banks. Others even find that banks actually restrained growth by missallocating capital in favor of “heavy 
industry” (Neuburger and Stokes, 1974). In contrast,  other recent studies are more in line with the classical scholars. 
Burhop (2006) e.g. finds only weak evience of a positive bank growth nexus on a nation-wide level, yet affirms bank led-
growth of the modern sector of the German economy during industrialization. Following the principals of the ´new growth 
theory´, assuming that coordination failures in investment may inhibit economies to reach multiple equilibria in their 
growth, Da Rin and Hellmann (2002) argue that universal banks were a crucial factor in initiating the process of 
industrialization in Germany because they took the lead in the coordination of investments.   
Essay 2: Trade finance and the importance of knowing a bank 
 
Wilfried Kisling – Trade finance in historical perspective 36 / 149 
 
between German banks and industrial firms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Hopner 
et al affirm that German banks accompanied companies “from the cradle to the grave” (Hopner 
et al, 2004 342). On one hand, this implied the capacity of German banks to finance business 
ventures in the long-run (Hurley, 1911, Foxwell, 1917, Fohlin, 1998, and Lehman and 
Neuberger, 2001). On the other hand, in theory, it improved a company’s access to external 
finance by reducing transaction and information costs (i.e. Edwards and Ogilvie, 1996, Agarwal 
and Elston, 2001, and Fear and Kobrak, 2010). 
Yet, research that examines the importance of such a link in the development of German foreign 
banks and trade seems absent. At the same time, recent studies confirm a positive link between 
export trends and access to credit for export firms. Minetti and Zhu (2011), for example, show 
that credit limitations restrain exports considerably and that companies with few and only short-
established relationships with creditors especially suffer from those negative effects. Berman 
and Héricourt utilize a cross country firm-level analysis in nine different countries to study the 
impact of financial constraints on firms’ export decisions and the amount exported by firms. 
Their results affirm a positive relation between credit access, productivity and exports. While 
productivity increases the amount of exports possible, credit access defines a firm’s actual 
capacity to enter the export market (Bergman and Héricourt, 2012, 206-209).   
In the vein of this literature, this article analyses the impact of German bank entry in a market 
on the development of German exports to that market. Following the idea that the link between 
banks and industry prevailing in nineteenth century Germany equally existed between the 
Auslandsbanken and the German export sector, it examines if industries that maintained a close 
relation to Auslandsbanken exported more, as they especially benefited from the banks´ 
financial and informational support abroad.  
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3.3. The Data 
I construct two novel data sets. The sources for both are presented in the Appendix B -  Sources. 
The first data set contains Argentine imports (value in pesos de Oro) by product and country 
for the years 1875, 1885, 1895, 1901, and 1912, and was extracted from the original official 
trade statistics. It also includes the specific tariff imposed on each product. The number of 
products and countries per year and their classification presented in the official statistics change 
over time.28 Thus, to ensure the homogeneity and comparability of the classification of products 
over time I re-classified the imports, using the classification of exported manufactures from the 
United Kingdom in 1905 as presented in the British Parliamentary Papers (LXXXIV, p. 352-
353). This uniformed and standardized classification for manufactured exports defines the 
principal classes of goods according to their comparative importance in terms of their export 
value in the year 1905. I expanded the original British classification by adding the following 
commodity groups: Food, Tobacco, Beverages, Mineral and Stones, Wood, Crystal & Ceramic 
Manufactures, and Other Articles. My resulting classification consists of 25 main commodity 
groups with various sub-groups, forming a total number of 217 different products. Each product 
is assigned a specific commodity group that is consistent over time. I then assign each 
commodity group a specific value of “skill intensity”, distinguishing between; High-Skill 
products (HS), Mid-Skill products (MS), Low-Skill products (LS), and primary products (PP). 
The skill intensity of a commodity group is defined by the relative wages in the sector that 
produces the commodities of the respective group (see Tena-Junguito, 2010)29. This 
classification follows the principal idea of differentiating between the imports of second and 
first industrial revolution products. The Low-skill class consists of manufactures that typically 
dominated international trade during the first industrial revolution, such as textiles of all sorts 
(wool, linen, cotton etc.). The HS-class, on the other hand, represent the products that defined 
                                                 
 
28  In 1875, Argentina imported a total of 167 different products from 17 different countries. In 1885, 346 products from 
18 countries, in 1895 464 products from 15 countries, in 1901 691 products from 15 countries and in 1912 1145 products 
from 32 countries respectively. In 1875 products are organized and presented in alphabetical order. In the years 1885, 1895, 
1901 and 1912 products are organized by commodity groups. However, the number and character of commodity groups 
change from each year. Also, in some cases, specific products are assigned to different commodity groups in different 
years. 
29  For the estimation of skill intensity and its relative ranking we applied the classification developed by Tena-Junguito 
(2010, pp. 122-125). He assembled 26 industrial products from 32 countries in 1875 in 16 different industrial sectors and 
estimated the relative skill intensity of these 16 sectors based on (i) the general structure of USA industrial wages in 1890 
using the wage distribution for male production workers in 12 manufacturing industrial sectors in Iowa offered by Claudia 
Goldin and Frank Katz (1999, appendix table 1, p.46), and (ii) the information on wage distribution in the textile sector 
(cotton, wool, hemp, jute and silk) in 1885 in Spain, Barcelona, included in Scheuch (1885). 
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trade during the second industrial revolution, such as machinery, especially electrical 
machinery, and iron and steel manufactures. The MS-class includes apparel and alkali products. 
Food, beverages, tobacco, and raw products are grouped in the PP class. Table 32 in Appendix 
B shows the classification of commodity groups, their relative “skill-intensity” and the high, 
mid and low skill cut off. 
The second data set introduces the connection between German banks and export companies. 
The connection is measured as the number of representatives a bank has on a company´s 
supervisory board. I differentiate between two types of connection; (i) The first one I define as 
direct connection, which is the representation of the Auslandsbanken operating in Argentina 
from 1887 to 1913 in German export companies. (ii) The second one is the representation of 
the mother institutions of the Auslandsbanken in German export companies. I refer to this as 
indirect connection. The information contains the character (chairman, vice-chairman, and 
member) and number of representatives from the directorate (Vorstand), including observations 
on 371 indirect and 117 direct connections. In the case of the Auslandsbanken, I differentiate 
between (i) the total number of their representation (ii) and their representation in exporting 
companies. Such connection between the Auslandsbanken and German companies was 
possible, as both, the directorate (Vorstand) of the banks and the supervisory boards 
(Aufsichtsrat) of the companies were situated in Germany. The data have been obtained from 
two different sources. (i) The names of the members of the directorate of both banks are taken 
from the official annual reports of the banks, consolidated in the Historische Institut der 
Deutschen Bank. (ii) The representation of the bank supervisory members in German industries 
are extracted from the Adressbuch Deutscher Exportfirmen, 1897, and the Handbuch deutscher 
Aktiengesellschaften, 1913/14. These two Almanacs provide detailed information on all 
German joint stock companies, including the members of the supervisory board. This permits 
one to identify the representation of the members of the directorate of each bank in the 
supervisory board of German companies. The Adressbuch deutscher Exportfirmen, 
furthermore, gives information on which types of products each company mainly produced and 
exported. A company hence has been assigned as an exporting company in each class of 
products in the case it was defined as such in the Adressbuch. In the case that the company was 
founded after 1897, and thus does not appear in the Addressbuch, it has been defined as an 
exporting company if it was one of the one-hundred largest German companies, following the 
assumption that larger firms are more likely to export. For the assignment and ranking of the 
companies according to their size, I use the information on the Top 100 largest German 
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companies in 1907, measured in terms of number of employees, provided by Martin Fiedler 
and Howard Gospel (2010). The German export companies with banking representation are 
than classified by industry according to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC-1968), and 
by the type of products they export according to my classification of HS, MS, LS and PP 
products.  
 
Finally, for the empirical analysis of the effect of German bank entry on German exports, I 
combine the information on imports and the interlocking data. I classify each of the 217 
products exported by Germany in each year according to whether it was exported by at least 
one of the export companies that were connected with at least one of the two Auslandsbanken 
operating in Argentina between 1887 and 1913 or not. For ease of reference, I henceforth refer 
to products exported by connected companies as bank-connected exports. I assume that the 
bank connection didn’t alter over the period of investigation. The data for 1913 is used. This 
creates a homogenous treatment group over time. A change in the treatment group eventually 
could bias the effect of the treatment, as changes in exports of the treated group may be the 
simple result of a change in the number and/or character of the exporting companies linked to 
banks rather than the effect of the treatment. Yet, the data show that even if the interlocking 
directorates are subject to change over time, this only marginally influences the composition of 
products exported by the companies linked to the banks.  
 
3.4. The advancement of German trade in Argentina – Exports, margins, and 
competitors  
 
Argentina emerged as one of the most promising markets in the last decades before World War 
I. In 1861, the victory of centralist forces and the reunification of the country finally ended the 
series of civil wars and revolts, and once the costly Paraguayan War was over, Argentina’s 
development accelerated. The massive European immigration – mainly Italian and Spanish -, 
urbanization, colonization of the inner country, rapid progress in agriculture and foreign trade, 
and partial industrialization all combined to augment the economy and society. The population 
more than quadrupled between 1870 and 1912 from 1.8 million to some 7.3 million (Bulmer-
Thomas, 2003, 412), and the economy followed suit. Between 1870 and 1914, Argentina 
experienced rapid economic growth, which changed to a real boom in the 1880s. “From 1880 
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to 1913, Argentina had an average growth rate of 5% p.a. in output, or about half that in terms 
of per capita. Argentina’s income per capita had risen from 67% of developed-country levels 
in 1870, to 90% in 1900, and 100% in 1913.” (Della Paolera, 2003 3). The massive growth of 
the 1880s was interrupted by the equally massive crisis of 1890, when a crash of Argentina’s 
financial system spread panic to the European financial markets. Around the third quarter of 
the 19th century, most income estimations situate Argentine living standards in a better position 
than most of the Latin American countries, however, still closer to the European periphery than 
to the rich European or new settler countries (Australia, New Zealand and the United States). 
By the early 20th century Argentina had become a member of the exclusive club of the top ten 
richest countries in the world30.  
 
As Figure 6 shows, between 1875 and 1914 on average 77 per cent of Argentine imports came 
from Europe, with clear dominance of the United Kingdom (around 35 per cent). Yet, German 
and US products constantly gained in share as their exports grew significantly faster, in 
particular by the turn of the century. Between 1890 and 1914, the annual average growth rate 
of British, German and US exports was 2, 5, and 6 per cent, respectively. Consequently, while 
Germany started with a 4 per cent share in 1874, by the beginning of the 20th century it had 
become the second biggest exporter to Argentina, slightly overtaking the US with a 15 per cent 
share. More than 60 per cent of Argentine imports were manufactures, almost half of which 
were products from the HS sector (see Figure 7a). Even though the Baring crisis temporarily 
diminished the share of the latter, at the same time it presented opportunities for other countries 
to gain market share and challenge the dominance of Britain. Taking the chance, Germany 
nearly doubled its share in HS imports from 12 per cent in 1885 to 21 per cent in 1895 (the 
British share declined from 57.63 to 38.02 per cent) and thereby established its relative 
importance in the Argentine market (See Figure 7b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
30  Based on GDP data according to Bolt, J. and J.L van Zanden (2013) 
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Figure 6: Argentine imports by country – Share of each country on total imports (%) - 1875-1914 
 
  
Sources: See Appendix B - Sources  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Argentine imports by skill class - Share of each class on total imports (%) -  and HS imports of 
main trade partners – Share per country (%) on total HS imports – 1875, 1885, 1895, 1901, and 1912 
 
  
    Sources: See Appendix B - Sources  
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What explains this success of German exports? Did Germany export larger quantities of each 
product (the intensive margin), or a wider set of goods (the extensive margin) in comparison to 
other countries exporting to Argentina? I calculate the extensive and intensive margin of exports 
following Hummels and Klenow (2005 710ff). In the form of an equation the extensive margin 
is expressed as: 
 
EMc= 
∑𝑥𝑟𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼𝑐
 
∑𝑥𝑟𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼
 
 
 
Where x is the nominal value of imports and Ic is the set of observable categories (products) in 
which Argentina has positive imports from country c, with xci > 0. Argentina has positive 
imports from reference country r in all I categories (products). In this model r is defined as all 
other countries from which Argentina imported but country c. EMc equals the Argentine 
imports from country r in all Ic relative to the imports from country r in all I categories 
(products). The extensive margin hence can be understood as a weighted count of the categories 
(products) from country c relative to the categories from all other countries r. An advantage of 
this approach is that it prevents that a certain category (product) appears to be important just 
because country c and no other country exports a lot of this category (product) to Argentina31. 
The corresponding intensive margin is defined as: 
 
IMc= 
∑𝑥𝑟𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼𝑐
 
∑𝑥𝑟𝑖
𝑖∈𝐼𝑐
 
 
 
                                                 
 
31  The following example illustrates the idea. In 1912, German exports to Argentina were 1.97 times larger than Italian 
exports (intensive margin, value of exports). This confirms the theory that larger economies tend to export more. However, 
part of this advantage may have derived from exporting a greater number of products (extensive margin) - Germany 
exported 88.38 per cent of the 1145 products, Italy 62.45 per cent. If all products were of equal importance, the extensive 
margin of Germany would be 1.42 times larger than Italy´s. This difference may derive from the fact that Germany was 
the sole exporter of certain products that in total exports to Argentina were of marginal importance. Yet, when including 
the weight count according to Hummels and Klenow, it becomes clear that Germany exported products that are a larger 
share of the rest-of-the-world exports to Argentina (the numerator in the EMc equation ). The extensive margin of Germany 
is 1.45 times greater than Italy´s, and its intensive margin is 1.53 times larger. 
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With IMc equaling the nominal Argentine imports from country c relative to the nominal 
imports from all other countries r in those categories in which Argentina imports from country 
c (Ic).   
 
Figure 8 shows the extensive (8a) and intensive (8b) margins of imports from Argentina´s main 
trading partners. The respective margins of HS and LS products are depicted in Figures 9 and 
10.  Figure 8a shows a slight but constant increase in the degree of diversification of imports 
from all six countries, with the exception of Italy. Yet, the changes are rather small. The 
extensive margin of Germany increased only slightly from 0.87 in 1875 to 0.93 in 1912. Similar, 
British margins increased from 0.84 to 0.92 respectively. The same dynamics exist in the 
imports of HS and LS products (9a and 10a). Eventually, the competition between the leading 
exporters took place in the intensification of exports, in particular of HS goods. Figure 3b 
illustrates that Great Britain always exported more than any other country, but from the Baring 
crisis in the 1890s its intensive margins constantly decreased, while German and US margins 
show the opposite trend. It appears that the financial distress caused a constant decrease in the 
intensive margins of HS products in general and of British margins in particular (9b). While the 
British seemed to substitute their loss with an intensification of LS exports (10b), Germany 
caught up in the HS sector. In 1875, the intensive margins of British HS imports exceeded those 
of Germany by an impressive 104 times. In 1912, the advantage had shrunk to British margins 
being only 1.2 times higher than German margins.  
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Figure 8: Imports Top 6 trade partners – Extensive and intensive margin – 1875, 1885, 1895, 1901, and 1912 
 
 
 
Sources: See Appendix B - Sources  
 
 
Figure 9: HS imports Top 6 trade partners – Extensive and intensive Margin– 1875, 1885, 1895, 1901, and 
1912 
 
  
Sources: See Appendix B - Sources  
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Figure 10: LS imports Top 6 trade partners – Extensive and intensive Margin – 1875, 1885, 1895, 1901, and 
1912 
 
 
 
Sources: See Appendix B - Sources  
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changed political powers in Uruguay, the new government refused to pay its debts. The 
situation further worsened with a massive depreciation of silver in the late 1870s, diminishing 
the invested capital. Since then, the bank never really recovered, and after continuous 
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it in 1884/5 (Riesser and Jacobs, 1911 423 433 443, Jones, 1991 103, Young, 1991 89, and Gall 
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Deutsche Südamerikanische Bank (SÜD) was established. In comparative perspective, 
Germany was late. At the time of German entry in Latin America, British banks had already 
been present for more than twenty years. The British were the first to enter, driven by the 
primary motive to participate in the growing trade business between Latin America and Europe 
Triner, 2006). In 1862 the London and River Plate bank was founded, followed one year later 
by the British Bank of South America. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, British 
trade and its financing was managed by the merchant houses, maintaining offices in England 
and in Latin America. With British trade and investment in Latin America accelerating 
intensively since the 1860s, Banks became indispensable to manage the increasing amount of 
financial transactions.32 Besides the British and the German banks, the French-Italian Banco 
Francés e Italiano para la America del Sud, and the Swiss Banco Suizo-Sud Americano were 
operating in Argentina between 1875 and 1913. Yet, the largest financial institutions were the 
Deutsche Überseeische Bank and the London and River Plate Bank (Hurley, 1914 25).  
 
Table 5: Expansion of British and German banks in Argentina  
 
 1881 1900 1913 
Nº British Bank Branches in South America 29 60 84 
Nº German Bank Branches in South America 2 14 47 
Nº British Bank Branches in Argentina 5 12 26 
Nº German Bank Branches in Argentina 1 2 9 
     Sources: See Appendix B - Sources  
 
 
                                                 
 
32  Besides being better suited to managing the increasing capital movements, banks also released the merchant houses 
from the necessity of maintaining expensive representation abroad, and thus, enabled smaller firms to enter into foreign 
trade business (Young, 1991, 82-85). In addition, some studies suggest that the British were attracted by the high interest 
rates prevailing in deposit and current account transactions in Latin America at this time (Young, 1991, 82-85). Argentina 
was a very profitable market for foreign banks after its unification and with the prospects of an economic takeoff in the 
1870’s and 1880’s. Foreign investments were high, and so were profit expectations. There were many splendid 
opportunities, especially for the British. Railway systems were constructed, connecting the large plains and the harbor 
cities. Industrial enterprises were interesting, too, and the ever-indebted government was desperately in need of foreign 
money. British investment was especially directed to the capital-intensive construction of the railways. The London and 
River Plate Bank for example, was the first to enter into the railway business in Argentina, and by 1914 it was holder of 
nearly all British-owned railroads in the country (Hurley, 1911 14). In the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth 
century, foreign banks additionally benefited from the relatively less developed Argentine financial sector. Besides some 
tentative first bank projects, such as the Banco de Buenos Aires (1822-26) and the Banco Nacional (1826-36), neither 
exchange nor depositary nor issuing banks existed until the second half of the 19th century. Commerce was largely financed 
by foreign trade companies, especially from Spain. While credits were administrated by the holding companies situated in 
the country of origin, their local representatives and wholesalers were responsible for the direct assignment in Argentina. 
Bills of exchange were applied, but specialized financial institutions did not exist until 1860 (Cortes, 1997 114-115). Thus, 
when the economy gained momentum in the late 1860s, there were no adequate, national financial institutions available. 
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The DÜB and the SÜD were founded by some of the largest and leading Grossbanken; the 
Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the Schaffhausen´scher Bankverein, and the Nationalbank 
für Deutschland. These banks maintained a close link to German industrial companies. This 
link – an indirect connection – is illustrated in Table 6. In 1913, together the four banks were 
represented by 441 seats in 371 different firms. This bank-industry nexus was maintained in 
the foreign markets via the Auslandsbanken. The establishment of the direct connection 
between the DÜB and SÜD and German industrial companies was possible because (i) the 
headquarters with the supervisory boards of the DÜB and SÜD were located in Germany, 
Berlin, (ii) and moreover due to the simple fact that the members of the management 
(Aufsichtsrat or Vorstand) of the mother institutions in many cases were the same people that 
formed the members of the supervisory boards of the Auslandsbanken. In 1887, for example, 
all members of the supervisory board of the Deutsche Überseeische bank in Argentina were 
also members of the supervisory board of the Deutsche Bank, with Georg Siemens being the 
chairman of both boards. In 1913, 6 out of 19 and 2 out of 11 members of the supervisory board 
of the DÜB and the SÜD were still represented in the management of their mother institutions. 
The direct connection is presented in Table 7. Together, the DÜB and the SÜD were represented 
by 141 seats in a total number of 117 companies, of which 31 were (identified as) exporting 
companies. One fourth of the representatives took a leading position in the management of the 
export companies, inhering either the seat of the chair or vice-chairman of the company’s board. 
It seems that the banks did not exclusively focus on the largest companies, even though they 
were represented in 14 of the top 100 and in three of the top ten largest firms.33  
 
 
  
                                                 
 
33  Measured in terms of employees, see Fiedler et al (2010) 
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Table 6: Indirect connection -  Representation of mother institutions in companies by number and character 
– 1913 
 
 Seats total 
of which 
Chairman 
of which Vice-
Chairman 
No. of Companies 
Deutsche Bank 134 25 22 116 
Dresdner Bank 102 19 13 87 
Nationalbank 95 3 3 95 
Schaafhausenscher 110 26 16 92 
Total 441 73 54 371 
 
Sources: See Appendix B - Sources  
 
 
Table 7: Direct connection – Total representation and representation of DÜB and SÜD in export companies 
by number and character – 1913 
 
 Seats 
total 
of 
which 
Chair
man 
of which 
Vice-
Chairman 
No. of 
Companies 
Seats 
Exporting 
Companies 
of which 
Chairma
n 
of which 
Vice-
Chairman 
No. of 
Companies 
Deutsche 
Überseeische 
Bank 
83 24 6 74 27 9 1 16 
Deutsche 
Südam. Bank 
58 5 4 49 17 0 1 15 
Total 141 29 10 117 44 9 2 31 
 
Sources: See Appendix B - Sources  
 
 
 
The sectorial composition of the export firms connected to the DÜB and the SÜD is rather 
diversified. The goods exported by the companies range from coal and petroleum products, to 
textile manufactures, paper, and metal manufacturing goods (see also Table 33 Appendix B). 
However, there is a certain tendency of concentration towards the HS sector. Figure 11 
illustrates the sectorial distribution of the companies that were connected to the DÜB and SÜD, 
and the structure of their exports. It shows (11a) the number of companies and the respective 
number of seats in the supervisory board by the different skill classes (HS, MS, LS, PP). More 
than 68 per cent of the companies came from the HS sector, accounting for more than 57 per 
cent of the banks’ overall seats in supervisor boards. Moreover, the figure illustrates (11b) the 
distribution of the total exported products of bank-connected companies and the share of the 
number of products exported by bank-connected companies on the total number of products 
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imported by Argentina by skill class. Of all the goods exported by bank-connected companies, 
45 per cent were HS products, covering 36 per cent of the variety of total Argentine HS imports. 
The companies that exported HS products were from the metal manufacturing industry such as 
the Mannesmannröhren Werke, the Phönix AG für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb -that mainly 
exported iron ore, metal tubes, steel-  and the large electrical enterprises such as the Allgemeine 
Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG) or Siemens & Halske -  exporting electrical wires, electrical 
motors and dynamos, amongst other products. 
 
 
Figure 11: The DÜB and SÜD and the German export companies in 1913 
 
   
Sources: See Appendix B - Sources  
  
Note: The share of number of products exported is the per cent share of the number of products exported by the 
companies in each class of the total number of products exported by the companies. The share of number of 
products in class is the per cent share of the number of products exported by the companies in the total number of 
products that exists in each class. 
 
 
 
A first review of the quantitative evidence seems to confirm that the performance of bank-
connected exports benefited, although with a time lag, from the bank´s entry into the market. 
Table 8 compares the share and growth of bank-connected exports with the rest of German 
exports. In the years 1875 and 1885, the bank-connected exports accounted for one fourth of 
total German exports. The situation did not change in the first year of observation after bank 
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entry, 1895. However, in the following years the bank-connected exports increased 
significantly more than the rest of German exports, doubling between 1895 and 1901, and 
reaching a share of 56 per cent of total exports in 1913. This increase of bank-connected exports 
after 1895 may to some extent have been driven by a general increase in the Argentine demand 
of these products at that time, given the high share of HS products in German bank-connected 
exports. The financial constraints that Argentina faced as result of the sovereign-debt crisis in 
1890 (Baring crisis) caused a sudden drop in the import of capital-intensive products, followed 
by a recovery and increasing imports in the second half of the 1890s. However, as discussed 
and illustrated in section 3.4 of this paper, whereas Argentina’s increasing demand did not lead 
to an equal increase in the exports of HS goods of all countries, Germany’s exports and market 
share increased. The idea that the increase of German bank-connected exports is not exclusively 
the result of demand effects is additionally strengthened by the following test. If one looks at 
the British exports, assuming a hypothetical differentiation between bank-connected and the 
rest of exports based on the exact same classification as in case of the German exports, one can 
observe that bank-connected exports only grew by 2.8 per cent and their share of total exports 
only marginally varied from 1895 to 1901 (See Table 34 Appendix B). This clearly highlights 
the dynamics of German bank-connected exports.  
 
 
Table 8: German bank-connected and not bank-connected exports  – Share of total exports (%) and growth 
respective to the previous year (%)  
 
Year Share – Bank-
connected 
Share - Not 
connected 
Growth – Bank-
connected 
Growth - Not 
connected 
1875 21,9 78,1   
1885 25,8 74,2 73,9 67,6 
1895 24,4 75,6 32,6 37,5 
1901 33,0 67,0 50,8 25,0 
1912 56,1 43,9 84,6 60,0 
Sources: See Appendix B - Sources  
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3.6. First stage analysis – The determinants of exports and their margins 
 
Using an augmented gravity model, based on the theoretical assumptions of Head and Mayer 
(2013), this section empirically identifies and analyzes the determinants of the exports of the 
major trading partners of Argentina between 1875 and 1912. It focuses on the comparison 
between total exports and the exports of different skill classes, answering three main questions: 
(i) Which factors, and to what degree, determined the development of exports? (ii) Did the same 
factors have an impact on the diversification and/or intensification of exports? If so, to what 
degree? (iii) And finally, can we observe a difference in their influence on exports of different 
skill classes? The previous analysis of the development and structure of the exports of the main 
trading partners of Argentina has shown that the success of Germany, in relative and total terms, 
essentially derived from its advancement in the HS-Skill sector. One of the principal concerns 
of this section hence is to answer the question: what determined the export, and its intensive 
and extensive margins, of HS-Skill products? 
 
I distinguish between two types of models. The “Standard Models”, examining the factors that 
shaped the development of total imports (2.1) and High-Skill (2.2) and Low-Skill (2.3) imports, 
and the “Advanced Models” that analyse the extensive and intensive margin of the total imports 
(2.4), (2.5), and the different skill classes (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.9). Seen from the supply side, I 
test for the influence of the relative productivity and the size of the economy of the exporting 
countries – measured as relative wages and real GDP34 respectively. Relative productivity, 
however, is the productivity of each country in comparison to other countries, and not the 
productivity of different export sectors. The possible effects of demand on exports are 
considered by the use of data on Argentine imports instead of the individual exports statistics 
of each trading partner. In addition, I account for the possible influence of transport costs, 
proxied by geographical distance in the absence of freight costs, and tariff frictions – measured 
as product specific tariffs. The number of banks of each country operating in Argentina in each 
year are used as an indicator of the presumable influence of finance. The models include 
observations from fourteen countries35 for the years 1875, 1885, 1895, 1901 and 1912. The 
                                                 
 
34   Alternatively, population has been used as a measure of the size of an economy, which did not change the results of 
the estimation significantly, showing the same patterns as GDP.  
35  The countries are; Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, France, Spain, Austria-Hungary, Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden-Norway, Brazil, the United States of America, and Canada. 
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number of trading partners was determined by the availability of data on respective GDP and 
real wages. Together, these countries account on average for more than 89 per cent of total 
imports, which I believe is a representative share. Expressed in the form of an equation, the 
“Standard Model” for total imports is designed as followed: 
 
 
Xct = β0 + β1lnYct + β2lnWct + β3lnDc + β4AdvWct + β5Bct + βt + ɛij     (2.1) 
 
 
Where Xct is the nominal value of imports of Argentina from country c in year t, β0 is a constant, 
Yct the nominal national income of each country (GDP) in each year, and Wct are the real wages 
of c in year t (100 = Great Britain real wages in 1905). Dc is the great circle distance between 
the capital cities of c and Argentina in kilometres. The variable AdvWct represents the ad 
valorem equivalent of the tariff of Argentina weighted by the imports (by product) from country 
c to Argentina in t (weighted ad valorem tariff).36 Bct is a numeric variable, representing the 
number of banks of country c present in Argentina at time t. The estimated model also includes 
time fixed effects (βt) and ɛij is an error term, representing the myriad other influences on 
exports. The “Standard Models” for the HS and LS imports are correspondingly specified as:  
 
 
HSXct = β0 + β1lnYct + β2lnWct + β3lnDc + β4AdvWHSct + β5Bct + βt + ɛij           (2.2) 
 
and 
 
LSXct = β0 + β1lnYct + β1lnWct + β2lnDc + β3AdvWLSct + β4Bct + βt + ɛij             (2.3) 
 
 
Where HSXct and LSXct is the nominal value of imports of High-Skill and Low-Skill products 
from country c in year t, respectively. AdvWHS and AdvWLS represent the weighted ad 
valorem tariff of HS and LS imports. The “Advanced Models” with the extensive and intensive 
margins of total imports are defined as:  
 
 
EMct = β0 + β1lnYct + β2lnWct + β3lnDc + β4AdvWct + β5Bct + βt + ɛij             (2.4) 
                                                 
 
36  With AdvWct =  
∑𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑡∗𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑡
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑐𝑡
, where advpt is the tariff of product p in year t, imppct is the value of imports of 
product p from country c in t, and impct the value of imports of country c in t. See also Appendix B -  Sources. 
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IMct = β0 + β1lnYct + β2lnWct + β3lnDc + β4AdvWct + β5Bct + βt + ɛij              (2.5) 
 
 
The “Advanced Models” with the extensive and intensive margins of HS and LS imports are 
accordingly specified as:  
 
 
EMHSct = β0 + β1lnYct + β2lnWct + β3lnDc + β4AdvWHSct + β5Bct + βt + ɛij      (2.6) 
 
IMHSct = β0 + β1lnYct + β2lnWct + β3lnDc + β4AdvWHSct + β5Bct + βt + ɛij        (2.7) 
 
EMLSct = β0 + β1lnYct + β2lnWct + β3lnDc + β4AdvWLSct + β5Bct + βt + ɛij      (2.8) 
 
IMLSct = β0 + β1lnYct + β2lnWct + β3lnDc + β4AdvWLSct + β5Bct + βt + ɛij        (2.9) 
 
 
EMct and IMct represent the extensive and intensive margin of Argentine imports from country 
c in t, and EMHSct, IMHSct, EMLSct, and IMLSct are accordingly the extensive and intensive 
margin of Argentine imports of High-Skill and Low-Skill products from country c in t. 
Technically, panel data is used to estimate equation (2.1) to (2.9) with Poisson-maximum 
likelihood (PPML). The use of PPML allows for including zero observations in the dependent 
variable, which must be excluded or treated improperly under log-linear OLS estimates 
(Lampe, 2009, Huberman et al, 2015) Additionally, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) have 
shown that Least Square estimates of log-linear models are inefficient, biased, and/or even 
inconsistent and propose the PPML with robust standard errors as a superior alternative. 
 
The results are presented in Table 9 and 10. They confirm the classical assumptions of a gravity 
model of trade, with a positive impact of economic size and a negative influence of distance on 
the trade between two countries. The variable GDP is always positive and, with the small 
exception of the intensive margins of total imports (2.5), statistically significant, and the 
variable distance, although not statistically significant in all cases, always shows negative 
values. The positive and significant effect of GDP on total imports (2.1) is 0.135, implying that 
the level of exports increases by 14.45 per cent37 if GDP increases by one per cent. The same 
increase in wages would lead to 1.57 times more exports. Especially in the HS (2.2) sector 
                                                 
 
37  Since 1-e 0.135 = 0.1445. See Wooldridge, Jeffrey (2002), “Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach”, 
Itps Thomson Learning; 2nd Revised edition 
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wages contribute significantly to the total value of exports, with a one per cent increase yielding 
a 7.75 times increase in exports. Moreover, it appears that productivity played a more important 
role in the intensification of exports of existing HS products (2.7), rather than exporting a wider 
set of goods (2.6). This may lead to the conclusion that the previously described advantage of 
Germany in the export of HS products, in particular in its intensive margins, derives from the 
higher productivity of the German economy in comparison to its competitors. The results for 
the weighted ad valorem tariffs are somehow puzzling, not showing any robust pattern that 
confirms an influence on Argentine imports. They seem to have a positive and significant 
impact on total imports (2.1), but show no effect on their extensive and intensive margins (2.4), 
(2.5). For LS imports I detect no effect at all, and in the case of HS imports, I observe a positive 
effect on the extensive (2.6) margins and a negative effect on the intensive (2.7) margins. One 
interpretation is that an increase in tariffs led to a reduction in the total values of imports but 
did not affect the variety of goods imported. Finally, I find a positive and significant impact of 
the presence of banks on the level of exports, confirming the assumption of a positive 
correlation between the existence of financial networks of the exporting country in the market 
of the importing country and the value of exports. The effect of banks on total exports is 0.512, 
implying that the level of exports increases by 67 per cent (since 1-e 0.402 = 0.668) with each 
additional number of bank. This effect is more pronounced in the case of LS exports (2.3), 
which is mainly driven by the correlation between British banks and British LS exports. When 
looking at the margins of imports, it seems that banks fostered the intensification of exports 
(2.5), (2.7), (2.9). 
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Table 9: The Standard Models - Determinants of Argentinian imports by "Skill Class" - 1875-1912  
 
  
(2.1) 
Total 
(2.2)  
HS 
(2.3) 
LS 
ln(wages) 0.943** 2.169*** 0.761** 
 
(0.382) (0.815) (0.344) 
ln(gdp) 0.135*** 0.201*** 0.183*** 
 
(0.028) (0.057) (0.037) 
ln(distance) -0.0840 -0.382 -0.474** 
 
(0.184) (0.264) (0.225) 
ln(AdvW) 4.775** 
  
 
(0.232) 
  
ln(AdvW- HS) 
 
4.254 
 
  
(0.391) 
 
ln(AdvW- LS) 
  
3.387 
   
(0.262) 
Number of Banks 0.512*** 0.394*** 0.603*** 
 
(0.086) (0.117) (0.084) 
Time fe (βt) YES YES YES 
No. Obs. 56 56 56 
Method of est, PPML PPML PPML 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Dependent variable in column (2.1) is the total value of Argentine imports from country c, in column (2.2) 
and (2.3) the total value of HS- and LS-Skill imports, respectively. For the classification of imports according to 
different skill classes see Table 32 Appendix B. Sample includes 1875, 1885, 1895, 1901, and 1912. The number 
of observations is reduced to 56 from original 70 (5 years*14 countries = 70 observations) as in the case of non-
existing imports from country c in year t, it is not possible to determine the weighted ad valorem tariff of this 
country. For the definition of weighted ad valorem tariff see Appendix B - Sources. Robust standard errors are 
clustered by country and product and are indicated in brackets. Sources: See Appendix B - Sources 
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Table 10: The Advanced Models - Determinants of extensive and entensive margin of Argentinian imports 
by "Skill Class" - 1875-1912  
 
 (2.4) 
Total-EM 
(2.5) 
Total-IM 
(2.6) 
HS-EM 
(2.7) 
HS-IM 
(2.8) 
LS-EM 
(2.9) 
LS-IM 
ln(wages) 0.500** 0.431 0.902*** 14.68*** 9.661* 11.69*** 
 (0.232) (0.431) (0.267) (2.984) (0.443) (2.067) 
ln(gdp) 0.069*** 0.033 0.092*** 0.903*** 0.386* 0.625*** 
 (0.015) (0.052) (0.015) (0.311) (0.228) (0.192) 
ln(distance) -0.190 -0.0575 -0.189 -5.958*** -3.142*** -5.030*** 
 (0.123) (0.203) (0.165) (0.751) (0.885) (0.655) 
ln(AdvW) 2.410 -0.853     
 (0.163) (0.240)     
ln(AdvW- HS)   4.310*** -29.12***   
   (1.525) (9.376)   
ln(AdvW- LS)     6.644 -5.126 
     (1.552) (4.755) 
Number of Banks 0.078 0.455*** 0.075 1.314** 1.584* 2.318*** 
 (0.058) (0.087) (0.080) (0.594) (0.890) (0.306) 
Time fe (βt) YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. Obs. 56 56 56 56 56 56 
Method of est. PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Note: Dependent variable in column (2.4) and (2.5) is the extensive and intensive margin of the total Argentine imports 
from country c, in column (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9) the extensive and intensive margin of HS-Skill and LS-Skill 
imports, respectively. The extensive and intensive margin are defined according to Hummels and Klenow. For the 
definition and the classification of imports according to different skill classes see Table 32 Appendix B. Sample includes 
1875, 1885, 1895, 1901, and 1912. The number of observations is reduced to 56 from original 70 (5 years*14 countries 
= 70 observations) as in case of non-existing imports from country c in year t, it is not possible to determine the weighted 
ad valorem of this country. For the definition of weighted ad valorem see Appendix B - Sources. Robust standard errors 
are clustered by country and product and are indicated in brackets. Sources: See Appendix B - Sources. 
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3.7. Second stage analysis – Measuring the effect of the bank-trade-nexus on 
exports 
 
This study investigates the effect of German bank entry on German exports to Argentina 
between 1880 and 1913. The major hypothesis is that German export companies connected to 
German banks operating in Argentina benefited from relatively easier access to financial 
support and privileged information in the Argentine market; in other words, a reduction of 
transaction costs and information asymmetry. Consequently, Germany exported more of those 
products that were exported by one or more companies connected to the banks after their entry. 
This assumption has its limitations. Presumably, companies that were not connected to the 
banks had alternative sources of finance and of gaining information about the Argentine market. 
We cannot totally be sure that companies not connected to the Auslandsbanken did not receive 
any financial and information support from these banks at all. This, however, also applies to 
the bank-connected companies, as they equally had access to all sources of finance. Therefore, 
the objective of this study is not to show any effect of German trade finance, but the effect of 
creating privileged access to financial and information support in the target market. This 
includes privileged access in comparison to those companies that did not, as well as to those 
that did possess the same and alternative sources of finance. 
 
I use a difference-in-difference model to measure the effect of German bank entry into 
Argentina (treatment) on the bank-connected exports (treated group) in comparison to the rest 
of German exports (control group) to Argentina between 1880 and 1913. The model covers 
German exports by product – based on my product classification presented in section 3.3 – for 
the years 1875, 1885, 1895, 1901, and 1912. I differentiate between two specifications of the 
model. The first one considers a product to be treated (bank-connected) if it has been exported 
by at least one of the export companies that was connected to the DÜB in 1913. The DÜB was 
the first German bank in Argentina that was exclusively founded by German institutions, as 
well as the largest, and for the major part of the period of investigation (from 1887 until 1906) 
the only German bank operating in Argentina. The second specification includes the SÜD, and 
consequently defines a product to be treated if it was exported by at least one of the export 
companies connected with the DÜB and / or the SÜD. I furthermore test for the possible 
influence of demand effects (Argentine imports by product) and trade frictions (product specific 
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tariffs) on German exports to Argentina. In the form of an equation, the models are expressed 
as followed:38 
 
 
Xpt = PRODUCTp + YEARt + CON1Bpt + INTERVpt + lnARGIMPpt + lnADVpt +ɛpt  (2.10) 
 
Xpt = PRODUCTp + YEARt + CON2Bpt + INTERVpt + lnARGIMPpt + lnADVpt +ɛpt  (2.11) 
 
 
The outcome of interest is Xpt, the nominal value of German exports of product p to Argentina 
in year t. The variable PRODUCTp is a fixed effect that controls for unobserved time-invariant 
characteristics of a product p. YEARt is a year fixed effect that controls for common shocks 
influencing all products equally in year t. The variable CON1Bpt included in the first 
specification of my model (Equation 2.10) is a dummy which takes the value one if a product 
p is exported in year t by at least one company connected to the DÜB, and the value zero in the 
opposite case. It identifies the treated group and captures differences between the treated and 
control group prior to the bank entry. I assume a time-invariant connection between bank and 
companies. The data for 1913 is used. This creates a homogenous treatment group over time. 
A change in the treatment group eventually could bias the effect of the treatment, as changes in 
exports of the treated group may be the simple result of a change in the number and/or character 
of the exporting companies linked to banks rather than the effect of the treatment. The variable 
CON2Bpt included in the second specification (2.11) is identical to CON1Bpt but also considers 
the connection of export companies with the SÜD. INTERVpt is the intervention dummy that 
is equal to one for the treated group after the event of bank entry (t > 1885). lnARGIMPpt is the 
natural logarithm of the nominal value of Argentine imports of product p in year t, capturing 
the possible influence of variations in the demand of a product p on the German exports of that 
product p in the year t. The variable Advpt represents the ad valorem equivalent of the tariff of 
each product imported from Argentina in each year. ɛij is an error term, representing the myriad 
other influences on exports. Technically, panel data is used to estimate equation (2.10) and 
(2.11) with Poisson-maximum likelihood (PPML) to account for zero value observations in the 
dependent variable. 
 
                                                 
 
38  Imbens and Wooldridge (2007) give a comprehensive explanation and overview of the existing designs of difference-
in-difference estimations. My model is based on their assumptions of a difference-in-difference analysis with multiple time 
periods (page 4).  
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The results are presented in Table 11. They indicate a positive and significant correlation 
between the Argentine demand for products and the respective German exports. Tariffs on the 
other hand seems to have a significant negative influence on the development of exports. The 
coefficient of interest is =(+++) – (++), which is the difference-in-difference 
estimate, with (+++) being the expected outcome of the treated group with bank 
intervention, and (++) the expected outcome of the treated group without the event of 
German bank entry.  is positively significant in every specification of the model, confirming 
the principal assumption of this study that German bank entry had a positive impact on bank-
connected exports.  
 
 
Table 11: Difference in Difference estimation for German exports to Argentina - 1875-1912  
 
 
(2.10) 
DÜB 
(2.11) 
DÜB/SÜD 
CON1B () 9.042  
 (65.60)  
CON2B ()  9.071 
  (55.42) 
INTERV () 0.668*** 0.523** 
 (0.219) (0.232) 
lnARGIMP () 0.791*** 0.799*** 
 (0.0843) (0.0858) 
lnADV () -1.534** -1.506** 
 (0.625) (0.618) 
PRODUCT () YES YES 
YEAR () YES YES 
Number of observations 930 930 
Method of estimation PPML PPML 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable in each column is the total value of German exports by product to Argentina. The sample 
includes the years 1875, 1885, 1895, 1901, 1912 and a total number of 217 products in each year. For the 
classification of products see Table 32 Appendix B. The number of observations is reduced as for some products 
ad valorem year observations are missing. Robust standard errors are clustered by product and year and are indicated 
in brackets. Sources: See Appendix B - Sources 
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To assure the validity of my results, I perform two robustness checks. First, (i) I expand the 
control group by the exports of the main trading partners of Argentina; Great Britain, the USA, 
France, and Belgium. The assumption is that the export industries of these countries were not 
connected with German foreign banks in Argentina, and hence their exports were not affected 
by the German bank entry. The specifications of the model are identical to equations (2.10) and 
(2.11), with the exception that dependent variable Xcpt is the nominal value of German, British, 
US, French, and Belgian exports of product p to Argentina in year t. Moreover, I test for the 
influence of the geographical distance of each country to Argentina and include country fixed 
effects. The results are presented in Table 35 Appendix B. They confirm the findings of a 
positive impact of bank entry with the difference-in-difference estimator  being positive and 
significant. Second, (ii) I perform a pre-treatment test. One principal issue may be that Germany 
in general exported high quantities of the treated products, even before the bank entry, and the 
results of the model hence reflect a time-invariant dynamic that is independent from German 
banking presence. Or, in other words, the difference-in-difference analysis assumes a parallel 
trend between the treated and control group before the treatment. To test for this assumption, I 
use a difference-in-difference model that is identical to the model described in equations (2.10) 
and (2.11), with the exception that it covers only the imports for the pre-treatment period (1875, 
1885) and assumes that German banks were established already during that period. The results 
show no statistical significance of the difference-in-difference estimator, , confirming no 
difference between the trend in the export of treated and non-treated products before the actual 
bank entry in 1888. The results of this second robustness check are presented in Table 36 
Appendix B. 
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3.8. Concluding remarks 
 
The objective of this article has been to identify and analyze the determinants of the success of 
German exports in comparison with the exports of other leading industrial economies of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to Argentina, one of the emerging markets at that 
time. In particular, it asks whether the establishment of the first German banks in Argentina, in 
their capability to provide financial and informational assistance in the target market, had a 
positive impact on German exports to Argentina. More precisely, I ask if Germany exported 
more products that were exported by one or more companies connected to the banks established 
in Argentina (bank-connected exports), as they benefited from  privileged access to the banks’ 
support.  
 
For this purpose, I empirical examine the determinants of the exports, and their extensive and 
intensive margins, of Argentina’s trading partners between 1875 and 1913, and test for the 
effect of bank entry on the exports of German industries linked and not linked to German banks 
in Argentina. The results show that a country’s export success is mainly explained by a 
comparatively higher degree of productivity together with an increase in the intensive margins 
of export. This dynamic is especially pronounced in the export of what I define High-Skill 
products, that are mainly products of the second industrial revolution. I moreover find a 
consistent and significantly positive impact of German bank entry in Argentina on the 
expansion of German bank-connected exports.  
 
The findings, on one hand, lend empirical support to the literature on international trade, 
expanding the pool of studies that defines the intensive margin as a decisive variable in 
explaining why some countries export more than others. On the other hand, they contribute to 
the literature on the role of finance in the development of foreign trade in general, and the role 
of German banks in the advancement of German trade in the late nineteenth century. My results 
give quantitative support to the positive correlation between the existence of financial networks 
of the exporting country in the target market and the countries respective exports to that market. 
Finally, I provide some first, empirical evidence that the link between banks and industry 
prevailing in nineteenth century Germany was transferred to the foreign markets via the 
Auslandsbanken. This confirms somewhat the wide literature on German banking that argues 
that due to this bank-industry nexus the German banks supported the German industrial 
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Konzerne in their process of internationalisation by establishing subsidiaries that provided them 
with financial and informational assistance abroad.  
 
Future research might benefit from including more countries to strengthen, or reject, the 
principal finding of this study on the link between German foreign banks and export industries 
and its positive influence on German exports on a more global scale. On the other, the here 
proposed difference in difference approach would benefit from expanding the time frame of the 
study to pinpoint more precisely the effect of bank entry, and to study in more detail the 
behavior of the treated and control group before and after treatment.  
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4. Essay 3: A microanalysis of trade finance - The Brasilianische Bank für 
Deutschland and its role in financing coffee exports in Brazil, 1880-1913 
4.1. Introduction 
In 1887 the Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland was founded, opening its first branch in Rio 
de Janeiro one year later.  One of the principal purposes of the bank was to get engaged in the 
financing of Brazilian coffee exports (Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland, 1912 4). Brazil was 
the world´s leading producer and exporter of coffee in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Between 1870 and 1913, Brazilian coffee production accounted for around 57 per 
cent of Brazilian exports and some 75 per cent of the total world production (see Table 13 and 
Figure 12 section 4.4). Germany was the second most important coffee importer at that time, 
behind the US, and Hamburg was the European hub for coffee imports (Krause, 2004 144ff, 
Rischbieter, 2011 42ff).  
 
The Brazilian market for coffee exports was extremely competitive, with hundreds of export 
houses operating in Rio de Janeiro and Santos between 1880 and 1913. For exporters, one of 
the key factors in securing a competitive edge was their ability to provide trade finance to their 
importing partners, either directly or through their banks. Moreover, over time export houses 
became increasingly involved in upstream activities such as storage and packing. As a 
consequence, their demand for credit increased significantly over time. By combining 
microdata on credit granted by Brasilianische Bank to export houses and exports of companies 
in Rio and Santos, the aim of this paper is to empirically address two main issues: 1) Did the 
Brasilianische’s entry contribute to ease firms’ credit constraints in the coffee market? 2) How 
did its entry affect the export performance of financed coffee export houses? 
 
With these questions in mind, I create two original and unique data sets. The first set contains 
the information on monthly credits granted by the bank between 1889 and 1913: 741 credits to 
679 different companies in Brazil and Europe. The second data set contains the annual quantity 
of coffee exported by companies in Rio de Janeiro and Santos, the principal (coffee) export 
harbours of Brazil at that time. For Rio, the data includes the exports of 389 export houses 
between 1880 and 1913. For Santos, the available data is limited to the period between 1893 
and 1913. Yet it has the advantage of providing not only the quantity but also the destination 
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of exports, including the information on exports of 152 companies to 88 different cities in 26 
different countries. 
 
Using a logistic regression, I first analyze the credit distribution of the Brasilianische Bank to 
the coffee export houses in Rio and Santos between 1889 and 1913. The results show that while 
on one hand the size of an export house matters - larger companies are more likely to receive 
credit - on the other hand the bank eventually financed new comers. This gives strong evidence 
that the Brasilianische Bank contributed to ease the credit constraints of new entrants. Most 
interestingly, the results affirm the idea that the bank channelled credit to export houses of 
German origin and companies exporting to Germany. On one hand this suggests that previous 
to the bank´s entry, German companies had suffered from credit constraints. On the other hand, 
it confirms the idea that the bank fostered the Brazilian trade to Germany. I then use a difference 
in difference model to measure the impact of the establishment of the Brasilianische on the 
performance of the coffee export houses in Rio between 1880 and 1913. The results affirm a 
positive, significant influence; companies financed by the Brasilianische exported significantly 
more after the bank`s entry than companies not-financed by the bank 
 
The article is structured as follows. The next section discusses the literature on trade finance, 
with a focus on the firm level finance of exports. Section three presents the data. Section four 
illustrates the development of Brazilian (coffee) exports during the first globalization. The 
history of the Brasilianische bank in Brazil and the empirical analysis of its credit distribution 
is presented in sections five and six, respectively. The specifications and the results of the 
econometric analyses, the difference in difference model, are presented in section seven. The 
final section concludes. 
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4.2. Related literature – Credit and export performance 
This research is based on three major strands of economic literature. One emphasizes the nexus 
between finance and trade by focusing on the impact of credit availability on firms’ decision to 
engage in exporting business. The second explores the positive impact that the entry of foreign 
banks (especially in developing markets) has on the growth potential of firms due to the 
relaxation of credit constraints. The third approach highlights the key role of trade finance in 
determining the patterns and expansion of exporting activities. 
 
The determinants of a company’s decision to engage in trade with foreign markets has been 
attracting the attention of economists since the pioneering study by Bernard and Jensen (1995). 
The major approach to define them was to look at the companies’ heterogeneity (see e.g. 
Benard& Jensen 2004, Campa 2004, Melitz 2003). The main argument is companies must cover 
additional costs to access foreign markets, associated with transport costs, e.g. due to the 
unfamiliarity with external markets, lack of preferential treatment in comparison to the local 
producers, etc. Empirical studies (see e.g. Clerides et al 1998, Girma et al 2004) have confirmed 
that indeed exporting firms are usually larger and tend to show higher productivity. Though 
size and productivity are most frequently acknowledged as variables defining a company’s 
export potential, some studies focus on other characteristics. Yeaple (2005) looks at 
differentiation in types of employees working in a company as well as in used technologies; 
Davidson at al. (2005) focuses on wages and Manasse&Turrini (2001) on entrepreneurial 
capabilities. The theoretical framework developed by Chaney (2005) by adding liquidity 
constraints in the Melitz model (2003) triggered a new branch of literature focused on the 
impact of financial conditions on exports. The first work on the topic opened a debate, with 
Chaney (2005) arguing that financial constraints do influence a company’s decision to export, 
while Van Biesebroeck (2005), who analyzes access to credit for companies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Blalock and Roy (2005), who estimate the influence of financial crises on 
companies’ exports in Indonesia, conclude the opposite. Further research testing the impact of 
both a country’s general financial development (e.g. Manova 2008) and a company’s credit 
constraints (e.g. Minetti & Zhu 2011 and Wang 2015) on export potential did not reach 
unambiguous conclusions either. Beginning with the contradictory company level, one-country 
studies, Greenaway et al (2007) finds a positive correlation between liquidity and export 
participation, especially in manufacturing companies that face financial constraints.  Minetti & 
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Zhu (2011) arrive at a similar conclusion for Italy: after controlling for other companies’ 
characteristics, they estimated that credit constraints decreased the probability of exporting by 
39%. At the same time Stiebale (2011), looking at a panel of French manufactures over the 
years 1998-2005, claims that there is no evidence that financial constraints have a direct impact 
on company’s exports. Wagner (2014) in his study on manufacturing industries in Germany 
claims not only that this link is weak for those companies who only plan to start their export 
activities, he also finds no difference in credit-rating scores between companies that stopped 
their export activities and those that continue exporting. On the other hand, cross-country 
research, evolving from testing the finance-export relation on an industry level (see e.g. Manova 
2008, 2013) to a company level (see e.g. Fauceglia 2015, Wang 2015, Pietrovito&Pozzolo 
2016), generally confirms the existence of negative effects of financial constraints on a 
company’s potential to export. 
 
The second strand of literature focuses on financial liberalization and the elimination of entry 
barriers, shifting the focus to the consequences of foreign banks’ entry on the development of 
local financial systems, their resilience to shocks, and the relaxation of credit constraints for 
local firms. While studies on the impact of foreign banks’ presence in developed countries show 
that the effect is not always positive since foreign banks suffer from cultural and linguistic 
barriers (see e.g. DeYoung and Nolle 1996, Chang et al 1998), similar research generally 
suggests that foreign banks perform more efficiently than local ones, triggering the 
improvement of the whole financial system (see e.g. Claessens et al 2000, Clarke et al 2005). 
Yeyati and Micco (2006) explain this phenomenon through a decreased level of competition in 
the industry, resulting in a more stable banking sector. Availability of more disaggregated data 
triggered studies aimed at determining the conditions and characteristics that influence foreign 
banks’ impact on the domestic market. Similarities between foreign banks’ countries of origin 
and destination seem to strengthen the positive effect of foreign banks on the efficiency of the 
local financial system (see e.g. Berger et al 2004). Poor general development in the host country 
as well as limiting entry barriers undermine efficiency (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt et al 2004).  
Claessens and Van Horen (2014) conclude that foreign banks have a negative influence in low-
income countries, when foreign banks obtain a limited market share, or when banks’ countries 
of origin are significantly distant from recipient countries. The heterogeneity of foreign banks’ 
clients appears to be an important factor in defining who was favored the most by their presence. 
Gianetti and Ongena (2009) conclude that young firms in emerging markets benefit the most 
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and companies connected to local banks or to the government suffer. Results on the impact of 
company size are rather contradictory even for one-country studies. For Argentina, Berger et al 
(2001) find that small companies have a lower chance of obtaining credit from foreign banks. 
At the same time Escude et al (2001) claim that despite small and medium-size companies 
indeed accounting for a smaller share of foreign banks’ loan portfolio in comparison with local 
Argentinian banks, they received virtually half of all credit granted by foreign banks in 2000. 
Clarke et al (2005) study four Latin American countries and conclude that foreign banks would 
grant less credit to small companies only if the banks have a relatively insignificant presence 
in the country. Giannetti and Ongena (2005) conclude that, for the case of Eastern Europe, the 
presence of foreign banks has a positive impact on all companies in the domestic market, 
however the benefits to larger companies are more substantial. 
 
The last stream of studies explores the relevance of trade finance for export performance. 
Specifically, most recent studies on the subject focus on the impact of negative shocks to trade 
credit availability on exports during the financial crises of 2008-09.  Initial work was comprised 
mainly of anecdotal evidence and surveys that, although stating the responsibility of trade 
finance in trade decline, could not provide solid proof of causality (see e.g. Auboin 2009, 
Dorsey 2009). Causality is established in single country company-level research; Amiti and 
Weinstein (2011) in Japan in the financial crises of the 1990s, Bricongne et al (2009) in France, 
and Paravisini et al (2014) in Peru during the 2008-09 financial crisis. At the same time, Del 
Prete and Federico (2014) attribute the decrease of Italian exports during the Great Recession 
to the reduced supply of general loans and not specifically trade finance. Yet, Niepmann and 
Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2017) criticize the previous authors for the lack of export data by 
destinations which could shed more light on the trade finance-trade relation. They claim that 
reductions in the supply of trade finance have a negative impact on exports through the risk 
channel, which becomes even more important during crises and for exports destined to small 
and poor countries. 
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4.3. The Data 
This study constructs two original and unique data sets. The first one contains the information 
on the credit provided by the Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland from 1889, the first year of 
any record of credit information of the bank, until the outbreak of World War I. It includes the 
duration and character of the credit given to each company on a monthly basis from 1889 to 
1913. The data have been obtained from the official reports of the supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsratberichte) of the Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland (see Appendix C – Sources). 
It contains data on 741 credits to 679 different companies in Brazil and Europe (the reports 
indicate the cities where the companies are located). The meetings of the supervisory board 
were held three or four times a year at the headquarters of the Brasilianische Bank in Hamburg, 
Germany. During these meetings, the supervisory board defined for all its subsidiaries the 
monthly credits granted to each company. In the reports, financing was differentiated into (i) 
direct credit lines and (ii) bills of exchange discounted. Moreover, the latter was further 
disaggregated into Wechsel von and Wechsel auf.  In the case of the “Wechsel von,” the bank 
discounted a bill of exchange from the issuer, granting thereby a credit to the issuer, with the 
expectation of receiving the value of the bill of exchange in the future by the acceptor. Such 
was the case when the bank financed a Brazilian company that exported goods to Germany. In 
the case of the “Wechsel auf,” the bank discounted a bill in the name of an acceptor 
(person/company) who was in debt with a third party (beneficiary). Such was the case when the 
bank financed European export companies that sold goods to Brazil. This study concentrates 
on the analysis of the effect of bank entry on the performance of exports from Brazil to Germany 
and hence focuses on the direct credit given to companies located in Brazil and the “Wechsel 
von” bills of exchange.39 
 
The second data set contains the annual quantity of coffee exported in Rio de Janeiro and 
Santos, the principal and most important hubs of Brazilian (coffee) exports at that time. For Rio 
de Janeiro it covers the period between 1880 and 1913 – with the exception of the years 1885, 
1889 and 1890 for which no data is available - and includes the exports of all 389 companies 
exporting during this period. For Santos, the available data is limited to the years 1893, 1894 
                                                 
 
39  Additionally, in most “Wechsel auf” cases, the Brasilianische Bank bought credits and/or discounted bills from banks 
that acted in the name of European exporters. It is hence not feasible to define the distribution of credits among the different 
export sectors.        
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and the years between 1898 and 1913. This however, seems to be only a minor drawback, as 
(i) it was not before 1893 and 1894 that the Brasilianische Bank opened branches in Sao Paolo 
and Santos, and (ii) Santos gained in importance as a coffee export harbour only by the turn of 
the centuries. More importantly, the information for Santos has the advantage of providing not 
only the quantity but also the destination of exports, which allows one to test for a possible bias 
of the Brasilianische Bank in financing companies that exported to Germany. The observations 
include the exports of 152 companies to 88 different cities in 26 different countries. The 
available information is provided on a weekly basis.40 The sample includes the exports of the 
first fifteen days of October in each year, which I believe, is representative as the data indicates 
that the relative distribution of exports between companies and destinations remained constant 
over the year. The month of October has been chosen as it marks the peak season of yearly 
coffee exports (see Figure 26 Appendix C). The data for both Santos and Rio de Janeiro have 
been obtained from several, contemporaneous newspapers (see Appendix C - Sources). 
 
  
                                                 
 
40  To compile a data set that includes annual observations was beyond the (time) scope of this thesis and should be 
subject for future investigation. 
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4.4. The dynamics of Brazilian coffee exports  
Great Britain was the main trading partner of Brazil in the nineteenth century, followed by the 
USA. In 1870, 42 per cent of the Brazilian exports and more than 58 per cent of its imports 
went to and came from Great Britian. German exports and imports accounted only for a bit 
more than 4 and 6 per cent respectivley. Yet, German trade with Brazil increased constantly 
while the British share, in the case of imports, declined. By the turn of the century, Germany 
had become Brazil´s second most important exporting and importing partner behind the USA 
and Great Britain, respectively (see Table 12).  
 
Table 12: Great Britain, Germany and the USA – Share on Brazilian total imports and exports (% of total) 
– 1870, 1902, 1913 
 Great Britain Germany  USA 
 Import Export Import Export Import Export 
1870 58,0 42,0 6,0 4,0 5,0 29,0 
1902 28,1 17,4 11,4 15,8 12,3 37,0 
1913 24,5 13,2 17,5 14,0 15,7 32,2 
Source: For the year 1870: Dedinger, Béatrice, et Paul Girard, 2017. For the rest: 50 Jahre Deutsche Überseeische Bank, 
1936 pp. 114-15 
 
 
Brazilian exports during the Belle Époque essentially consisted of two products, coffee and 
rubber. But without doubt, coffee was the most important one. In the 1880s, Brazilian coffee 
production accounted for around 60 per cent of Brazilian exports and about 72 per cent of the 
total world production (see Table 13 and Figure 12). Around the turn of the century coffee 
exports experienced a sudden decline when prices dropped sharply due to overproduction in 
the previous decades and the resulting saturation of the international coffee market. Although 
prices already had started their downfall around 1898, the coffee tree produces with a lag of 
around 5 to 6 years, so that coffee producers needed some time to adapt to the changes in 
demand. Consequently the decrease in production began a few years later between 1901 and 
1905 (see also Figure 25 Appendix C). The problems of the coffee sector were sharpened by a 
financial crisis that was inflicted by the deflationary monetary policy of the Brazilian 
government. Between 1899 and 1900, the latter reduced the money supply by more than 11.5 
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per cent –it actually burnt the notes-, causing a sudden revaluation of the Brazilian currency.41 
The fall in coffee prices did not stop until the Brazilian government started to intervene in 
1905/6 and act as a direct buyer from the coffee producers. From then exports recovered and in 
1913 Brazil was the sole supplier of 80 per cent of the world coffee demand (Hutchinson, 1909, 
Strasser, 1924 148, Krieger, 2011 220, Topik, 2004 20).42  
 
Table 13: Commodity export shares in Brazil (% of total) – 1870-1919 
 
Year Coffee Sugar Cotton Rubber Total 
1870-79 56.3 11.8 9.7 5.5 83.3 
1880-89 60.5 10.6 4.4 7.6 83.1 
1890-99 65.4 6.1 2.5 14.2 88.2 
1900-09 53.1 1.5 2.3 25.6 82.6 
1910-19 52.1 2.4 1.7 16.4 72.6 
 Source: Abreu and Bevilaqua, 1996 9 
 
 
The principal export harbour of coffee from the 1820s until the end of the 1880s was Rio, and 
from the 1890s onwards Santos. Until the establishment of the Republic and the abolition of 
slavery in 1888 the state of Rio de Janeiro was the largest coffee producing region. However, 
with abolition, the planters in Rio de Janeiro lost immense capital investments, and although 
the producers of Santos did so too, the comparatively higher quality of their soil gave them an 
advantage in compensating the losses during the transition to free labour. The land in Rio had 
suffered from intensive cultivation in the previous decades and the space for plantation was 
more limited and fragmented than in Santos, allowing the latter to produce more and on larger 
scales. Consequently, Rio got equally substituted by Santos as the principal port for coffee 
                                                 
 
41  The revaluation was additionally accelerated by the banks in Brazil, foreign and national, speculating on and investing 
intensively in the Brazilian currency. In only ten days in the month of March in 1900, the exchange rate increased from 10 
to more than 14d. This overvaluation of the currency not only caused an overall stagnation of Brazilian trade, but also gave 
incentive to foreign investors to sell their Brazilian bonds and securities on a large scale. The consequent money outflow 
together with the increasing foreign debt of Brazil ultimately ended up in a financial crisis (Strasser, 1924 148). 
42  During the coffee crisis, rubber temporarily gained in importance, increasing its share of total exports to 25.6 per cent 
in comparison to 14.2 per cent in the previous decade. This substitution effect, however, ended with the recovery of coffee 
exports and with Southeast Asian producers entering heavily into the world rubber market in the beginning of the twentieth 
century. In 1919, rubber exports accounted for only 5 per cent of total Brazilian exports (Abreu and Bevilaqua, 1996 6-8, 
Bértola and Ocampo, 2010 99, see also Absell and Tena Junguito, 2016 19, 27). The principal destinations for rubber 
exports were the United States with more than 50 per cent of all exports in 1912, followed by Great Britain and France 
with 35 and 11 per cent respectively. Germany only received 4 per cent of all rubber exports (own calculations based on: 
Anuario Estatistico do Brazil, 1908-1912 120-121). 
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exports (see e.g. Greenhill, 1977 198-99, Pereira de Melo, 2003 78 363-65, Sweigart, 1987 5-
6).  
 
Figure 12: World and Brazilian coffee trade and quantities of coffee exported in Rio and Santos (thousands 
of metric tons) – 1880-1913 
 
 
Source: The quantities for Rio and Santos are from the authors data set – see Appendix C - Sources. The Brazilian total 
exports are the sum of the exports of Rio and Santos. The World coffee trade includes the production and trade from Cuba, 
Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Martinique, Brazil, Surinam, and Indonesia (Java). The data for all countries other than Brazil are 
from: Mario Samper and Radin Fernando. 2004. Appendix: Historical statistics of coffee production and trade from 1700 to 
1960. In William Gervase Clarence-Smith and Steven Topik (eds.), The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America, 1500-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 411-462. 
 
 
The commodity chain of Brazilian coffee from its production to its export in the XIX century 
can be summarized as follows. First, producers (fazendeiros) brought their coffee to the nearest 
harbor, or train station, from where it was sent to the countries principal export harbors: Rio de 
Janeiro and Santos. Once arrived, the coffee was received by a factor (commisario), a 
representative of the producer who was responsible for the storage of coffee in the harbor. At 
the third stage a packer (or sacker), a middle man between factors and export companies, bought 
and sold coffee in the Rio and/or Santos market. The packer than blended and grouped coffee 
according to its quality to comply with the international market standards. Finally, exporters, 
acting as agents of the importing houses abroad, purchased coffee and organized shipping 
abroad. In the first half of the nineteenth century, factors additionally took the role of financiers, 
providing producers with the credit they needed to meet their increasing need of labor - that 
was, buying slaves - and to bridge their income gap between the harvests. The situation changed 
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with the advancement of the railway in the 1870s and 1880s that connected the hinterland with 
the coast.43 The resulting integration and concentration of markets initially increased the 
competition between factors and packers, and finally led to the substitution of both by export 
houses by the turn of the century. At the same time factors were replaced in their function as 
financiers of producers by public institutions and banks. This work does not study this aspect 
of finance in the production of coffee, as it is interested in the role of banks in financing exports. 
It thus focuses on the relation between banks and export houses. The function of the latter, 
although the selling chain had shortened, continued to be intermediary between the Brazilian 
producer and the international coffee markets.44 Their need for capital, hence, derived from 
several factors. First, (i) to finance the acquisition of coffee. Second, (ii) to compensate the 
exchange rate risk, as they bought the coffee in national and sold it in international currencies, 
and finally, (iii) to finance shipping abroad (see Pereira de Melo, 2003 371-73 and Sweigart, 
1987 29-31). 
 
In the years from 1880 to 1913, a total number of 389 different exporting houses operated in 
Rio de Janeiro. The coffee export in Santos in the years between 1893 and 191345 was managed 
by 152 different companies. Yet, the markets showed an increasing concentration over the 
years, in particular by the turn of the century. Figure 13 shows the number of export houses 
operating in each year in Rio and Santos. In 1881, 117 houses operated in Rio. In 1900, there 
were only 48 houses. This drop may partly be explained by the rising competition from Santos, 
yet, the share in number of exporters in Rio and Santos in the years after 1900 stayed more or 
less the same. The concentration becomes even more evident when looking at the relative 
contribution of each company in total exports. Eventually, exports were dominated by only a 
few houses. Between 1880 and 1913, the ten largest houses accounted for more than a half of 
the total exports from Rio. In Santos, they contributed 63 per cent of the coffee exports from 
1893 to 1913 (see Table 14). The majority were foreign companies. Out of the twenty largest 
                                                 
 
43  The Brazilian railway mainly evolved along the coffee-producing provinces and the main harbours. In 1873, Rio de 
Janeiro and Sao Paolo possessed 45 and 22 per cent of Brazil´s railroad network, respectively (Pereira de Melo, 2003 367) 
44  In some minor cases, the export houses also acquired their own plantations. The German merchant Theodor Wille 
was the leading coffee exporter in Brazil before the outbreak of World War I. His company the “Thedor Wille and Co”, 
founded in 1844, was the largest export house in Santos, with branches in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paolo. The company not 
only had its own plantations but also its own sailing ships and was bondholder in several navigation lines such as Deutsch-
Südamerikanische Dampfschiffahrtsgesellschaft, Kosmos and Hapag (Albers, 1978 611, Krause, 2004 144ff, Fenner, 
2013).   
45   The years with information on export firms in Santos are limited according to the available data. See section 4.3. 
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companies in Rio, one third came from the USA, one fourth from the UK, and another one 
fourth were of the German origin. The rest were Brazilian, French and Austrian firms. The 
relative distribution in Santos is nearly the same, with one third of the companies being German 
houses, followed by the British, one fourth, and the US companies, one fifth. 
 
 
Figure 13: Number of export companies in Rio - 1880-1913 - and Santos - 1893-1913 
 
 
Sources: See Appendix C -  Sources  
 
Note: Rio de Janeiro includes observations for the years from 1880 to 1913. For Santos the years 1893, 1894, and 1898 to 
1913. See also section 4.3. 
 
 
The principal destinations of Brazilian coffee exports in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries were the USA, Germany and the Netherlands. In 1912, exports to the USA accounted 
for 52, exports to Germany for 15, and exports to the Netherlands for 10 per cent of total coffee 
exports46. If looking only at the exports from Santos, see Table 40 Appendix C, the gap between 
Germany and the USA was even smaller, with shares in total exports in the same year of 19 and 
38 per cent, respectively. In the 1870s, coffee started to gain popularity in Germany and within 
a few years the German coffee consumption became the highest in Europe. Studies provide 
several reasons for this increase in demand. Most frequently it is argued that it was the result 
of the rise in overall individual income level after 1871, together with some sort of imitation 
effect of upper-class habits by the growing German middle class. On the other hand, it was 
                                                 
 
46  Own calculations based on: Anuario Estatistico do Brazil, 1908-1912 120-121 
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triggered by the qualities of coffee itself; its stimulating effect and its capacity to dampen 
hunger. This last characteristic of coffee explains the intensive increase of coffee consumption 
by the working class during the industrialization of Germany (Fenner, 2012). 
 
Table 14: The 20 largest coffee exporting companies in Rio de Janeiro - 1880-1913, and Santos - 1893-1913 
– Share on exports (% of total)  
 
Company Share of 
exports (*) 
Nationality Company Share of 
exports (*) 
Nationality 
Arbuckle Irmaos & C 9,89 USA Naumann, Gepp & C 12,69 UK 
Ornstein & C 7,30 Austria Theodor Wille 12,65 Germany 
Theodor Wille 6,62 Germany Prado Chaves 8,87 - 
Ed. Johnston & C 6,02 UK Ed. Johnston & C 7,01 UK 
Hard Rand & C 5,88 USA Hard Rand & C 4,77 USA 
J.W. Doane 5,03 USA Michaelsen Wright & C 4,58 USA 
Norton Megaw & C 3,31 USA Arbuckle Irmaos & C 3,37 USA 
Gustavo Trinks & C 2,97 Germany Societe F. Bresilienne 3,28 Swiss (?) 
Eugen Urban 2,88 Germany Carl Hellwig 3,09 Germany 
W.F. Mac Laughlin & C 2,72 USA Nossack & C 2,61 Germany 
Phipps Irmaos & C 2,66 UK Cia. Krische 2,52 Germany 
Pinto & C 2,63 - Baldwin & C 2,46 - 
John Bradshaw & C 2,24 USA Zerrenner Bulow & C 2,32 Germany 
Karl Valais & C 2,23 France J.W. Doane 1,73 USA 
Levering & C 2,16 USA Barbosa & C 1,68 - 
Wille Schmilinsky &C 2,11 Germany A. Trommel 1,57 Germany 
Zenha Ramos & C 1,61 Brazil Holworthy, Ellis & C 1,34 UK 
Carlos Pareto 1,49 Brazil Roxo & C 1,23 - 
Mac Kinnell & C 1,45 UK Schmidt Trost & C 1,16 Germany 
E. Pecher & C 1,38 UK Rose & Knowles 1,10 UK 
Total 72,58 
  
80,05  
Sources: See Appendix C -  Sources 
 
 (*) Note: The share of exports is a company´s average share in the nominal value of the total exports of (i) 389 export 
companies in Rio de Janeiro between 1880 and 1913, and (ii) 152 companies in Santos between 1893 and 1913, respectively.  
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4.5. The Brasilianische Bank and the Brazilian coffee export sector  
 
“The progress of Brazilian commerce shows  
that those nations enjoying the preponderance of its trade 
 are the two great maritime and over-seas banking powers,  
Great Britain and Germany”  
Edward N. Hurley, 1911 
 
 
The two largest and most influential financial institutions in late nineteenth century Brazil were 
the German Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland and the British London and Brazilian Bank. 
The latter was the first foreign bank to be established in Brazil, opening its first branch in 1863 
in Rio de Janeiro (Orbel and Turton, 2001 342ff). The driving forces of British banking 
engagement in the second half of the nineteenth century in Brazil were the increasing 
investment possibilities in the capital markets and infrastructure projects (Hurley, 1911 14ff). 
The integration of the Brazilian economy into global markets made large-scale infrastructure 
work necessary. Mainly driven by coffee, the export boom triggered the construction of harbour 
and, most important, railway systems. Rothschild & Sons, the most prominent of all, started 
after Brazilian independence (1822) to issue loans at the “request of the Brazilian government”. 
In 1855, the Rothschilds managed to be appointed as the Brazilian government’s financial agent 
in London. It went on to run the government’s needs on the London capital market and remained 
“close” to Brazil’s financial policies for a long while afterwards47, and it was the Rothschilds 
that raised loans for some of the most important railway companies from 1858 on (Shaw, 2005 
171-178).  
The Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland was founded in 1887 as a joint venture of the 
Diskonto-Gesellschaft in Berlin and the Norddeutsche Bank in Hamburg. It opened its first 
branch in 1888 in Rio de Janeiro, followed by branches in Sao Paulo, 1893, and Santos, 1894. 
While the Diskonto was interested in entering the infrastructure and railway construction 
                                                 
 
47  The overthrow of emperor Pedro II and the declaration of the First Republic 1889 took the Rothschilds by surprise, 
but they were quick to adapt to the new situation. “Since everyone, even the Emperor, is satisfied in Brazil, we don’t see 
why we should be more royalist than the King.” (Alphonse de Rothschild in a letter to English cousins. See Shae, 2005, 
and also http://www.rothschildarchive.org/ib/?doc=/ib/articles/previewbusiness) All the more so since the following 
governments needed help in their construction of a centralized national bank system. It was again the Rothschilds who gave 
advice and assistance to the Banco da Republica do Brazil (1893) and the Banco do Brazil (1905). Their confidence in 
Brazilian governments in general and those of the republic in particular was well founded: “We are glad to learn that Brazil 
continues to make you remittances. This country must be rich indeed to be able to pay for its civil war and at the same time 
repay its debts.” (A. Rothschild, ibid).  
Essay 3: A microanalysis of trade finance 
 
Wilfried Kisling – Trade finance in historical perspective 77 / 149 
 
business in Brazil, the Norddeutsche already had been an important player in the exporting and 
importing relations with Brazil in previous decades (Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland, 1912 
4). In its memorandum the Diskontogesellschaft stated: 48 
 
“Hamburg takes in the European coffee import, which mainly comes from Brazil, the 
first place. The Diskontogesellschaft shows high interest in the Brazilian railway 
companies and the resulting bond issues [...] (both) makes a direct representation in 
the local landing desirable.”  
 
 
The establishment of the Brasilianische followed a first, unsuccessful attempt of positioning a 
German bank in Brazil in the 1870s. In 1872, the Deutsch-Brasilianische Bank was founded in 
Hamburg, with the International Bank, the Beremberg Gosslar & Co, and the Norddeutsche 
Bank being the main shareholders. The bank had to close only three years later, due to 
mismanagement, the provision of huge credits of the bank’s branch in Rio de Janeiro caused 
liquidity constraints, and heavy losses during the financial crisis in Brazil in 1875 (Burhop, 
2004 193-194). Interestingly, it was the coffee exporter Theodor Wille who first raised again 
the idea to establish a bank in Rio de Janeiro in 1884.Wille was leading in the foundation of 
one of the biggest German financial institutes of the nineteenth century, the Commerz- und 
Disconto Bank. In his function as the Director of the bank, and as the biggest coffee exporter 
operating in Brazil, he expressed the need for the establishment of financial support in Brazil 
in order to assure a successful future development of German export companies in Brazil 
(Miller, M, 2012 139ff). The reasons why the idea did not come into immediate effect are 
debatable. On one hand, the Commerzbank was clearly more limited in its resources than the 
other leading German banks, such as the Deutsche Bank or the Discontogesellschaft. The 
estimated costs for the establishment of a bank in Brazil were 10 Mio Marks, which 
corresponded to one third of the capital of the Commerzbank, but only one sixth of the capital 
from the Deutsche and the Disconto bank. On the other hand, eventually the competing 
institutions were simply faster in the race for financial influence in Brazil (Albers, 1978 611, 
Krause, 2004 144ff). 
                                                 
 
48  (Denkschrift der Diskontogesellschaft, Hauser, 1906 53, translated from German.) 
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The Brasilianische Bank was the only German bank operating in Brazil until 1911, when the 
Deutsche Überseeische and the Deutsch-Südamerikanische Bank were established in Rio de 
Janeiro. In 1913, these three banks jointly possessed over nine branches in Brazil. The 
Brasilianische, however, was the only institution that exclusively concentrated its business in 
the Brazilian market, having branches in Rio, Santos, Sao Paolo, Porto Alegre, and Bahia. In 
the same year, three British banks with twenty-two branches were operating in Brazil; the 
London and Brazilian, the London and River Plate, and the British Bank of South America (see 
Appendix C - Sources, and also Hurley, 1911 12-22 36ff, Hauser 1906 54ff). Yet, the increasing 
competition from German banks had its impact. In 1906, British banks held about 77% of the 
foreign deposits in the major financial centres, in 1930 this figure decreased to 31%. German 
banks “were by far the second most relevant actors in the region. (…) in terms of indicators 
such as total deposits, paid in capital or profits, they were far bigger than their continental 
competitors, such as the French” (Briones and Villela, 2006, 5-6). Table 39 in the Appendix C 
shows the German and British Banks and their branches in Brazil in 1913. 
The Brasilianische Bank in Brazil financed both companies in Brazil and in Europe. Initially 
the bank directed major parts, some 72 per cent in 1889/90, of its finance to the latter. However, 
with the bank adapting to the market conditions and expanding business in Brazil, the capital 
provided to companies in Brazil increased constantly in subsequent years and by the turn of the 
century equalled the share of the finance received by companies in Europe. The bank´s principal 
financial instrument was the discounting of bills of exchange. More than 92 per cent of the 
bank´s total provision of credit to companies in Europe and Brazil from 1889 to 1913 was done 
via the discounting of bills. Yet, the direct credit gained constantly in importance in the finance 
of companies in Brazil, increasing its share in the total credit provided to companies in Brazil 
from 13 per cent in 1889 to 40.7 per cent in 1912. The main advantage of direct credit was that 
it was solely given in the national Brazilian currency, Milreis, and hence minimized the 
exchange rate risks. The principal currency of the bills of exchange was the British Pound. 
From 1889 to 1913, 81 per cent of all bills discounted were noted in pounds (see section 4.3 – 
Data and Appendix C - Sources).49 
                                                 
 
49  The rest were noted in the German Mark, 7 per cent, the French Franc and Milreis, both 6 per cent. 
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Among the Brazilian companies financed by the Brasilianische, 42 were coffee exporting 
houses in Rio and 42  coffee exporters in Santos. Together they received 20.1 per cent of the 
total credit provided by the Brasilianische Bank to companies in Brazil between 1889 and 1913. 
Figure 14 shows the number of companies financed in Rio and Santos. It indicates a shift in the 
distribution of credit towards Santos by turn of the century, as from 1900 the number of 
financed companies decreased in Rio and increased in Santos. Yet, the shares of Rio and Santos 
in the monthly average credit provided to coffee exporters are quite similar. Figure 15 illustrates 
the development of the monthly average credit provided to coffee exporting houses in Rio and 
Santos between 1889 and 1913 by the Brasilianische. From 1889 to 1913, companies in Rio 
received on average 18.337 pounds per month and companies from Santos 17.494 pounds per 
month (sources see Appendix C - Sources).  
 
 
Figure 14: Number of export companies that received and did not receive credit  in Rio - 1880-1913 - and 
Santos - 1893-1913  
  
Sources: See Appendix C -  Sources 
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Figure 15: Monthly average credit provided by the Brasilianische (in Pounds) –Total, in Brazil, in Europe, 
and to the coffee exporting companies in Rio and Santos – 1889-1913 
  
Sources: See Appendix C -  Sources 
 
Note: The monthly average of credit provided for Europe includes the credit provided and the bills of exchange discounted 
(Wechsel auf) for companies that are located in Europe. For Brazil, it includes the credit provided and bills of exchange 
discounted (Wechsel von) for companies operating in Brazil. The total is the equivalent average for companies in Brazil and 
Europe. For Rio and Santos, it is the monthly average of the bills discounted and credit provided to the 42 coffee exporting 
houses in Rio and Santos.  
 
The majority of the exporting houses were foreign companies, 89 per cent, with German, US 
American, and British companies dominating, accounting for 41, 26, and 10 per cent 
respectively. 50 Most of the credit was directed to companies with German origins, 32 per cent 
of the total credit provided to coffee exporters in Rio and Santos between 1889 and 1913, 
followed by US American, 25 per cent, and British, 20 per cent, companies. Also, it seems that 
in particular the large export houses benefited from the financial support of the bank. 19 per 
cent of the companies financed in Rio were among the twenty leading export houses at the time 
of the bank´s entry in 1889. Yet, at the same time, the bank supported new comers, as 48 per 
cent of the financed export houses in Rio did not export before 1889 (see Tables 41 and 42 
Appendix C).  
 
                                                 
 
50   The share of companies of a certain nationality is the number of companies of the respective nationality relative to 
the total number of 82 companies that have been financed by the Brasilianische Bank in Rio and Santos between 1889 and 
1913 adjusted by the companies which nationality could not be identified.   
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4.6. The business strategy of Brasilianische Bank and its impact on credit 
constraints 
Microdata on Brasilianische’s credit allocation across firms provide interesting insights into 
the business strategy followed by the bank and may help clarify to what extent it contributed to 
relieve credit constraints in the coffee export market. The empirical literature suggests that 
some firms’ characteristics are usually correlated with constrained access to credit: 1) size: 
small- and medium-size firms have less assets to pledge as collateral, are less transparent and 
more costly to monitor; 2) age: younger, less-established firms might be unable to finance their 
activities on the basis of their current cash-flow, which increases their dependence on external 
finance; at the same time, they carry higher default risk as they might be tempted to compete 
by pursuing riskier strategies. Additionally, in the specific historical circumstances of late 19th-
early 20th century Brazil, a firm’s nationality could be another possible source of difficult access 
to credit – e.g. incumbent British banks might have incentives to discriminate against German 
exporters in order to protect the market share of British firms. 
 
I use a logit estimation to empirically investigate the factors that determined the distribution of 
credit provided by the Brasilianische to the exporting houses in Rio de Janeiro and Santos. For 
Rio, the panel data include the information on the credit provided to 389 export companies 
between the years 1891 and 1913.51 For Santos the credit information on 152 companies 
between 1893 and 1913. The logit estimation for Rio de Janeiro in the form of an equation is 
expressed as follows: 
 
Rct = α0 + βSIZEct-1  + μAct_89c + λGer_Compc + INTERct ψ + θt + ɛct     (3.1 – Rio) 
 
Where Rct is a variable that takes the value one if an exporting company in Rio de Janeiro 
received credit in year t and the value zero in the opposite case. α0 is a constant. The variable 
SIZEct-1  is the share of a company c on the total exports in t-1. It proxies the size of a company, 
assuming that the banks` information of a company´s size in year t is based on a company´s 
relative export performance in the previous year. The variable Act_89c is a dummy equal to one 
                                                 
 
51   The years 1889 and 1890 are missing due to a lack of available data. See data description in section 4.3. 
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in case a company c existed before the German bank entry in t=1889.52 The dummy variable 
Ger_compc considers the possible bias of the Brasilianische in favor of German companies, 
becoming one if a company c is of German origin and zero in the opposite case. The variable 
INTERctψ is a set of interactions, including the interaction between SIZE*Act_89, 
Ger_Comp*Act_89, and Ger_Comp*SIZE. The estimated model also includes time fixed 
effects (θt),53 and ɛct is an error term, representing the myriad of other influences on the 
distribution of credit. The equivalent equation for the logit estimation for Santos is: 
 
Sct= α0 + βSIZEct-1 +  λGer_Compc + χExp_Gerct + INTERctψ + θt  + ɛct     (3.2 – Santos) 
 
Where Sct is a categorical variable that takes the value one if an exporting company in Santos 
received credit in year t and the value zero in the opposite case. The specifications for the 
independent variables are the same as for Rio (Equation 3.1), with the exception that there is 
no information on the companies before 1889 (Act_89ct-1), but the data allows one to additionally 
test for the assumption that the Brasilianische financed those companies that exported to 
Germany. The effect is captured by the dummy variable Exp_Gerct that has the value one or 
zero in case a company c exported or did not export do Germany in t, respectively. The variable 
INTERctψ is a set of interactions, including Ger_Comp*SIZE and Exp_Ger*SIZE. 
 
The results of the estimations of equations 3.1 and 3.2 are presented in Table 15. The 
coefficients - columns (3.1) and (3.2) -  indicate whether or not an independent variable had a 
significant positive or negative influence on the probability that an export house c received 
finance in year t. The marginal effects54 – columns (3.1a) and (3.2a) - quantify the influence. 
The coefficient of the variable SIZEc is positively significant suggesting that larger, less 
constrained companies were more likely to receive credit. Size seems also to be the most 
important variable of influence, as it shows in both, Rio and Santos, the highest marginal 
effects. Younger companies likewise have a higher probability to be financed by the bank. The 
                                                 
 
52   This proxy for a company´s age is used in the absence of information on the date of establishment of exporting firms 
or their period of activity in the Brasilian market.  
53   Company fixed effects have not been included as they are collinear with the company specific variables included in 
the estimations (size, German company, and company exporting to Germany).  
54  The marginal effects are the average marginal effects representing the expected difference in outcome probability 
associated with a one unit increase in the predictor variable, adjusted to the sample distributions of all the variables in the 
model.  
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negative significant coefficient on Act_89 indicates that incumbent companies that exported 
before 1889 had less chances to receive a credit than those that entered the market after 1889. 
This strongly indicates that the Brasilianische contributed to ease the credit constraints of new 
entrants. This dynamic seems to be independent from a company´s size, as the interaction 
between SIZE*Act_89 is not significant. Most interestingly, the results confirm the idea that 
the bank in particular directed credit to German companies. Whether or not a company was of 
a German origin was after size the second most important factor in determining a company´s 
probability of receiving a credit in Rio. This provides suggestive evidence that German 
companies might have suffered from credit constraints prior to the Brasilianische’s entry. 
Moreover, it seems that small German companies were favoured, independently from their time 
being in the market, as the interaction Ger_Comp*SIZE is negatively and the interaction 
Ger_Comp*Act_89 positively significant. Finally, the findings for Santos suggest that the 
Brasilianische especially financed companies that exported to Germany, with the coefficient χ 
being positively significant, and its marginal effects being the second highest after a company`s 
size. This seems to be especially the case for small companies Germany, as the interaction 
Exp_ger*SIZE is negative and significant.  
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Table 15: Estimation results Logit and marginal effects -  Rio de Janeiro (Equation 3.1) and Santos 
(Equation 3.2)  
 
 (3.1) (3.1) (3.1a) (3.1a) (3.2) (3.2) (3.2a) (3.2a) 
 Rio Rio Rio Rio Santos Santos Santos Santos 
Company`s Size (β) 33.96*** 45.99*** 0.869*** 1.185*** 18.05*** 31.32*** 0.867*** 1.505*** 
 (4.432) (7.379) (0.1115) (0.1974) (2.882) (6.289) (0.1348) (0.307) 
Active before 1889 (μ) -0.665*** -0.838*** -0.0170*** -0.0216*** - - - - 
 (0.1246) (0.129) (0.0034) (0.0034) - - - - 
German company (λ) 1.704*** 1.679*** 0.0436*** 0. 0433*** 0. 797*** 1.117*** 0.038*** 0.054*** 
 (0.1542) (0.186) (0.0042) (0.0053) (0.235) (0.265) (0.0115) (0.0153) 
Export to Germany (χ) - - - - 2.453*** 2.612*** 0.118*** 0.126*** 
 - - - - (0.217) (0.0.233) (0.0105) (0.011) 
SIZE*Act_89 (ψ1) - -6.203 - -0.1598 - - - - 
 - (9.469) - (0.2445) - - - - 
Ger_Comp*Act_89 (ψ2) - 0.797*** - 0.0205*** - - - - 
 - (0. 266) - (0.0067) - - - - 
Ger_Comp*SIZE (ψ3) - - 21.130*** - -0.5443*** - -13.819*** - -0.664*** 
 - (8.124) - (0.2145) - (6.476) - (0.248) 
Exp_Ger*SIZE (ψ4) - - - - - -12.792** - -0.615** 
 - - - - - (5.097) - (0.314) 
No. Obs. 8947 8947 8947 8947 2584 2584 2584 2584 
Pseudo R2 0.1978 0.2055 - - 0.3338 - - - 
Method of est. Logit Logit 
Logit - 
Marginal 
Logit - 
Marginal 
Logit 
Logit - 
Marginal 
Logit - 
Marginal 
Logit - 
Marginal 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Note: Rio de Janeiro includes observations on 389 export companies in the years from 1891 to 1913. For Santos 152 companies in the years 1894, 
and 1898 to 1913. The year 1893 is missing as no observations on the exports of the companies in the previous year that are used to measure a 
company’s size are available. Robust standard errors are clustered by company and year and are indicated in brackets. Time dummies are included 
but not reported. The marginal effects are the average marginal effects based on the Delta-method. 
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4.7. Exports better with credit? – Financing the export of coffee 
 
The results of the previous section suggest that the Brasilianische Bank allocated its credit to 
export houses that, for their characteristics (German nationality, new entrants), were more 
exposed to the risk of being credit constrained in the Rio and Santos markets. This section 
empirically analyzes the effect of the banks´ provision of credit on the performance of coffee 
export houses in Rio de Janeiro from 1880 to 1913. In particular, it examines whether we can 
observe a divergence in the exports of companies that received credit (financed) and did not 
receive credit (not-financed) from the Brasilianische Bank after the entry. I make two 
specifications. Specification one, shown in Figure 16, compares the export of financed with 
non-financed companies, considering all the 389 export houses operating in Rio de Janeiro from 
1880 to 1913. Specification two, shown in Figure 17, omits companies that did not exist before 
1889, with a remaining number of 246 companies. In contrast to Figure 16, Figure 17 shows an 
overall decline in exports over time, indicating that growing exports are connected to new 
entrants. Yet, both figures exhibit a greater increase in exports of financed relative to non-
financed houses after entry. Hence, it does not appear that the difference in the export of 
financed and non-financed companies is driven by the arrival of new entrants in the market. In 
specification one and two a company is included in the Brasilianische’s group of export houses 
if it received credit from the bank at least in three months after the bank’s entry. This definition 
has its limitations, as it assumes that even the event of a one-time credit can have a considerable 
long-term impact on a company´s export performance. I therefore additionally consider the 
frequency of credit, differentiating between export houses that received up to 25 per cent 
(occasionally), between 25 and 75 per cent (frequently), and more than 75 per cent of the time 
credit (continuously). The majority of the companies received occasionally credit, 57 and 68 
per cent in the case of specification one and two, respectively. One third of the companies 
received credit frequently, 36 and 27 per cent, respectively. The share of companies that 
received credit continuously was rather small, with 7 and 5 per cent. There seems to be no bias 
in frequency of credit explained by a company`s size (see Figure 18). Figure 19 compares the 
exports of companies receiving occasionally, frequently and continuously credit for 
specification one and two. It suggests that the divergence between financed and non-financed 
companies is mainly driven by companies that frequently received credits.  
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Figure 16: Coffee exports Rio  – All export houses - Total exports, exports of companies financed vs. non-
financed (in Saccas) - 1880-1913 
 
Sources: See Appendix C -  Sources 
 
Note: The exports of all 389 companies exporting in Rio de Janeiro between 1880 and 1913 are considered. A company is 
defined to be financed if it received at least three months’ credit from the Brasilianische Bank between 1880 and 1913. For the 
years 1885, 1889, and 1890 observations are missing due to the lack of available data. One “sacca” equals 60 Kg of coffee. 
 
 
Figure 17: Coffee exports Rio - Companies exporting before 1889  – Total exports, exports of companies 
financed vs. non-financed (in Saccas) - 1880-1913 
 
Sources: See Appendix C -  Sources 
 
Note: The exports of (246) companies that already exported before 1889 are considered. A company is defined to be financed 
if it received at least three months credit from the Brasilianische Bank between 1880 and 1913. For the years 1885, 1889, and 
1890 observations are missing due to the lack of available data. One “sacca” equals 60 Kg of coffee. 
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Figure 18: Frequency of credit and size of company  - All export houses and companies exporting before 
1889 
  
Sources: See Appendix C -  Sources 
 
Note:  Figure 18a) shows the number of companies receiving occasionally, frequently, and continuously credit in the period 
between 1889 and 1913. Figure 18b) does the same, omitting export houses that did not export before 1889. 
 
Figure 19: Export Index (1888=100) - Companies receiving occasionally-, frequently- and continuously 
credit – 1880-1913 
  
Sources: See Appendix C -  Sources 
 
Note:  Figure 19a) shows the export index (1888=100) of all 389 export companies operating in Rio between 1880 and 
1913. Figure 19b) the index for the 246 companies that already exported before 1889. For the years 1885, 1889, and 
1890 observations are missing due to the lack of available data. Occasionally, includes the exports of companies that 
received up to 25 per cent, frequently the exports of companies that received between 25 and 75 per cent, and 
continuously the exports of companies that received more than 75 per cent of the time between 1889 and 1913 credit 
from the Brasilianische Bank. One “sacca” equals 60 Kg of coffee. 
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I use a difference in difference model to measure the effect of the establishment of the 
Brasilianische on the performance of financed and non-financed coffee export companies in 
Rio de Janeiro between 1880 and 1913. Based on specifications one and two and the 
differentiation of credit duration, I distinguish between four models. (i) Model-I covers 
observations on the quantities of coffee exported and the monthly average credit received of all 
389 export houses operating in Rio de Janeiro from 1880 to 1913. A company is defined to be 
treated if it received at least three months’ credit. (ii) Model-II is identical to Model-I, but only 
considers export companies that already exported before bank entry in 1889. (iii) Model-III is 
identical to Model-I, but distinguishes the treated group between companies that received short-
, long-, and continuous credit during 1889 until 1913. (iv) Model-IV differentiates between the 
duration of credit for Model-II. In the form of an equation, the models are expressed as follows: 
 
 
Xct = COMPc + YEARt + FINct + INTERVct +ɛct  (3.3 - Model-I) 
Xbt = COMPb + YEARt + FINbt + INTERVbt +ɛbt  (3.4 - Model-II) 
Xct = COMPc + YEARt + FINct + INTERVct  +ɛct   (3.5 - Model-III) 
Xbt = COMPb + YEARt + FINbt + INTERVbt  +ɛbt   (3.6 - Model-IV) 
 
The outcomes of interest are Xct and Xbt, the quantities exported by a company in year t, with c 
(N=389) including all export companies and b (N=246) only considering companies that 
exported before 1889. The variables COMPc and COMPb are fixed effects that control for 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics of companies. YEARt is a year fixed effect that 
controls for common shocks influencing all companies equally in year t. The variables FINct 
and FINbt are dummies that take the value one for financed companies, and the value zero in 
the opposite case. They identify the treated group and capture differences between the treatment 
and control group prior to the bank entry. The variables FINct and FINbt represent a full set of 
treatment dummies, differentiating between companies receiving credit occasionally, 
frequently, and continuously. INTERct, INTERVbt, INTERVct, and INTERVbt are the 
intervention dummies that are equal to one for the respective treated groups after the event of 
bank entry. ɛct and ɛbt are error terms, representing the myriad other influences on exports. 
Technically, panel data is used to estimate the equations of Model I to IV with Poisson-
Essay 3: A microanalysis of trade finance 
 
Wilfried Kisling – Trade finance in historical perspective 89 / 149 
 
maximum likelihood (PPML). Using PPML allows one to include zero observations, as many 
of the export houses did not export throughout the whole period of observation. 
 
The results are presented in Table 16. The coefficient of interest is =(+++) – (++), 
which is the difference-in-difference estimate, with (+++) being the expected outcome of 
the treated group with bank intervention, and (++) the expected outcome of the treated 
group without the event of German bank entry.  is positively significant in each Model I to IV, 
confirming the principal assumption of this study that the provision of credit by the 
Brasilianische Bank had a positive impact on the performance of coffee export houses. In 
Model-I, after the banks´ entry, financed companies exported on average 3.7 times more (based 
on the estimation results of equation 3.3 since 1-e 1.522 = 3.721)55 more than non-financed 
companies. Moreover, the results suggest that companies that received credit with more 
frequency performed better. Companies that received credit occasionally exported on average 
1.2 times more than non-financed companies, and companies receiving credit frequently 6.8 
times more.56 
 
I use a pre-treatment test to confirm the validity of my results. The test includes two difference-
in-difference models that are identical to the Models I and II, with the exception that they cover 
only the exports by company for the pre-treatment period (1880 - 1888) and assume that 
German banks were already established during that period in 1885. The results, presented in 
Table 45 Appendix C, show no statistical significance of the difference-in-difference estimator, 
, confirming no difference between the trend in the export of treated and non-treated 
companies before actual bank entry in 1889. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
 
55  See Wooldridge, Jeffrey (2002), “Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach”, Itps Thomson Learning; 2nd 
Revised edition 
56  Based on Model-III with 1-e 0.803 = 1.232  (occasionally) and 1-e 2.066 = 6.893 (frequently).  
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Table 16: Difference-in-Difference estimation for coffee export houses in Rio - 1880-1913 
 
  (3.3) 
Model-I 
(3.4) 
Model-II 
(3.5) 
Model-III 
(3.6) 
Model-IV 
FIN () 7.490*** 6.690***   
 (0.749) (0.856)   
FIN – occasionally (1)   6.804*** 7.038*** 
   (0.838) (0.845) 
FIN – frequently (2)   7.015*** 8.979*** 
   (0.769) (0.799) 
FIN – continuously (3)   5.282*** 5.434*** 
   (0.941) (0.949) 
INTERV () 1.522*** 0.888***   
 (0.178) (0.198)   
INTERV – occasionally (1)   0.803*** 0.420*** 
   (0.180) (0.199) 
INTERV – frequently (2)   2.066*** 1.348*** 
   (0.267) (0.317) 
INTERV – continuously (3)   1.582*** 1.315*** 
   (0.337) (0.324) 
YEAR () Yes Yes Yes Yes 
COMP () Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 12,059 7,626 12,059 7,626 
Method of estimation PPML PPML PPML PPML 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable in columns (3.3) and (3.5) is the quantity of coffee exported by company and year considering all 
389 export companies operating between 1880 and 1913 in Rio de Janeiro.The dependent variable in columns (3.4) and 
(3.6) is the quantity of coffee exported by company and year considering only the 246 companies that already exported 
before 1889. For the years 1885, 1889, and 1890 observations are missing due to the lack of available data. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by company and year and are indicated in brackets.  
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4.8. Concluding remarks 
In 1888 the Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland established itself in Brazil. One of the 
principal purposes of the bank was to engage in the finance of Brazilian coffee exports. The 
objective of this article has been to analyze the impact of German bank entry on the performance 
of export houses in Brazil during the period 1880 to 1913. 
 
For this purpose, I created two original and unique data sets on the annual quantity of coffee 
exported and the amount of credit received from the Brasilianische Bank by the export houses 
in Rio de Janeiro and Santos from 1880 and 1893 respectively, to 1913. Using a logistic 
regression, the study first analyzes the credit distribution of the bank between its establishment 
until 1913. The results show that larger export houses were more likely to receive finance, yet 
at the same time the bank eventually financed new comers. This gives strong evidence that the 
Brasilianische Bank contributed to ease the credit constraints of new entrants. Most 
interestingly, the results affirm the idea that the bank channelled credit to export houses of 
German origin and / or companies exporting to Germany. This, on one hand, suggests that 
previous to the bank´s entry, German companies had suffered from credit constraints. On the 
other hand, it confirms the idea on the significant role of the bank in promoting trade between 
Brazil and Germany. I than test, using a difference in difference model, the influence of the 
provision of credit of the Brasilianische on the performance of coffee export houses in Rio de 
Janeiro. The results confirm a positive, significant influence; companies financed by the 
Brasilianische exported significantly more after its entry than companies not financed by the 
bank. In particular, companies that received with more frequency credit performed better. 
 
This study contributes to the ongoing discussion on the role of finance in trade, expanding those 
studies that confirm a positive relation between the availability of external credit and the 
performance of export companies. It widens the perspective by providing first, quantitative 
evidence on the impact of foreign banking penetration on the development of a country´s 
exports in general, and the role of European bank entry on the development of the export sector 
in emerging countries in particular. Finally, this work lends empirical support to the qualitative 
studies on the history of German foreign banking that affirm a central role of the 
Auslandsbanken in the fostering of trade by providing financial assistance in the international 
markets, especially to German companies.   
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This work has some limitations. The empirical analysis on the determinants of the Brazilian 
coffee exports tests additional to the influence of finance for assumption that companies already 
established in the market bear a certain advantage in experience and size over companies that 
were only recently established at the time of bank entry. However, the limitations in the 
available data on one hand only allow for the use of a rough measure for the latter (the 
distinction between companies exporting before and after bank entry), and exclude the 
possibility of considering further factors of influence. Hence, future research should focus on 
the improvement of the measurement, such as using the year of foundation of the companies as 
an indicator of established and new comer companies, and the definition and inclusion of further 
factors that might have influenced the performance of Brazilian coffee export houses.  
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6. Appendix  
6.1. Appendix A 
6.1.1. Sources 
The data on trade includes observations for the periods from 1880 to 1884, 1898 to 1902, and 
1909 to 1913. The number of countries presented in the data set varies over time in accordance 
with the official trade statistics, with 66 countries for the years 1880-1884, 92 for the years 
1898-1902, and 102 for the years 1909-1913. The bank data cover the years 1881, 1900, and 
1913, for the same number of countries as trade in the respective years. In the case of the Gravity 
Model, the original numbers of observations had to be adjusted to 52 countries in 1881 and 59 
countries in 1900 and 1913, respectively, due to limitations in the available GDP data.  
The data for trade were obtained from the official German and British statistics on 
foreign trade. For Germany: Statistik des Deutsche Reiches - Auswärtiger Handel des deutschen 
Zollgebietes nach Herkunfts- und Bestimmungsländern in den Jahren 1880 bis 1896 - 
Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt; Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich – Spezialhandel 
nach Erdteilen und nach Ländern – Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Jahrgang 1906, 1908, 1913, 
1916.; and for Great Britian: David Jacks – Taken from the Statistical Abstract for the United 
Kingdom, London, various years.  
The information for bank data was extracted from the Almanac Directory, Year Book 
and Diary. A Parliamentary Directory and Complete Banking Directory published by Sir Inglis 
Palgrave in London, which provides detailed information on the number and location of 
branches of German and British banks in the world for the years 1881, 1900 and 1913. In some 
cases it was possible to locate the original banking reports (Geschäftsberichte) of the 
Auslandsbanken, such as the Deutsche Überseeische Bank, and the Deutsche Asiatische Bank. 
Furthermore, the data from the Almanac has been verified and, if necessary, supplemented with 
the information provided by the quantitative works of Hauser, R. Die deutschen Banken im 
Ausland (1906), Riesser and Jacobs Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration 
(1914), Hurely, Edward N. (1911), “Banking and Credit in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru”, 
U.S. Department of Commerce. Special Agents Series No. 90. Washington D.C , Strasser, K. 
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Die deutschen Banken im Ausland (1924), Lough,W. Banking Opportunities in South America 
(1930), and Whale, B. Joint Stock Banking in Germany (1930). 
Real GDP data was obtained from Bolt, J. and J.L van Zanden (2013) The First Update 
of the Maddison Project; Re-Estimating Growth Before 1820, Maddison Project Paper 4. In 
case of South and Central America, Africa and Asia, the data provided do not cover the entire 
years of observation 1881, 1900 and 1913, and missing years are estimated by geometric 
interpolation. The real GDP of Austria-Hungary is estimated as weighted sum of GDP of 
Austria and Hungary. The GDP for Korea is likewise calculated as the weighted sum of North 
and South Korean GDP. The same method is applied for the data of Australia in 1881, including 
the GDP of Uruguay, and Australasia in 1900 and 1913, including the GDP of Australia and 
New Zealand, as equally statistics on trade combine these countries in the respective years.  
The calculations on great circle distance in kilometers are based on the data on the 
geographic coordinates of the countries capitals (longitude and latitude) provided by the 
internet source http://www.fallingrain.com/world/index.html. Common language and land lock 
status has been assigned on the base of the information provided by the CEPII Geodesic 
Distance data From the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales. The 
information on colonial links was extracted from Correlates of War 2 Project. 
Colonial/Dependency Contiguity Data, 1816-2002, Version 3.0  in combination with the data 
provided by the sources http://www.britishempire.co.uk/timeline/colonies.htm and 
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/COLONIES.html#German. The data on shared borders is 
based on common knowledge of the author. The information on the adherence to the Gold 
Standard was obtained from the EH.net database http://eh.net/encyclopedia/gold-standard/. 
 
  
Appendix 
 
Wilfried Kisling – Trade finance in historical perspective 106 / 149 
 
6.1.2. Tables and Graphs 
Table 17: The chronology of German foreign banks in the world and their mother institutions – 1869–1913 
 
Auslandsbanken Founded, Operating in Mother Institution Located Founded Type of involvement 
Ungarische Escompte 
und Wechselbank 
1869 Hungary Darmstädter Bank Darmstadt 1853 
Silend Partnership 
(Kommandite) 
Deutsche Bank 
London 
1870 Great Britain Deutsche Bank Berlin 1870 Branch 
Deutsche Bank 
Istambul 
1870 Turkey Deutsche Bank Berlin 1870 Branch 
London Hanseatic 
Bank 
1870 Great Britain Commerz Bank Hamburg 1870 Subsidiary 
   
Deutsche Diskonto-
Gesellschaft/Disconto 
Bank 
Berlin 1851  
Amsterdamsche Bank 1871 Netherlands Darmstädter Bank Darmstadt 1853 Subsidiary 
La Plata Bank 1872 Argentina 
Deutsche Diskonto 
Gesellschaft 
Berlin 1851 
Subsidiary 
(Liquidated in 1885) 
   Deutsche Bank Berlin 1870  
Deutsche 
Überseeische Bank 
1886 Argentina Deutsche Bank Berlin 1870 Subsidiary 
  Bolivia     
  Brazil     
  Chile     
  Peru     
  Spain     
  Uruguay     
Brasilianische Bank 
für Deutschland 
1887 Brazil Norddeutsche Bank Hamburg 1851 Subsidiary 
   
Deutsche Diskonto-
Gesellschaft/Disconto 
Bank 
Berlin 1851  
Deutsch Asiatische 
Bank 
1889 China Deutsche Bank Berlin 1870 Subsidiary 
  India 
Deutsche Diskonto-
Gesellschaft/Disconto 
Bank 
Berlin 1851  
  Japan Darmstädter Bank Darmstadt 1853  
  Singapore 
Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft 
Berlin 1856  
   
A Schaafhausen`scher 
Bankverein 
Cologne 1848  
   
Nationalbank für 
Deutschland 
Berlin 1881  
   Dresdner Bank Dresden 1872  
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Bank für 
Orientalische 
Eisenbahn 
1890 Switzerland Deutsche Bank Berlin 1870 Subsidiary 
Ungarische Bank und 
Handels-
Aktiengesellschaft 
1890 Austria     
  Bosnia     
  Bulgaria     
  Croatia     
  France     
  Hungary     
  Rumania     
  Serbia     
  Turkey     
  Ukraine     
Banca Commerciale 
Italiana 
1894 Brazil Deutsche Bank Berlin 1870 Subsidiary 
  Italy 
Deutsche Diskonto-
Gesellschaft/Disconto 
Bank 
Berlin 1851  
  Turkey Dresdner Bank Berlin 1872  
   
Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft 
Berlin 1856  
   
A Schaafhausen`scher 
Bankverein 
Cologne 1848  
   Darmstädter Bank Darmstadt 1853  
Banca Commerciale 
Tunisina 
1894 France 
Banca Commerciale 
Italiana 
Milan 1894 Subsidiary 
Bank für Chile und 
Deutschland 
1895 Bolivia Norddeutsche Bank Hamburg 1851 Subsidiary 
  Chile 
Deutsche Diskonto-
Gesellschaft/Disconto 
Bank 
Berlin 1851  
Norddeutsche 
Creditanstalt 
1897 Poland    Branch 
Banca Generala 
Romana 
1879 Romania 
Deutsche Diskonto-
Gesellschaft/Disconto 
Bank 
Berlin 1851 Subsidiary 
   S. Bleichröder Berlin   
Banque 
Internationale de 
Bruxelles 
1898 Belgium 
Deutsche Diskonto-
Gesellschaft/Disconto 
Bank 
Berlin 1851 Subsidiary 
   Darmstädter Bank Darmstadt 1853  
   
Berliner 
Handelsgesellschaft 
Berlin 1856  
   
A Schaafhausen`scher 
Bankverein 
Cologne 1848  
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Deutsche Palästina 
Bank 
1898 Israel    Subsidiary 
  Lebanon     
  Syria     
  Syria     
Diskonto Gesellschaft 
London 
1900 Great Britain 
Deutsche Diskonto-
Gesellschaft/Disconto 
Bank 
Berlin 1851 Branch 
Dresdner Bank 
London 
1901 Great Britain Dresdner Bank Berlin 1872 Branch 
Wechselstube 
Aktiengesellschaft 
1902 Austria Darmstädter Bank Darmstadt 1853 
Silend Partnership 
(Kommandite) 
Banque d`Orient 1904 Greece 
Nationalbank für 
Deutschland 
Berlin 1881 Subsidiary 
  Turkey     
Deutsche 
Westafrikanische 
Bank 
1904 Cameroon Dresdener Bank Berlin 1872 Subsidiary 
  Togo     
Deutsch 
Südamerikanische 
Bank 
1905 Argentina Dresdener Bank Berlin 1872 Subsidiary 
  Brazil 
Schaffhausen`scher 
Bankverein 
Cologne 1848  
  Chile 
Nationalbank für 
Deutschland 
Berlin 1881  
  Mexico     
Deutsche Afrika Bank 1905 South Africa 
Deutsche Diskonto-
Gesellschaft/Disconto 
Bank 
Berlin 1851 Subsidiary 
   C. Woermann    
German East African 
Bank 
1905 Kenia Deutsche Bank Berlin 1870 Subsidiary 
  Tanzania 
Deutsche Diskonto-
Gesellschaft/Disconto 
Bank 
Berlin 1851  
   
Deutsch-Ostafrikanische 
Handelsgesellschaft 
Berlin 1884  
Banque Crédit 
(Kreditna Banka) 
1906 Bulgaria 
Deutsche Diskonto-
Gesellschaft/Disconto 
Bank 
Berlin 1851 Subsidiary 
   S. Bleichröder    
   Norddeutsche Bank Hamburg 1851  
Deutsche Orientbank 1906 Egypt Dresdner Bank Berlin 1872 Subsidiary 
  Greece 
A. Schaaffhausen`sche 
Bankverein 
Cologne 1848  
  Italy 
Nationalbank für 
Deutschland 
Berlin 1881  
  Lebanon     
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  Morocco     
  Syria     
  Turkey     
Mexikanische Bank 
für Handel und 
Industrie 
1906 Mexico Deutsche Bank Berlin 1870 Subsidiary 
  USA     
Deutsche 
Antiquoquia Bank 
1912 Colombia 
German Merchants from 
Bremen 
Bremen  Subsidiary 
Bankers Trading 
Syndicate of London 
 Great Britain Darmstädter Bank Darmstadt 1853 Subsidiary 
   
Nordwestdeutsche Bank 
of Bremen 
Bremen   
Deutsch Afrika-Bank 
Aktiengesellschaft 
 Namibia Deutsche Bank Berlin 1870 Subsidiary 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
 
 
 
Table 18: German exports, imports and total trade by continent (in Mio USD) – 1880-84, 1898-1902, 1900 -
1913 
 
year Continent Imports Exports Total 
1880 Africa 4.07 1.29 5.35 
1880 America Central 0.56 0.52 1.08 
1880 America North 41.48 46.11 87.58 
1880 America South 14.02 5.03 19.05 
1880 Asia 15.68 4.97 20.65 
1880 Australia 1.85 0.42 2.28 
1880 Europe 477.94 490.33 968.28 
1880 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1880 Total 555.60 548.67 1,104.27 
1881 Africa 3.04 1.35 4.39 
1881 America Central 0.32 0.73 1.06 
1881 America North 36.37 47.57 83.94 
1881 America South 12.39 6.38 18.77 
1881 Asia 6.89 5.04 11.93 
1881 Australia 1.34 0.75 2.09 
1881 Europe 510.71 517.95 1,028.67 
1881 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1881 Total 571.07 579.77 1,150.84 
1882 Africa 3.49 1.21 4.70 
1882 America Central 0.25 0.82 1.06 
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1882 America North 28.02 47.45 75.47 
1882 America South 13.34 7.50 20.83 
1882 Asia 8.97 5.41 14.38 
1882 Australia 0.85 1.62 2.47 
1882 Europe 561.65 553.01 1,114.66 
1882 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1882 Total 616.57 617.01 1,233.58 
1883 Africa 2.62 1.54 4.16 
1883 America Central 0.34 0.75 1.08 
1883 America North 32.88 43.08 75.95 
1883 America South 14.74 8.35 23.09 
1883 Asia 9.30 6.03 15.33 
1883 Australia 1.18 1.26 2.44 
1883 Europe 581.16 554.59 1,135.75 
1883 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1883 Total 642.22 615.59 1,257.81 
1884 Africa 3.19 1.72 4.90 
1884 America Central 0.55 0.76 1.31 
1884 America North 30.63 41.77 72.40 
1884 America South 17.31 9.42 26.73 
1884 Asia 7.90 8.03 15.94 
1884 Australia 1.38 1.41 2.79 
1884 Europe 584.15 524.90 1,109.05 
1884 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1884 Total 645.11 588.01 1,233.12 
1898 Africa 24.02 15.19 39.21 
1898 America Central 7.77 6.73 14.50 
1898 America North 235.38 92.54 327.91 
1898 America South 72.44 27.12 99.56 
1898 Asia 81.99 40.39 122.38 
1898 Australia 20.96 8.24 29.20 
1898 Europe 849.50 761.88 1,611.38 
1898 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1898 Total 1,292.06 1,031.51 2,323.57 
1900 Africa 30.45 14.75 45.20 
1900 America Central 9.52 10.47 19.99 
1900 America North 242.92 109.92 352.84 
1900 America South 120.63 44.73 165.36 
1900 Asia 84.46 54.96 139.42 
1900 Australia 28.55 15.71 44.26 
1900 Europe 844.16 839.40 1,683.56 
1900 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1900 Total 1,360.69 1,089.94 2,450.63 
1901 Africa 29.14 15.29 44.42 
1901 America Central 8.60 9.55 18.15 
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1901 America North 238.83 98.88 337.71 
1901 America South 116.79 38.69 155.48 
1901 Asia 87.89 50.16 138.05 
1901 Australia 26.51 13.14 39.65 
1901 Europe 775.26 820.64 1,595.89 
1901 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1901 Total 1,283.02 1,046.34 2,329.35 
1902 Africa 37.92 20.27 58.19 
1902 America Central 9.30 11.69 20.99 
1902 America North 217.03 117.10 334.13 
1902 America South 114.24 37.20 151.44 
1902 Asia 93.49 48.41 141.90 
1902 Australia 28.61 11.21 39.82 
1902 Europe 828.76 856.43 1,685.19 
1902 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1902 Total 1,291.43 1,102.31 2,393.74 
1909 Africa 86.33 34.34 120.67 
1909 America Central 10.97 15.98 26.95 
1909 America North 306.21 151.20 457.41 
1909 America South 227.75 92.53 320.28 
1909 Asia 158.59 67.97 226.56 
1909 Australia 58.19 14.79 72.98 
1909 Europe 1,169.75 1,171.66 2,341.41 
1909 Oceania 0.48 1.19 1.67 
1909 Total 2,018.27 1,549.65 3,567.92 
1910 Africa 99.30 43.10 142.40 
1910 America Central 11.19 19.05 30.24 
1910 America North 288.61 160.26 448.87 
1910 America South 222.17 119.54 341.72 
1910 Asia 197.41 79.06 276.47 
1910 Australia 68.58 15.72 84.30 
1910 Europe 1,078.49 1,314.47 2,392.96 
1910 Oceania 1.19 1.43 2.62 
1910 Total 1,966.95 1,752.63 3,719.58 
1911 Africa 99.20 44.72 143.92 
1911 America Central 13.56 20.22 33.78 
1911 America North 329.23 163.42 492.65 
1911 America South 243.11 140.35 383.46 
1911 Asia 203.15 91.11 294.26 
1911 Australia 63.04 19.74 82.78 
1911 Europe 1,337.36 1,417.05 2,754.41 
1911 Oceania 1.67 2.14 3.81 
1911 Total 2,290.31 1,898.76 4,189.07 
1912 Africa 114.22 44.02 158.24 
1912 America Central 14.99 20.94 35.93 
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1912 America North 394.77 179.89 574.66 
1912 America South 276.26 155.15 431.41 
1912 Asia 239.38 99.94 339.32 
1912 Australia 70.20 21.65 91.85 
1912 Europe 1,430.10 1,605.23 3,035.34 
1912 Oceania 2.14 2.14 4.28 
1912 Total 2,542.05 2,128.97 4,671.03 
1913 Africa 118.34 49.29 167.62 
1913 America Central 14.05 22.62 36.67 
1913 America North 426.91 199.76 626.67 
1913 America South 272.15 160.48 432.63 
1913 Asia 250.01 130.96 380.96 
1913 Australia 75.72 22.14 97.86 
1913 Europe 1,193.36 1,485.99 2,679.35 
1913 Oceania 2.38 2.62 5.00 
1913 Total 2,352.90 2,071.95 4,424.85 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
 
 
Table 19: German exports, emports and total trade by continent as % of total trade – 1880-84, 1898-1902, 
1900 -1913 
 
year Continent Imports Exports Total 
1880 Africa 0.73 0.23 0.48 
1880 America Central 0.10 0.09 0.10 
1880 America North 7.47 8.40 7.93 
1880 America South 2.52 0.92 1.73 
1880 Asia 2.82 0.91 1.87 
1880 Australia 0.33 0.08 0.21 
1880 Europe 86.02 89.37 87.68 
1880 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1881 Africa 0.73 0.23 0.48 
1881 America Central 0.10 0.09 0.10 
1881 America North 7.47 8.40 7.93 
1881 America South 2.52 0.92 1.73 
1881 Asia 2.82 0.91 1.87 
1881 Australia 0.33 0.08 0.21 
1881 Europe 86.02 89.37 87.68 
1881 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1882 Africa 0.53 0.23 0.38 
1882 America Central 0.06 0.13 0.09 
1882 America North 6.37 8.21 7.29 
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1882 America South 2.17 1.10 1.63 
1882 Asia 1.21 0.87 1.04 
1882 Australia 0.24 0.13 0.18 
1882 Europe 89.43 89.34 89.38 
1882 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1883 Africa 0.57 0.20 0.38 
1883 America Central 0.04 0.13 0.09 
1883 America North 4.54 7.69 6.12 
1883 America South 2.16 1.21 1.69 
1883 Asia 1.46 0.88 1.17 
1883 Australia 0.14 0.26 0.20 
1883 Europe 91.09 89.63 90.36 
1883 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1884 Africa 0.41 0.25 0.33 
1884 America Central 0.05 0.12 0.09 
1884 America North 5.12 7.00 6.04 
1884 America South 2.30 1.36 1.84 
1884 Asia 1.45 0.98 1.22 
1884 Australia 0.18 0.20 0.19 
1884 Europe 90.49 90.09 90.30 
1884 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1898 Africa 0.49 0.29 0.40 
1898 America Central 0.08 0.13 0.11 
1898 America North 4.75 7.10 5.87 
1898 America South 2.68 1.60 2.17 
1898 Asia 1.23 1.37 1.29 
1898 Australia 0.21 0.24 0.23 
1898 Europe 90.55 89.27 89.94 
1898 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1900 Africa 1.86 1.47 1.69 
1900 America Central 0.60 0.65 0.62 
1900 America North 18.22 8.97 14.11 
1900 America South 5.61 2.63 4.28 
1900 Asia 6.35 3.92 5.27 
1900 Australia 1.62 0.80 1.26 
1900 Europe 65.75 73.86 69.35 
1900 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1901 Africa 2.24 1.35 1.84 
1901 America Central 0.70 0.96 0.82 
1901 America North 17.85 10.09 14.40 
1901 America South 8.87 4.10 6.75 
1901 Asia 6.21 5.04 5.69 
1901 Australia 2.10 1.44 1.81 
1901 Europe 62.04 77.01 68.70 
1901 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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1902 Africa 2.27 1.46 1.91 
1902 America Central 0.67 0.91 0.78 
1902 America North 18.62 9.45 14.50 
1902 America South 9.10 3.70 6.67 
1902 Asia 6.85 4.79 5.93 
1902 Australia 2.07 1.26 1.70 
1902 Europe 60.42 78.43 68.51 
1902 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1909 Africa 2.94 1.84 2.43 
1909 America Central 0.72 1.06 0.88 
1909 America North 16.81 10.62 13.96 
1909 America South 8.85 3.38 6.33 
1909 Asia 7.24 4.39 5.93 
1909 Australia 2.22 1.02 1.66 
1909 Europe 64.17 77.69 70.40 
1909 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1910 Africa 4.28 2.22 3.38 
1910 America Central 0.54 1.03 0.76 
1910 America North 15.17 9.76 12.82 
1910 America South 11.28 5.97 8.98 
1910 Asia 7.86 4.39 6.35 
1910 Australia 2.88 0.95 2.05 
1910 Europe 57.96 75.61 65.62 
1910 Oceania 0.02 0.08 0.05 
1911 Africa 5.05 2.46 3.83 
1911 America Central 0.57 1.09 0.81 
1911 America North 14.67 9.14 12.07 
1911 America South 11.30 6.82 9.19 
1911 Asia 10.04 4.51 7.43 
1911 Australia 3.49 0.90 2.27 
1911 Europe 54.83 75.00 64.33 
1911 Oceania 0.06 0.08 0.07 
1912 Africa 4.33 2.36 3.44 
1912 America Central 0.59 1.06 0.81 
1912 America North 14.37 8.61 11.76 
1912 America South 10.61 7.39 9.15 
1912 Asia 8.87 4.80 7.02 
1912 Australia 2.75 1.04 1.98 
1912 Europe 58.39 74.63 65.75 
1912 Oceania 0.07 0.11 0.09 
1913 Africa 4.49 2.07 3.39 
1913 America Central 0.59 0.98 0.77 
1913 America North 15.53 8.45 12.30 
1913 America South 10.87 7.29 9.24 
1913 Asia 9.42 4.69 7.26 
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1913 Australia 2.76 1.02 1.97 
1913 Europe 56.26 75.40 64.98 
1913 Oceania 0.08 0.10 0.09 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
 
 
Table 20: German exports, imports and total trade by continent growth rates (%) – 1880-84, 1898-1902, 
1900 -1913 
 
1880-1884 Exports in % Imports in % Total in % 
Africa -8.14 9.64 -2.92 
America Central -1.06 12.72 6.27 
America North -10.10 -3.30 -6.35 
America South 7.03 20.89 11.29 
Asia -22.84 16.03 -8.63 
Australia -9.78 40.19 6.82 
Europe 6.69 2.27 4.52 
Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 4.98 2.31 3.68 
    
1898-1902    
Africa 15.22 9.61 13.16 
America Central 5.98 18.40 12.32 
America North -2.71 7.85 0.63 
America South 15.19 10.54 13.98 
Asia 4.37 6.04 4.93 
Australia 10.37 10.27 10.34 
Europe -0.82 3.90 1.49 
Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total -0.02 2.21 0.99 
    
1909-1913    
Africa 10.51 12.04 10.95 
America Central 8.24 11.59 10.27 
America North 11.08 9.28 10.49 
America South 5.94 18.35 10.02 
Asia 15.17 21.86 17.32 
Australia 8.78 13.46 9.78 
Europe 0.67 7.92 4.49 
Oceania 53.59 26.24 36.57 
Total 5.11 9.68 7.18 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
 
Appendix 
 
Wilfried Kisling – Trade finance in historical perspective 116 / 149 
 
Table 21: British exports, imports and total trade by continent (in Mio USD) – 1880-84, 1898-1902, 1900 -
1913 
 
year Continent Imports Exports Total 
1880 Africa 4.07 1.29 5.35 
1880 America Central 0.56 0.52 1.08 
1880 America North 41.48 46.11 87.58 
1880 America South 14.02 5.03 19.05 
1880 Asia 15.68 4.97 20.65 
1880 Australia 1.85 0.42 2.28 
1880 Europe 477.94 490.33 968.28 
1880 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1880 Total 555.60 548.67 1,104.27 
1881 Africa 92.58 79.78 172.36 
1881 America Central 52.15 48.84 100.99 
1881 America North 553.02 222.59 775.61 
1881 America South 61.87 77.89 139.77 
1881 Asia 272.73 249.53 522.27 
1881 Australia 130.28 115.82 246.10 
1881 Europe 752.87 628.23 1,381.10 
1881 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1881 Total 1,822.92 1,342.92 3,338.19 
1882 Africa 91.32 81.86 173.18 
1882 America Central 57.74 52.59 110.32 
1882 America North 480.90 240.53 721.43 
1882 America South 73.85 88.24 162.09 
1882 Asia 319.21 235.21 554.41 
1882 Australia 122.60 138.55 261.14 
1882 Europe 862.29 641.96 1,504.25 
1882 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1882 Total 1,916.58 1,397.07 3,486.83 
1883 Africa 101.69 73.42 175.11 
1883 America Central 43.48 53.41 96.89 
1883 America North 540.77 227.14 767.91 
1883 America South 67.84 83.86 151.69 
1883 Asia 310.66 249.18 559.84 
1883 Australia 125.76 130.14 255.91 
1883 Europe 872.95 648.50 1,521.45 
1883 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1883 Total 1,961.46 1,392.23 3,528.79 
1884 Africa 99.84 70.33 170.17 
1884 America Central 42.35 45.71 88.06 
1884 America North 472.36 205.92 678.29 
1884 America South 56.66 91.31 147.97 
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1884 Asia 282.26 243.86 526.12 
1884 Australia 137.41 130.10 267.52 
1884 Europe 797.93 636.68 1,434.61 
1884 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1884 Total 1,788.99 1,353.59 3,312.75 
1898 Africa 144.36 177.68 322.04 
1898 America Central 20.78 34.68 55.46 
1898 America North 711.72 174.88 886.61 
1898 America South 89.26 84.81 174.07 
1898 Asia 220.28 263.05 483.34 
1898 Australia 96.15 91.85 188.00 
1898 Europe 1,018.08 649.91 1,667.98 
1898 Oceania 43.70 21.65 65.35 
1898 Total 2,344.34 1,498.51 3,842.84 
1899 Africa 153.45 175.75 329.19 
1899 America Central 19.16 43.38 62.54 
1899 America North 684.88 212.77 897.65 
1899 America South 104.05 88.38 192.43 
1899 Asia 235.19 301.50 536.68 
1899 Australia 114.89 96.32 211.21 
1899 Europe 1,062.81 729.54 1,792.35 
1899 Oceania 47.18 24.01 71.19 
1899 Total 2,421.61 1,671.64 4,093.25 
1900 Africa 140.48 202.10 342.58 
1900 America Central 19.50 43.00 62.50 
1900 America North 783.44 228.68 1,012.12 
1900 America South 128.10 103.56 231.66 
1900 Asia 233.85 312.37 546.22 
1900 Australia 115.80 114.55 230.35 
1900 Europe 1,112.37 777.86 1,890.22 
1900 Oceania 56.51 28.70 85.21 
1900 Total 2,590.05 1,810.82 4,400.86 
1901 Africa 153.17 234.86 388.03 
1901 America Central 21.01 42.65 63.66 
1901 America North 786.47 230.67 1,017.14 
1901 America South 120.06 92.29 212.35 
1901 Asia 238.51 351.56 590.07 
1901 Australia 118.01 114.58 232.58 
1901 Europe 1,166.07 749.43 1,915.50 
1901 Oceania 51.62 29.57 81.19 
1901 Total 2,654.92 1,845.60 4,500.52 
1902 Africa 172.08 298.56 470.64 
1902 America Central 20.90 42.91 63.81 
1902 America North 733.56 270.50 1,004.06 
1902 America South 133.58 91.94 225.52 
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1902 Asia 246.40 331.41 577.81 
1902 Australia 96.14 104.89 201.03 
1902 Europe 1,256.21 712.76 1,968.98 
1902 Oceania 53.02 30.01 83.03 
1902 Total 2,711.90 1,882.98 4,594.88 
1909 Africa 252.05 233.45 485.49 
1909 America Central 36.02 58.61 94.63 
1909 America North 711.17 380.11 1,091.28 
1909 America South 272.18 101.80 373.97 
1909 Asia 331.48 422.00 753.47 
1909 Australia 159.13 132.58 291.71 
1909 Europe 1,317.96 942.38 2,260.34 
1909 Oceania 86.40 39.38 125.78 
1909 Total 3,166.38 2,310.30 5,476.69 
1910 Africa 279.75 293.03 572.78 
1910 America Central 46.76 65.27 112.03 
1910 America North 714.61 417.38 1,131.99 
1910 America South 291.29 152.75 444.04 
1910 Asia 411.91 468.31 880.23 
1910 Australia 187.60 151.11 338.70 
1910 Europe 1,338.92 1,052.34 2,391.26 
1910 Oceania 101.84 45.72 147.57 
1910 Total 3,372.69 2,645.91 6,018.60 
1911 Africa 278.90 310.45 589.35 
1911 America Central 36.76 72.57 109.33 
1911 America North 732.17 386.56 1,118.74 
1911 America South 243.90 219.11 463.01 
1911 Asia 431.49 533.34 964.82 
1911 Australia 190.14 167.95 358.09 
1911 Europe 1,423.48 1,100.56 2,524.04 
1911 Oceania 86.79 51.54 138.33 
1911 Total 3,423.63 2,842.07 6,265.71 
1912 Africa 318.14 329.79 647.92 
1912 America Central 44.78 76.82 121.60 
1912 America North 803.65 451.52 1,255.16 
1912 America South 309.82 232.50 542.32 
1912 Asia 506.83 572.74 1,079.58 
1912 Australia 175.75 186.27 362.02 
1912 Europe 1,500.37 1,156.71 2,657.08 
1912 Oceania 98.79 54.43 153.22 
1912 Total 3,758.13 3,060.77 6,818.90 
1913 Africa 322.01 344.14 666.14 
1913 America Central 48.88 76.32 125.20 
1913 America North 852.79 426.82 1,279.61 
1913 America South 327.21 240.64 567.84 
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1913 Asia 489.63 686.63 1,176.26 
1913 Australia 185.19 183.99 369.18 
1913 Europe 1,570.23 1,226.19 2,796.42 
1913 Oceania 98.92 57.34 156.26 
1913 Total 3,894.84 3,242.07 7,136.90 
 
Source: See Appendix A – Sources 
 
 
Table 22: British exports, imports and total trade by continent as % of total trade – 1880-84, 1898-1902, 
1900 -1913 
year Continent Imports Exports Total 
1880 Africa 5.02 5.74 5.04 
1880 America Central 2.94 3.43 2.98 
1880 America North 30.80 17.30 24.03 
1880 America South 3.53 5.29 4.03 
1880 Asia 14.22 19.56 15.57 
1880 Australia 6.56 6.98 6.39 
1880 Europe 41.94 47.45 41.95 
1880 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1881 Africa 5.08 5.94 5.16 
1881 America Central 2.86 3.64 3.03 
1881 America North 30.34 16.58 23.23 
1881 America South 3.39 5.80 4.19 
1881 Asia 14.96 18.58 15.65 
1881 Australia 7.15 8.62 7.37 
1881 Europe 41.30 46.78 41.37 
1881 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1882 Africa 4.76 5.86 4.97 
1882 America Central 3.01 3.76 3.16 
1882 America North 25.09 17.22 20.69 
1882 America South 3.85 6.32 4.65 
1882 Asia 16.65 16.84 15.90 
1882 Australia 6.40 9.92 7.49 
1882 Europe 44.99 45.95 43.14 
1882 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1883 Africa 5.18 5.27 4.96 
1883 America Central 2.22 3.84 2.75 
1883 America North 27.57 16.31 21.76 
1883 America South 3.46 6.02 4.30 
1883 Asia 15.84 17.90 15.86 
1883 Australia 6.41 9.35 7.25 
1883 Europe 44.51 46.58 43.12 
1883 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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1884 Africa 5.58 5.20 5.14 
1884 America Central 2.37 3.38 2.66 
1884 America North 26.40 15.21 20.48 
1884 America South 3.17 6.75 4.47 
1884 Asia 15.78 18.02 15.88 
1884 Australia 7.68 9.61 8.08 
1884 Europe 44.60 47.04 43.31 
1884 Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1898 Africa 6.16 11.86 492.77 
1898 America Central 0.89 2.31 84.86 
1898 America North 30.36 11.67 1356.65 
1898 America South 3.81 5.66 266.36 
1898 Asia 9.40 17.55 739.58 
1898 Australia 4.10 6.13 287.67 
1898 Europe 43.43 43.37 2552.28 
1898 Oceania 1.86 1.44 100.00 
1899 Africa 6.34 10.51 8.04 
1899 America Central 0.79 2.59 1.53 
1899 America North 28.28 12.73 21.93 
1899 America South 4.30 5.29 4.70 
1899 Asia 9.71 18.04 13.11 
1899 Australia 4.74 5.76 5.16 
1899 Europe 43.89 43.64 43.79 
1899 Oceania 1.95 1.44 1.70 
1900 Africa 5.42 11.16 7.78 
1900 America Central 0.75 2.37 1.42 
1900 America North 30.25 12.63 23.00 
1900 America South 4.95 5.72 5.26 
1900 Asia 9.03 17.25 12.41 
1900 Australia 4.47 6.33 5.23 
1900 Europe 42.95 42.96 42.95 
1900 Oceania 2.18 1.58 1.94 
1901 Africa 5.77 12.73 8.62 
1901 America Central 0.79 2.31 1.41 
1901 America North 29.62 12.50 22.60 
1901 America South 4.52 5.00 4.72 
1901 Asia 8.98 19.05 13.11 
1901 Australia 4.44 6.21 5.17 
1901 Europe 43.92 40.61 42.56 
1901 Oceania 1.94 1.60 1.80 
1902 Africa 6.35 15.86 10.24 
1902 America Central 0.77 2.28 1.39 
1902 America North 27.05 14.37 21.85 
1902 America South 4.93 4.88 4.91 
1902 Asia 9.09 17.60 12.58 
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1902 Australia 3.55 5.57 4.38 
1902 Europe 46.32 37.85 42.85 
1902 Oceania 1.96 1.59 1.81 
1909 Africa 7.96 10.10 8.86 
1909 America Central 1.14 2.54 1.73 
1909 America North 22.46 16.45 19.93 
1909 America South 8.60 4.41 6.83 
1909 Asia 10.47 18.27 13.76 
1909 Australia 5.03 5.74 5.33 
1909 Europe 41.62 40.79 41.27 
1909 Oceania 2.73 1.70 2.30 
1910 Africa 8.29 11.07 9.52 
1910 America Central 1.39 2.47 1.86 
1910 America North 21.19 15.77 18.81 
1910 America South 8.64 5.77 7.38 
1910 Asia 12.21 17.70 14.63 
1910 Australia 5.56 5.71 5.63 
1910 Europe 39.70 39.77 39.73 
1910 Oceania 3.02 1.73 2.45 
1911 Africa 8.15 10.92 9.41 
1911 America Central 1.07 2.55 1.74 
1911 America North 21.39 13.60 17.85 
1911 America South 7.12 7.71 7.39 
1911 Asia 12.60 18.77 15.40 
1911 Australia 5.55 5.91 5.71 
1911 Europe 41.58 38.72 40.28 
1911 Oceania 2.54 1.81 2.21 
1912 Africa 8.47 10.77 9.50 
1912 America Central 1.19 4.02 1.78 
1912 America North 21.38 23.61 18.41 
1912 America South 8.24 12.16 7.95 
1912 Asia 13.49 29.96 15.83 
1912 Australia 4.68 9.74 5.31 
1912 Europe 39.92 60.50 38.97 
1912 Oceania 2.63 2.85 2.25 
1913 Africa 8.27 10.61 9.33 
1913 America Central 1.25 2.35 1.75 
1913 America North 21.90 13.16 17.93 
1913 America South 8.40 7.42 7.96 
1913 Asia 12.57 21.18 16.48 
1913 Australia 4.75 5.68 5.17 
1913 Europe 40.32 37.82 39.18 
1913 Oceania 2.54 1.77 2.19 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
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Table 23: British exports, imports and total trade by continent growth rates (i%) – 1880-84, 1898-1902, 
1900 -1913 
 
1880-1884 Exports in % Imports in % Total in % 
Africa -1.99 1.61 0.07 
America Central 0.80 -9.16 -4.36 
America North -2.97 -7.05 -5.86 
America South 9.39 -5.51 2.88 
Asia -1.43 1.54 0.13 
Australia 11.98 3.34 7.26 
Europe 1.01 0.14 0.53 
Oceania 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 1.30 -1.91 -0.53 
    
1898-1902    
Africa 17.30 5.86 12.65 
America Central 7.10 0.20 4.67 
America North 14.54 1.01 4.15 
America South 2.69 13.44 8.63 
Asia 7.70 3.74 5.95 
Australia 4.43 0.00 2.23 
Europe 3.08 7.01 5.53 
Oceania 10.88 6.44 7.98 
Total 7.61 4.85 5.96 
    
1909-1913    
Africa 12.94 8.17 5.03 
America Central 8.80 10.17 3.70 
America North 3.86 6.05 4.09 
America South 28.68 6.14 8.20 
Asia 16.23 13.00 9.66 
Australia 10.92 5.06 2.87 
Europe 8.78 5.84 5.22 
Oceania 12.53 4.51 1.91 
Total 11.29 6.90 8.83 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
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Table 24: German banks in the world – Number of banks and branches – 1881, 1900, 1913 
 
 1881 1900 1913 
Continent Banks Branches Banks Branches Banks Branches 
Africa 0 0 0 0 8 20 
America Central 0 0 0 0 2 5 
America North 1 1 3 3 3 3 
America South 2 2 5 14 14 47 
Asia 0 0 2 9 13 27 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Europe 16 18 18 30 34 133 
Oceania 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 19 21 28 56 74 235 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
 
 
 
Table 25: British banks in the world – Number of banks and branches – 1881, 1900, 1913 
 
 1881 1900 1913 
Continent Banks Branches Banks Branches Banks Branches 
Africa 14 66 17 162 17 284 
America Central 8 28 7 27 8 22 
America North 8 13 11 128 9 183 
America South 13 29 17 60 18 84 
Asia 38 99 43 148 38 204 
Australia 11 148 8 273 11 602 
Europe 40 55 15 25 24 62 
Oceania 5 18 2 40 2 80 
Total 137 456 120 863 127 1521 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
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Table 26: Geographical distribution of German banks and branches (% of total) – 1881, 1900, 1913 
 
 1881 1900 1913 
Continent Banks Branches Banks Branches Banks Branches 
Africa 0 0 0 0 10.81 8.51 
America Central 0 0 0 0 2.7 2.13 
America North 5.26 4.76 10.71 5.36 4.05 1.28 
America South 10.53 9.52 17.86 25 18.92 20 
Asia 0 0 7.14 16.07 17.57 11.49 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Europe 84.21 85.71 64.29 53.57 45.95 56.6 
Oceania 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
 
 
 
Table 27: Geographical distribution of German banks and branches (% of total) – 1881, 1900, 1913 
 
 1881 1900 1913 
Continent Banks Branches Banks Branches Banks Branches 
Africa 10.22 14.47 14.17 18.77 13.39 18.67 
America Central 5.84 6.14 5.83 3.13 6.3 1.45 
America North 5.84 2.85 9.17 14.83 7.09 12.03 
America South 9.49 6.36 14.17 6.95 14.17 5.52 
Asia 27.74 21.71 35.83 17.5 29.92 13.41 
Australia 8.03 32.46 6.67 31.63 8.66 39.58 
Europe 29.2 12.03 12.5 2.9 18.9 4.08 
Oceania 3.65 3.95 1.67 4.63 1.57 5.26 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
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Table 28: German and British foreign banks by relative geographical distribution – 1881, 1900, 1913 
 
 1881 1900 1913 
Continent 
Total 
Banks 
Of which 
German 
(%) 
Of which 
British 
(%) 
Total 
Banks 
Of which 
German 
(%) 
Of which 
British 
(%) 
Total 
Banks 
Of which 
German 
(%) 
Of which 
British 
(%) 
Africa 14 0 100 17 0 100 25 32 68 
America Central 8 0 100 7 0 100 10 20 80 
America North 9 11.11 88.89 14 0 100 12 25 75 
America South 15 13.33 86.67 22 22.73 77.27 32 43.75 56.25 
Asia 38 0 100 45 4.44 95.56 51 25.49 74.51 
Australia 11 0 100 8 0 100 11 0 100 
Europe 56 28.57 71.43 33 54.55 45.45 58 58.62 41.38 
Oceania 5 0 100 2 0 100 2 0 100 
Total 156 12.18 87.82 148 18.92 81.08 201 36.82 63.18 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
 
 
Table 29: German and British branches by relative regional distribution – 1881, 1900, 1913 
 
 1881 1900 1913 
Continent 
Total 
Branches 
Of which 
German 
(%) 
Of which 
British 
(%) 
Total 
Branches 
Of which 
German 
(%) 
Of which 
British 
(%) 
Total 
Branches 
Of which 
German 
(%) 
Of which 
British 
(%) 
Africa 66 0 100 162 0 100 304 6.58 93.42 
America Central 28 0 100 27 0 100 27 18.52 81.48 
America North 14 7.14 92.86 131 0 100 186 1.61 95.39 
America South 31 6.45 93.55 74 18.93 81.01 131 35.88 64.12 
Asia 99 0 100 157 5.73 94.27 231 11.69 88.31 
Australia 148 0 100 273 0 100 602 0 100 
Europe 73 24.66 75.34 55 54.55 45.45 195 68.21 31.79 
Oceania 18 0 100 40 0 100 80 0 100 
Total 477 4.4 95.60 919 6.09 93.91 1756 13.38 86.62 
 
Source: See Appendix A - Sources 
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Table 30: Descriptive Statistics - Equation 1.2 (PPML)  
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
lnGDP 340 20.8382 1.82679 15.37174 25.47869 
lnD 340 8.274309 1.038228 5.765348 9.842469 
B-Ger 340 0.3205882 0.9313546 0 7 
B-GB 340 0.9617647 2.009199 0 12 
LandLock 340 0.0352941 0.1847942 0 1 
SharedBord 340 0.0529412 0.2242461 0 1 
ComLang 340 0.1235294 0.3295289 0 1 
B-Ger_1881 340 0.0558824 0.4204866 0 6 
B-Ger_1900 340 0.0794118 0.4305991 0 5 
B-Ger_1913 340 0.1852941 0.7512555 0 7 
B-GB_1881 340 0.3647059 1.464201 0 12 
B-GB_1900 340 0.2882353 1.133758 0 12 
B-GB_1913 340 0.3088235 1.105862 0 12 
ColLink 340 0.1058824 0.3081405 0 1 
GS 340 0.6176471 0.4866783 0 1 
 
 
 
Table 31: Descriptive Statistics - Equation 1.3 (Probit)   
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Banks 59 0.516129 0.5038194 0 1 
Imports (LnImp) 56 1.794242 1.266509 0.0276896 5.397216 
Import growth (LnGrowth) 56 0.0424038 0.0529925 -0.019254 0.3562781 
Share Germany (LnShare) 32 0.045996 0.0695473 0 0. 2390169 
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6.2. Appendix B 
6.2.1. Sources 
If not otherwise indicated, the general data for German and British trade were obtained from 
the official German and British statistics on foreign trade. For Germany: Statistik des Deutsche 
Reiches - Auswärtiger Handel des deutschen Zollgebietes nach Herkunfts- und 
Bestimmungsländern in den Jahren 1880 bis 1896 - Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt; 
Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich – Spezialhandel nach Erdteilen und nach 
Ländern – Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt, Jahrgang 1906, 1908, 1913, 1916.; and for Great 
Britian: David Jacks – Taken from the Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom, London, 
various years.  
The information for (the geographical distribution, including the number of banks per 
country in Argentina) bank data was extracted from the Almanac Directory, Year Book and 
Diary. A Parliamentary Directory and Complete Banking Directory published by Sir Inglis 
Palgrave in London, various years. In some cases it was possible to locate the original banking 
reports (Geschäftsberichte) of the Auslandsbanken, such as the Deutsche Überseeische Bank. 
Furthermore, the data from the Almanac has been verified and, if necessary, supplemented with 
the information provided by the quantitative works of Hauser, R. Die deutschen Banken im 
Ausland (1906), Riesser and Jacobs Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration 
(1914), Strasser, K. Die deutschen Banken im Ausland (1924), Lough, W. Banking 
Opportunities in South America (1930), and Whale, B. Joint Stock Banking in Germany (1930). 
The data for my data base on Argentine imports has been taken from the original trade statistics; 
Cuadro General del Comercio Exterior Durante el Año de 1875, Buenos Aires, Anuario de la 
Dirección General de Estadisticas Correspondient al Año 1885, 1895, 1901, y 1912 - Resumen 
General del Comercio Especial Exterior por Procedencias y Destinos; Buenos Aires 1886, 
1896, 1902, y 1913. For the years 1885, 1895, 1901, and 1902 it also includes the specific tariff 
imposed on each product. For the year 1875, official statistics do not provide information about 
tariffs but only differentiate between products being or not being subject of import tariffs. The 
tariffs (ad valorem) for the year 1875 are from Tena-Junguito, A. & Lampe, M.  & Tamega, 
F.   (2012) “How much trade Liberalization was there in the World before and after Cobden-
Chevalier” Journal of Economic History Vol. 72, issue 3, September 2012, pp. 708-740, with 
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special thanks to the authors for providing the data. The official Argentinian trade statistics 
indicate the tariff (Derechos de importación) applied on each product in per cent. In some cases, 
however, the tariffs are indicated as the value (in pesos fuertes) charged on each unit of a 
product. In this case, I calculate the ad valorem as a function of: 
Advpt = 
𝑉𝑇𝑝𝑡∗𝑄𝑝𝑡
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑡
 
 
where VTpt is the tariff value charged on each unit of product p in year t, Qpt the quantity of 
product p imported in t, and imppt is the value of imports of product p in t. 
The ad valorem equivalent of the tariff of Argentina weighted by the imports (by product) from 
country c to Argentina in t (weighted ad valorem tariff) is calculated as follows:  
AdvWct =  
∑𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑝𝑡∗𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑡
𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑐𝑡
 
 
where advpt is the ad valorem tariff of product p in year t, imppct is the value of imports of 
product p from country c in t, and impct the value of imports of country c in t. 
The source for my classification of products of the Argentinian imports is British 
Parliamentary Papers LXXXIV (1905), “The Comparative Incidence of Foreign and Colonial 
Import Tariffs on the principal Classses of Manufactures Exported from the United Kingdom”, 
In continuation of Memorandum No. XVI. In Cd. 1761 of 1903 
For the Augmented Gravity Model as well as the Difference in Difference, the data for 
imports are from the presented (Section 3.3) panel data set on Argentine imports by country 
and by product for the years 1875, 1885, 1895, 1901, and 1912.  The number of trading partners 
included in the gravity model was determined by the availability of data on respective GDP and 
real wages. The countries are; Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, France, Spain, Austria-
Hungary, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden-Norway, Brazil, the United States 
of America, and Canada. 
Real GDP Data was obtained from Bolt, J. and J.L. van Zanden (2013) The first update 
if the Maddison Project; Re-Estimating Growth Before 1820, Maddison Project Paper 4. The 
real GDP for Austria-Hungary is estimated as the weighted sum of GDP of Austria and 
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Hungary. The same method is applied for the data of Norway and Sweden, as the official 
Argentine import statistics combine the imports of the two countries. 
The wages are international real wages relative to the real wages from Great Britain in 
1905 (1905=100) as provided by Williamson (1995), "The Evolution of Global Labor Markets 
since 1830: Background Evidence and Hypotheses", Explorations in Economic History 32, p. 
178. 
The calculations of great circle distance in kilometers are based on the data on the 
geographic coordinates of the countries capitals (longitude and latitude) provided by the 
internet source http://www.fallingrain.com/world/index.html. 
 
6.2.2. Tables and Graphs 
Figure 20: Argentine imports (value in pesos de oro) – 1874-1914  
 
 
Source: See Appendix B - Sources 
 
 
  
0
50.000.000
100.000.000
150.000.000
200.000.000
250.000.000
300.000.000
350.000.000
400.000.000
450.000.000
1874 1878 1882 1886 1890 1894 1898 1902 1906 1910 1914
Appendix 
 
Wilfried Kisling – Trade finance in historical perspective 130 / 149 
 
Figure 21: Argentine imports by skill class – Share of each class (%) on total imports – 1875, 1885, 1895, 
1901, 1912 
 
 
Source: See Appendix B - Sources 
 
 
Table 32: Classification of products of Argentinian imports and skill intensity  
 
No 
Class 
Product  
Skill 
intensity 
 
1 Ships 13,01 High Skill 
 Sailing Iron    
 Boats    
  Irons   
  wood   
  others   
2 Machinery hardware etc 12,65  
 Machines    
  Textil   
  Spinning   
  Weaving   
 Motors & Cars    
  Motor cars   
  Cars   
  Motorbikes   
 Locomotive    
  Heavy Locomotives   
  Carriages (Locomotive)   
 Firearms    
 Electricity    
  Electric Wire and cable   
0%
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HS - % on total MS - % on total LS - % on total PP - % on total Others - % on total
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  Dynamos, Pumps & Electric Motors   
  Supporting Articles for electricity   
 Machinery Other    
3 Paper manufactures 11,65  
 Paper    
  Paper for writing   
  Paper for printing   
  Paper of other sorts   
  Paper for construcction   
 Carton    
 Books & Printings    
  Paper articles   
  Books and prints   
4 Silk thrown 11,58  
 Silk    
  Silk made   
  Silk manufactured   
  Silk yarns   
 Silk Mix    
  Silk mix made   
  Silk mix manufactured   
 Silk with Cotton    
  Silk with cotton   
  Silk with cotton made   
  Silk with cotton manufactured   
5 Iron, steel, metals manufactures 11,29  
 Iron    
  Iron bars, ingots, angles,shapes   
  Iron galvanised    
  Iron manufactured   
  Iron articles (manufactured)   
 Steel    
  Steel bars, ingots, angles,shapes   
  Steel galvanised    
  Steel manufactured   
 Iron & Steel    
  Iron and steel manufactured   
 Wire    
  Wire steel or iron   
  Wire steel or iron galvanised   
  Wire other classes   
 Tins    
  Tin bars, ingots etc   
  Tin manufactured   
 Railways    
  Rails   
  Railway Material   
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 Other Metals    
  Other metals bars, ingots, angles   
  Other metals manufactured   
  Metal jewelry   
6 Leather manufactures 11,00  
 Calf    
  Calf Skins   
  Other skins   
 Leather    
  Leather made   
  Leather manufactured   
     
7 Copper lingots, cakes, slabs 10,01 Mid Skill 
 Copper    
  Copper lingots, cakes, slabs   
  Copper manufactured   
8 Alkali chemical products 9,64  
 Acids & Salts    
  Acids   
  Salts   
 Sulphate    
  Sulphate of copper(s/cwt)   
  Sulphate others   
 Soda    
  Bicarbonate Soda   
  Crystals of Soda (Sodium carbonate)   
 Carbide    
 Belaching powder    
 Pitch    
 Ink & Colors    
 Others    
9 Apparel 9,27  
 Apparel General    
 Apparel Silk    
  Silk    
  Silk mix   
 Apparel Leather    
 Apparel Wool    
  Wool   
  Wool mix   
 Apparel Cotton    
  Cotton   
  Cotton mix   
 Apparel other fibers    
10 Woollen & worsted manufacture 7,90 Low Skill 
 Wool    
  Wool made   
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  Wool manufactured   
 Wool Mix    
  Wool mix made   
  Wool mix manufactured   
 Wool with Silk    
  Wool with silk made   
  Wool with silk manufactured   
11 Cotton manufactures 7,74  
 Cotton    
  Cotton made   
  Cotton made white   
  Cotton made colored   
  Cotton manufactured   
  Cotton manufactured raw   
  Cotton manufactured white   
  Cotton manufactured colored   
  Cotton manufactured printed   
  Cotton manufactured dyed   
 Cotton Mix    
  Cotton made mix   
  Cotton manufactured mix   
 Cotton with Silk    
  Cotton with silk made   
  Cotton with silk manufactured   
12 Jute & Hemp manufactures, canvas and sacking 7,04  
 Jute    
  Jute yarn   
  Jute made   
  Jute manufactured   
  Jute canvas and sacking   
 Hemp    
  Hemp Yarn   
  Hemp made   
  Hemp manufactured   
  Hemp canvas and sacking   
13 Woollen yarns (stuffs all wooll) 6,20  
 Woolen Yarn    
 Woolen Yarn Mix    
 Woolen Yarn with Silk    
14 Linen yarn 5,90  
 Linen    
  Linen yarns unbleached   
  linen yarns single   
  linen yarns double   
15 Cotton yarns (undyed) 5,80  
 Cotton thread    
  Cotton thread for sewing   
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 Cotton Yarn    
  Cotton yarn Grey   
  Cotton yarn bleached or dyed   
  Cotton yarn colored   
  Cotton yarn painted   
 Cotton Yarn Mix    
 Cotton Yarn with Silk    
16 Other Fibers 5  
 Other Fibers    
  Made   
  Manufactured   
  Yarn   
17 Crystal, Ceramics 5  
 Crystal    
  Crystal   
  Crystal Artifacts / Articles   
 Ceramic    
  Ceramic   
  Ceramic Artifacts / Articles   
 Glass    
  Glass   
  Glass Artifacts / Articles   
18 Food: grains < 5 
Primary 
Products 
 Corn    
  Wheat   
  Maize, or Indian Corn   
 Rice    
 Nuts, Fruits and Vegtables    
 Cereals and Cookies    
 Others    
19 Food: animal products < 5  
 Meat and Fish    
 Bacon    
 Beef    
 Living Animals    
 Spice, Oils, and Sauces    
 Butter, Milk, and Cheese    
 Medical Oils    
 Others    
20 Food: tropical < 5  
 Coffee    
  Coffee, Raw   
 Sugar    
  Sugar, unrefined, beetroot   
  Sugar, unrefined, cane   
  Sugar, refined   
  Sugar other classses   
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 Cacoa, Chocolate, Tea etc    
 Others    
21 Tabacco < 5  
 Tobacco    
  Tobacco, raw   
  Cigarrs   
22 Beverages < 5  
 Beverages    
  Alcoholic   
  Non Alcoholic   
23 Minerals < 5  
 Oils    
  Petroleum   
  Kerosine   
  Mineral Oils   
  Nafta (Petrolio)   
 Coal    
 Iron, ore of    
 Stones    
  Stones   
  Precious Stones   
  Stones for construcction   
 Others    
  Earths   
  Other Minerals and Stones   
24 Wood < 5  
 Wood    
  Raw   
  Manufactured   
  For Paper   
25 Other Articles  Others 
 Other Primary Products    
 Other Materials    
 Other Manufactured    
 Other    
Source: See Appendix B - Sources 
 
Note: made = "confeccionados" in the original statistics    
 manufactured = "manufacturados" in the original statistics    
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Figure 22: MS imports main trade partners - Share per country (%)  on total MS imports – 1875, 1885, 
1895, 1901, and 1912 
 
 
Source: See Appendix B - Sources 
 
 
Figure 23: LS imports main trade partners - Share per country (%)  on total LS imports – 1875, 1885, 1895, 
1901, and 1912 
 
 
Source: See Appendix B - Sources 
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Figure 24: PP imports main trade partners - Share per country (%)  on total PP imports – 1875, 1885, 1895, 
1901, and 1912 
 
 
Source: See Appendix B - Sources 
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Table 33: Representation of the Deutsche Überseeische and the Deutsche Südamerikanische Bank in 
exporting German companies in 1913 – Sectorial composition 
 
  Deutsche Übers. Bank 
Deutsche Südam. 
Bank 
Total 
SIC Industry Seats 
No. 
Companies 
Seats 
No. 
Companies 
Seats 
No. 
Companies 
1 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 Mining and quarrying 0 0 2 2 4 2 
3 Food, drink and tobacco 0 0 1 1 2 1 
4 
Coal and petroleum 
products 
3 2 1 1 7 3 
5 
Chemicals and allied 
trades 
0 0 2 1 3 1 
6 Metal manufacture 5 4 5 5 19 9 
7 Mechanical engineering 0 0 1 1 2 1 
8 Instrument engineering 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 Electrical engineering 2 2 0 0 4 2 
10 
Shipbuilding and marine 
engeering 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 Vehicles 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 Other metal 0 0 0 0 0 0 
13 Textiles 2 2 0 0 4 2 
14 Leather goods 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 Clothing and footwear 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 
Brick, pottery, glass and 
cement 
0 0 1 1 2 1 
17 Timber, frunishing 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 
Paper, printing and 
publishing 
1 1 0 0 2 1 
19 Other manufacturing 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 Construction 7 2 0 0 9 2 
21 Gas, electricity and water 7 3 3 2 15 5 
22 
Transport and 
communication 
0 0 1 1 2 1 
 Total 27 16 17 15 44 31 
 
Source: See Appendix B - Sources 
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Table 34: British hypothetical bank-connected and not bank-connected exports  – Share on total exports 
(%) and growth respective to the previous year (%) 
 
Year Share – Bank-
connected 
Share - Not 
connected 
Growth – Bank-
connected 
Growth - Not 
connected 
1875 45,10 54,90   
1885 60,83 39,17 67,80 39,13 
1895 42,04 57,96 -30,47 39,05 
1901 46,96 53,04 2,82 -18,58 
1912 56,64 43,36 75,95 64,51 
 
Source: See Appendix B - Sources 
 
 
Table 35: Robustness 1 – Difference-in-Difference estimation for German, British, US, French, and Belgian 
Exports to Argentina - 1875-1912  
  
DÜB 
(Equation 2.10) 
DÜB/SÜD 
(Equation 2.11) 
CON1B () -1.234***  
 (0.464)  
CON2B () 
 
-1.122*** 
 
 
(0.330) 
INTERV () 1.804*** 1.501*** 
 (0.396) (0.256) 
lnARGIMP () 0.936*** 0.938*** 
 
(0.0711) (0.0711) 
lnADV () -0.298 -0.266 
 
(0.257) (0.261) 
lnDIST() -12.22*** -11.66*** 
 
(2.316) (2.465) 
COUNTRY () YES YES 
PRODUCT () YES YES 
YEAR () YES YES 
Number of observations 4,650 4,650 
Method of estimation PPML PPML 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable in each column is the total value of German, British, US, French, and Belgian exports by 
product to Argentina. The sample includes the years 1875, 1885, 1895, 1901, 1912 and a total number of 217 
products in each year. The number of observations is reduced as for some products ad valorem year observations 
are missing. For the classification of products see section 3.3 and Data and Appendix B - Sources. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by product and year and are indicated in brackets. Sources: See Appendix B - Sources 
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Table 36: Robustness 2 – Pre-Treatment-test for the Difference-in-difference estimations 2.10 and 2.11 
 
 
(1) 
DÜB 
(2) 
DÜB/SÜD 
(3) 
DÜB 
(4) 
DÜB/SÜD 
CON1B () 18.43  -0.689*  
 (22.21)  (0.366)  
CON2B ()  18.54  -0.962* 
  (47.79)  (0.547) 
INTERV () -0.126 -0.169 -0.00951 0.387 
 (0.225) (0.236) (0.437) (0.479) 
lnARGIMP () 0.792*** 0.789*** 1.045*** 1.043*** 
 (0.196) (0.193) (0.109) (0.108) 
lnADV () -3.446* -3.512* -3.137** -3.075** 
 (1.931) (1.942) (1.366) (1.367) 
lnDIST()   -22.02 -11.66*** 
    (2.465) 
COUNTRY ()   YES YES 
PRODUCT () YES YES YES YES 
YEAR () YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 372 372 1,860 1,860 
Method of estimation PPML PPML PPML PPML 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable in the columns (1) and (2) is the total value of German exports to Argentina. The dependent variable 
in the columns (3) and (4) is the total value of German, British, US, French, and Belgian exports by product to Argentina. The 
variable lnDIST is the great circle distance between the respective capital cities of Germany, Great Britain, the USA, France, 
Belgium and Argentina in kilometres. The sample includes the years 1875, 1885 and a total number of 217 products in each 
year. The number of observations is reduced as for some products ad valorem year observations are missing. For the 
classification of products see section 3.3 and Data and Appendix B - Sources. The assumed pre-treatment period is year 1875, 
the assumed post-treatment period is year 1885. Robust standard errors are clustered by product and year and are indicated in 
brackets. Sources: See Appendix B -  Sources 
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Table 37: Descriptive Statistics  - Equations 2.1 to 2.9  (Gravity Models) 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Imports Total 165  4421324 1.34e+07 0 1.25e+08 
Imports HS 165  1313951 4951872 0 4.01e+07 
Imports LS 165  1162951 4283939 0 4.14e+07 
Total-EM 165  250.5115 331.1374 0 991.6 
Total-IM 165  60.08788 124.7085 0 788.6 
HS-EM 165  237.1788 352.8287 0 995.8 
HS-IM 165  203754.7 1852836 0 1.84e+07 
LS-EM 165  60.88547 778.4772 0 10000 
LS-IM 165  163.0331 1524.14 0 16889 
Ln(AdvW) 96  0.4452532 2.111282 0.009475 20.89228 
Ln(AdvW-HS) 96  0.1543823 0.0939575 0 0.4623242 
Ln(AdvW-LS) 96  0. 1988251 0.098224 0 0.502166 
Ln(wages) 70 4.334962 0.442622 3.332205 5.32301 
Ln(gdp) 140  14.94687 5.535815 6.654152 22.97855 
Ln(distance) 165  21.0262 1.21348 17.79252 22.98524 
No. of Banks 165  0.1393939 0.5727232 0 4 
 
 
Table 38: Descriptive Statistics - Equations 2.10 and 2.11 (Difference in Difference) 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
CON1B  1085 .1889401 .3916415 0 1 
CON2B 1085 .2304147 .4212925 0 1 
INTERV (DÜB) 1085 .1133641 .3171835 0 1 
INTERV (DÜB/SÜD) 1085 .1382488 .3453202 0 1 
lnARGIMP 1085 8.446188 6.374236 0 17.40847 
lnADV 930 .2270082 0.1119269 0 .8613707 
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6.1. Appendix C 
6.1.1. Sources 
The data on German and British imports and exports from and to Brazil are taken from the 
official Brazilian statistics Mappas estatisticos do commercio e navegação do Porto do Rio de 
Janeiro. Exercicio de 1880-81, 1885-86, 1890; Estatistica Importacao Brasil 1898; Anuario 
Estatistico do Brasil, 1903; Anuario Estatistico do Brasil, 1909-12, with the exeption of the 
data for the year 1870, which I consulted from Dedinger, Béatrice, et Paul Girard. 2017. « Exploring 
trade globalization in the long run: The RICardo project ». Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative 
and Interdisciplinary History 50 (1): 30-48 
The data on yearly coffee exports by company from Rio de Janeiro and by company and 
destination from Santos were collected from the Jornal do Comercio Retrospecto, the O 
Commercio de Sao Paolo and the The Brazilian Review.  
The information on the nationality of the exporting houses was collected from: Pereira 
da Silva, Gustavo (2015), “O predomínio das casas estrangeiras sobre a exportacao cafeeira 
em Santos no século XIX”, America Latina en la historia económica, vol. 22 no.3, Mexico; 
Rischbieter, Julia Laura (2011), “Mikro-Ökonomie der Globalisierung. Kaffee, Kaufleute und 
Konsumenten im Kaiserreich, 1870-1914”, Böhlau-Verlag, Köln, p. 130-131. 
The data on monthly credits provided by the Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland 
between 1888 and 1913 have been compiled from the official reports of the advisory board 
meetings (Aufsichtsratberichte) from 1888 to 1913, available at the Historische Archiv der 
Deutschen Bank, Frankfurt am Main – Aktenzeichen KA/799 - Brasilianische Bank für 
Deutschland - Sitzung des Aufsichtsrats - Sitzungssaal Norddeutsche Bank Hamburg.  
Exchange rates were extracted from the Handbook of World Exchange Rates, 1590-
1914 (Markus A. Denzel, Ashgate, 2010) 
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6.1.2. Tables and Graphs 
 
Figure 25: Brazilian coffee exports – Quantity (tonnes) and prices (fob prices, pound sterling) – 1880-1913 
 
 
Source: Absell and Tena Junguito, 2016 Appendix 1, with special thanks to Christopher Absell for providing the 
data 
 
 
Figure 26: Brazilian coffee exports – Share each month (%) on total quantity exported in year (saccas 
embarcadas)  – 1881 and 1913 
 
  
Source: See Appendix C – Sources 
 
Note:  One “sacca” equals 60 Kg of coffee. 
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Table 39: German and British banks and their branches in Brazil – 1913 
 
Name of Bank Branches in 
German  
Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland Bahia 
Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland Porto Alegre 
Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland Rio de Janeiro 
Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland Santos 
Brasilianische Bank für Deutschland Sao Paulo 
Deutsch Südamerikanische Bank Rio de Janeiro 
Deutsche Überseeische Bank Rio de Janeiro 
Deutsche Überseeische Bank Santos 
Deutsche Überseeische Bank Sao Paulo 
British  
London and Brazilian Bank, Limited Bahia 
London and Brazilian Bank, Limited Ceara 
London and Brazilian Bank, Limited Curityba 
London and Brazilian Bank, Limited Manaos 
London and Brazilian Bank, Limited Para 
London and Brazilian Bank, Limited Pernambuco 
London and Brazilian Bank, Limited Porto Alegre 
London and Brazilian Bank, Limited Rio de Janeiro 
London and Brazilian Bank, Limited Rio Grande do Sol 
London and Brazilian Bank, Limited Santos 
London and Brazilian Bank, Limited Sao Paulo 
London and River Plate Bank, Limited Bahia 
London and River Plate Bank, Limited Curityba 
London and River Plate Bank, Limited Para 
London and River Plate Bank, Limited Pernambuco 
London and River Plate Bank, Limited Rio de Janeiro 
London and River Plate Bank, Limited Santos 
London and River Plate Bank, Limited Sao Paulo 
London and River Plate Bank, Limited Victoria 
British Bank of South America, Limited Bahia 
British Bank of South America, Limited Monte Video 
British Bank of South America, Limited Rio de Janeiro 
British Bank of South America, Limited Sao Paulo 
Source: See Appendix A – Sources 
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Table 40: Total exports from Santos -  Share of exports by destination (% of total) – 1893-1913 
 
Year GER NL USA UK ESP ITA FRA 
REST 
EU 
REST 
LA 
REST 
1893 20,91 6,33 64,39 1,59 0,00 0,00 4,66 2,12 0,00 0,00 
1894 13,87 6,58 50,97 0,00 0,00 13,76 10,19 4,63 0,00 0,00 
1898 31,78 10,09 19,73 0,88 0,00 17,68 8,89 10,96 0,00 0,00 
1899 8,81 16,27 23,07 0,00 0,00 13,73 31,43 4,29 0,00 2,39 
1900 36,04 11,56 33,81 0,41 0,65 1,13 7,38 8,34 0,00 0,69 
1901 39,10 3,12 21,79 0,82 0,58 9,96 14,91 8,21 0,00 1,52 
1902 35,38 20,29 20,46 0,29 0,14 1,30 13,76 7,52 0,00 0,85 
1903 30,87 13,72 9,35 3,34 0,00 18,55 17,45 6,56 0,16 0,00 
1904 31,04 5,00 38,36 0,00 0,21 15,36 6,46 2,47 0,94 0,15 
1905 36,57 5,18 37,87 0,00 2,46 13,75 0,53 3,25 0,31 0,08 
1906 21,93 9,44 39,62 2,07 0,01 8,63 13,94 3,70 0,22 0,45 
1907 39,85 9,75 33,10 2,44 3,12 0,87 5,02 4,00 1,84 0,00 
1908 30,47 13,76 34,66 6,58 0,51 2,98 2,15 6,94 0,70 1,26 
1909 16,97 13,99 35,93 2,32 0,80 10,91 9,89 8,62 0,55 0,01 
1910 9,95 16,77 22,02 7,46 2,46 8,36 27,04 4,34 1,36 0,02 
1911 19,19 33,31 20,14 4,80 1,53 2,61 12,29 6,05 0,09 0,00 
1912 19,16 23,14 38,75 0,95 1,08 2,94 8,14 5,09 0,68 0,07 
1913 23,34 18,10 22,67 0,04 0,96 8,26 20,81 5,13 0,55 0,14 
Total 25,85 13,13 31,48 1,89 0,81 8,38 11,94 5,68 0,41 0,42 
Source: See Appendix C – Sources 
 
 
Table 41: Export companies financed by the Brasilianische Bank – Rio – 1889-1913 
 
Company Nationality 
Share 
credit 
1889-13  
(%) 
Active 
before 
1889 
Top 20 
ranking 
1880-88 
Share 
exports 
1880-88 
(%) 
Share 
exports 
1889-
13 
(%) 
Gustavo Trinks & C Germany 16,43 Yes 15 1,82 3,34 
E. Johnston & C UK 13,34 Yes 1 8,21 5,07 
Theodor Wille Germany 10,89 No - 0,00 8,64 
Naumann, Gepp & C UK 9,05 No - 0,00 0,24 
W.F. Mac Laughlin & C USA 7,82 No - 0,00 3,55 
Zenha Ramos & C - 5,83 Yes - 0,50 1,99 
Prado Chaves - 4,62 No - 0,00 0,12 
Karl Valais & C France 3,39 Yes 20 1,56 2,44 
Hard Rand & C USA 2,96 Yes 4 6,98 5,27 
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Rich. Riemer & C Germany 2,55 No - 0,00 1,27 
Ornstein & C Austria 2,45 No - 0,00 9,53 
Pinto & C - 2,32 Yes - 0,00 3,43 
Pierre Pradez & C - 1,92 No - 0,00 0,71 
Karl Krische & C Germany 1,74 No - 0,00 1,31 
Aretz & C USA 1,46 No - 0,00 0,51 
C.W. Gross & C - 1,09 Yes - 1,26 0,22 
Wille Schmilinsky &C Germany 0,95 Yes 10 3,15 1,75 
Empreza Industrial Brazileira Brazil 0,93 No - 0,00 0,25 
Eugen Urban Germany 0,93 No - 0,00 3,76 
C. Dabelow Germany 0,93 No - 0,00 0,86 
Dabelow & wilberg Germany 0,91 No - 0,00 0,54 
J.W. Doane USA 0,88 Yes 12 2,45 5,88 
Carlos Pareto - 0,76 No - 0,00 1,95 
E Pecher & C UK 0,69 Yes 9 3,39 0,72 
Companhia Geral Commercio 
e Industria 
Brazil 0,65 No - 0,00 0,23 
Heinrik Volk & C Germany 0,61 No - 0,00 0,19 
Athazde Mazrink Brazil 0,50 Yes - 0,00 0,00 
Steinwender Stoffregen & C USA 0,49 No - 0,00 0,88 
Matherson - 0,45 No - 0,00 0,24 
Frank Norton & C USA 0,43 No - 0,00 0,55 
August Leuba & C France 0,41 Yes - 0,89 0,44 
William Ford & C USA 0,38 Yes 19 1,56 0,00 
John Moore & C - 0,28 Yes - 0,13 0,44 
Okell Monrao & Wilson - 0,20 Yes - 0,12 0,31 
Correo Leite Brazil 0,19 Yes - 0,01 0,00 
Haupt, Biehn & C Germany 0,17 No - 0,00 0,06 
Frias & Irmaos Brazil 0,13 Yes - 0,04 0,01 
A.J. Freitas & C Brazil 0,10 Yes - 0,02 0,01 
Monteiro Hime & C - 0,07 Yes - 0,11 0,01 
Gustavo Gudgeon French 0,06 Yes - 0,03 0,11 
A Martins Siqueira & Irmao Brazil 0,04 Yes - 0,34 1,43 
Viuva Leonne Miranda & C Brazil 0,03 Yes - 0,10 0,00 
Total  100   32,68 68,25 
Source: See Appendix C – Sources 
 
Note: The share credit 1889-1913 (%) is a company´s share of total credit, which includes direct credits and discounted 
bills of exchange (see section 4.3), provided by the Brasilianische bank between 1889 and 1913 to the here listed 42 
coffee export houses in Rio. The Top 20 ranking 1880-88 indicates a company´s rank among the twenty largest export 
companies between 1880 and 1888, measured as the share of the total quantity of coffee exported by the 389 export 
companies operating in Rio during that time. The Share exports 1880-88 (%) and 1889-13 is a company´s share of the 
total quantity of coffee exported in Rio between 1880 and 1888, and 1889 and 1913, respectively. 
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Table 42: Export companies financed by the Brasilianische Bank – Santos – 1893-1913 
 
   
Share exports (%) to each country in total export of the respective company  
1893-1913 
Company     Nationality 
Share 
credit 
1893-
1913 
(%) 
GER NL USA UK ESP IT FRA 
REST 
OF 
EU 
REST 
LA 
REST 
Arbuckle Irmaos & C USA 18,71 0,00 0,00 100 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Theodor Wille Germany 17,40 27,98 23,08 21,81 0,37 0,50 16,98 3,55 4,19 0,00 1,53 
Naumann, Gepp & C UK 12,61 31,36 17,08 20,73 1,30 1,16 8,41 12,35 6,43 0,03 1,14 
Prado Chaves USA 7,93 16,45 18,84 31,16 1,52 2,35 5,17 18,86 5,51 0,07 0,07 
M. Wright & C - 6,21 29,41 26,26 26,90 1,98 0,06 3,90 6,23 5,25 0,00 0,00 
R. Alves Toledo & C - 3,79 19,64 9,67 42,41 0,33 0,17 3,90 13,80 2,00 8,08 0,00 
Hard Rand & C USA 3,78 10,20 15,48 49,56 1,57 0,43 9,96 5,70 6,94 0,16 0,00 
Ed. Johnston & C UK 3,28 30,54 8,40 33,08 3,21 0,35 8,51 11,59 3,48 0,78 0,07 
Cia. Krische Germany 2,99 43,64 8,90 23,59 0,31 1,31 3,40 9,00 6,84 2,85 0,15 
Diebold & C - 2,51 28,46 27,76 11,69 0,00 0,00 0,35 19,44 11,45 0,85 0,00 
Baldwin & C USA 2,32 13,72 1,58 47,10 0,63 0,79 3,70 24,21 8,18 0,08 0,00 
Levy & C USA 2,27 28,83 22,61 1,90 0,00 0,86 17,51 13,40 14,05 0,83 0,00 
Nossack & C Germany 1,57 27,92 14,05 10,56 0,50 6,71 9,66 19,75 9,92 0,73 0,20 
Zerrenner Bulow & C Germany 1,55 35,52 10,26 25,33 1,52 0,34 8,01 4,04 14,98 0,00 0,00 
Schmidt Trost & C Germany 1,48 68,31 3,45 0,89 0,00 0,89 9,69 14,43 2,00 0,27 0,08 
Henry Woltje & Co - 1,35 44,43 18,65 5,14 0,00 0,00 4,94 0,00 26,84 0,00 0,00 
J.W. Doane USA 1,19 23,23 7,46 35,41 0,92 0,00 7,64 17,68 4,35 0,00 3,30 
Goetz Hayn USA 1,02 19,64 13,85 32,13 0,00 0,00 7,11 20,01 7,25 0,00 0,00 
Barbosa & C - 0,99 24,00 16,21 49,13 0,00 0,00 3,80 4,46 2,03 0,37 0,00 
G. da Fonseca - 0,91 15,84 0,00 21,23 0,00 0,88 0,88 60,59 0,59 0,00 0,00 
Prado Lima - 0,85 46,98 9,22 0,00 0,00 1,68 28,49 0,00 13,64 0,00 0,00 
G. Trinks Germany 0,74 21,45 0,00 57,63 0,00 0,00 4,52 6,32 6,49 3,59 0,00 
Whitaker Brotero & C - 0,58 29,98 10,18 9,05 1,13 0,00 2,83 45,70 1,13 0,00 0,00 
Nathan & Co - 0,46 17,55 1,11 68,52 0,00 0,00 4,46 5,57 2,79 0,00 0,00 
S. Caldeira & C - 0,44 10,37 2,59 87,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Holworthy, Ellis & C UK 0,33 27,11 5,03 52,68 0,91 0,43 8,78 0,43 4,64 0,00 0,00 
Julian Hangwitz Germany 0,29 21,87 0,00 46,86 0,00 0,00 0,00 6,25 25,02 0,00 0,00 
Diogenes Ferreira - 0,26 22,19 13,87 0,00 0,00 2,08 27,18 0,00 34,67 0,00 0,00 
Geo. Rosenheim Germany 0,23 35,36 2,69 9,31 6,89 0,00 3,77 23,68 17,80 0,51 0,00 
Rose & Knowles - 0,22 36,63 2,60 55,76 0,00 0,00 4,30 0,73 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Roxo & C - 0,22 30,54 17,64 14,08 0,00 1,26 0,74 27,75 5,99 2,01 0,00 
August Leuba - 0,21 37,23 3,60 0,00 0,00 0,00 7,24 32,63 19,29 0,00 0,00 
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Albert Kussner Germany 0,20 100 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Georg Frey - 0,19 0,00 0,00 0,00 61,29 0,00 0,00 37,76 0,95 0,00 0,00 
Ford USA 0,17 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 100 0,00 0,00 
L. Schweitzer Germany 0,15 0,00 0,00 100 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Leite & Santos Brasil 0,15 12,43 10,36 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,14 8,29 64,79 0,00 0,00 
A.Schirmer Germany 0,10 42,40 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 5,08 0,00 52,52 0,00 0,00 
Heyer Orl - 0,10 91,04 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 8,96 0,00 0,00 
Muller & Co Germany 0,10 66,17 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 14,50 0,00 19,33 0,00 0,00 
Rombauer & C Germany 0,10 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 100 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Carl Hellwig Germany 0,06 18,33 7,92 30,82 0,00 0,00 3,90 33,69 5,33 0,00 0,00 
Total 
 
100 82,94 25,71 14,37 31,28 1,11 0,91 8,08 11,67 6,01 0,34 
Source: See Appendix C – Sources 
 
Note: The share credit 1893-13 (%) is a company´s share of the total credit, which includes direct credits and discounted bills of 
exchange (see section ??), provided by the Brasilianische bank between 1893 and 1913 to the here listed 42 coffee export houses 
in Santos. The share of exports to a country (%) is the share of a company´s export to that country in the total quantity of coffee 
exported by the same company between 1893 and 1913. 
 
 
Table 43: Descriptive Statistics - Equation 3.1 (Logit Rio) 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Rct 8947 .0316307 .1750247 0 1 
Company´s Size 8947 .0024728 .0140564 0 0.3298309 
Active before 1889 (Act_89) 8947 .6303789 .4827291 0 1 
German company (Ger_Comp) 8947 .0482843 .2143784 0 1 
SIZE*Act_89 8947 .001553 .0097336 0 0.2092386 
Ger_Comp*Act_89 8947 .0179949 .1329399 0 1 
Ger_Comp*SIZE 8947 .0008254 .0101391 0 0.3289309 
 
 
Table 44: Descriptive Statistics -  Equation 3.2 (Logit Santos) 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Sct 2584 .0734649 .2609458 0 1 
Company´s Size 2584 .006506 .0236017 0 0.276608 
German company (Ger_Comp) 2584 .1122076 .3156794 0 1 
Export to Germany (Exp_Ger) 2584 .1140351 .317912 0 1 
Ger_Comp*SIZE 2584 .0018549 .0125642 0 0.1694341 
Exp_Ger*SIZE 2584 .0049327 .0214225 0 0.2766008 
Appendix 
 
Wilfried Kisling – Trade finance in historical perspective 149 / 149 
 
Table 45: Robustness - Pre-Treatment Test for the Difference-in-Difference estimations 3.3 and 3.4 
 
  (1) 
Model-I+II 
FIN () 6.116*** 
 (0.844) 
INTERV () 0.305 
 (0.195) 
YEAR () Yes 
COMP () Yes 
Number of observations 3.112 
Method of estimation PPML 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable in each column is the quantity of coffee exported by company and year between 
1880 and 1913 in Rio de Janeiro. Sample includes the years from 1880 to 1888. The observations for the year 
1885 are missing due to the lack of available data. The assumed year of entry in 1885. Robust standard errors 
are clustered by company and year and are indicated in brackets. Sources: See Appendix C – Sources 
 
 
Table 46: Descriptive Statistics -  Equations 3.3 to 3.6 (Difference in Difference Model I - IV) 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Xct 12059 16671.74 916440.3 0 1.01e+08 
FINct 12059 .1079692 .3103543 0 1 
FINct – occasionally 12059 .0212202 .1441235 0 1 
FINct – frequently 12059 .0230438 .1500487 0 1 
FINct – continuously 12059 .0070458 .0836462 0 1 
INTERVct 12059 .0801061 .2714687 0 1 
INTERVct – occasionally 12059 .045756 .2089641 0 1 
INTERVct – frequently 12059 .0285975  .1666792 0 1 
INTERVct – continuously 12059 .0057195 .0754139 0 1 
Xbt 7626 8670.751 46097.21 0 1159349 
FINbt 7626 .1097561 .312606 0 1 
FINbt – occasionally 7626 .0650407 .2466137 0 1 
FINbt – frequently 7626 .0325203 .1773891 0 1 
FINbt – continuously 7626 .0121951 .1097633 0 1 
INTERVbt 7626 .0814319 .2735152 0 1 
INTERVbt – occasionally 7626 .048256 .2143207 0 1 
INTERVbt – frequently 7626 .024128 .1534565 0 1 
INTERVbt – continuously 7626 .009048 .0946958 0 1 
 
